In addition to its No Dong MRBMs, North Korea possesses the liquid/solid-propellant Taepo Dong 1. An initial crude attempt at developing a long-range delivery system, this missile is capable of reaching a maximum range of 2,000 km, and can deliver a low- to medium-yield nuclear warhead. In 1998, North Korea test launched a Taepo Dong 1 missile over Japan, thus demonstrating that it was serious about obtaining a delivery device for nuclear weapons. However, the ultimate goal of this program--a missile that can directly threaten the United States--was achieved by its successor, the Taepo Dong 2. Approximately 20 Taepo Dong 1 missiles are assumed to be active, although the exact number remains uncertain.[1]
Jane's Defence Weekly has also indicated that North Korea is developing a new medium-to-intermediate-range missile. This new system is believed to be based primarily on the Russian SS-N-6 (R-27) submarine-launched missile, and is believed to be capable of striking U.S. military forces in Guam and Japan and perhaps the continental United States.[2] As further evidence, the South Korean newspaper Chosun Ilbo added that North Korea is building new missile bases for mobile IRBMs. U.S. intelligence satellites have also identified some 10 new ballistic missiles and launchers at two new locations in Yangdok and Hochon. The Chosun Ilbo speculated that these new missiles may be of Russian origin. Russia has since denied the possibility of transferring such technology to North Korea.[3]
Short-Range Ballistic Missiles
North Korea's short-range arsenal includes the Hwasong-5, Hwasong-6, and the Hwasong-7, all of which are 'Scud' variants. The road-mobile Hwasong-5 has a range of 300 km and carries a single 985 kg warhead that can either be high explosive, chemical, biological, or submunitions. It was based on the Russian-built 'Scud B,' which North Korea purchased from Egypt. The Hwasong-5 can be launched from a North Korean-built copy of the Russian designed 'Scud B' Transporter-Erector-Launcher (TEL) vehicle or from converted commercial trucks. An estimated total of 300 Hwasong-5 missiles have been manufactured.[4] North Korea also possesses the road-mobile Hwasong-6 ('Scud C' variant) and the Hwasong-7 ('Scud D' variant), which represent a substantial improvement over the Hwasong 5. The two SRBMs have ranges of 500 km and 700 km, respectively, which gives North Korea the ability to bombard all targets in South Korea critical to a Communist invasion.[5]
In addition to its ability to attack South Korea with SRBMs, North Korea is capable of loading one of its Hwasong missiles aboard a merchant ship, and launching it against a U.S. coastal city from close range. In 2001, U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld warned of this very threat, stating that an unnamed rogue states has tested a ship-launched missile. Former Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz has also discussed this scenario, noting that it would allow rogue nations or terrorist organizations to attack the United States "without fingerprints," for they would most likely scuttle the cargo ship after the SRBM has been launched.[6] In 2004, military specialist Richard D. Fisher noted that the ship-launch scenario remains North Korea's "simplest option" of attacking the United States.[7]
Proliferation
Beyond its offensive capability, North Korea is also a major proliferator of ballistic missile technology and expertise. Since 1980, it has supplied Middle Eastern countries, such as Iran, Iraq, Yemen, and Syria, but also Egypt and Libya, with over 400 Scud-class ballistic missiles.[8] In recent years, it has been reported North Korea has offered to provide these countries with two versions of the long-range Taepo Dong 2.[9] It has also assisted Syria in setting up facilities for production and testing.[10] In addition, strong evidence also exists that Libya purchased 1.7 metric tons of uranium for one nuclear bomb from North Korea.[11] And as Admiral Thomas B. Fargo, Commander of the U.S. Pacific Command, testified before the House Armed Services Committee in April 2004, there is real danger that North Korea could supply terrorist groups, such as Al-Qaeda, with nuclear and ballistic missile technology.[12]
[1] Lennox, 128-129.
[2] Jane's Defence Weekly, 3 August 2004.
[3] Chosun Ilbo, 4 May 2004.
[4] Lennox, 122-123.
[5] Lennox, 124-125.
[6] Paul Wolfowitz, Remarks at Frontiers of Freedom, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Washington, DC (24 October 2002), available at http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/2002/s20021024-depsecdef.html, accessed on 29 August 2005.
[7] Bill Gertz and Roman Scarborough, "Inside the Ring," The Washington Times, 3 September 2004.
[8] Lennox, 122-123.
[9] "N. Korea Puts Long-Range Missile on the Market," WorldTribune.com, 5 May 2004.
[10] Lennox, 124-125.
[11] David E. Sanger and William J. Broad, "Evidence Is Cited Linking Koreans to Libya Uranium," The New York Times, 23 May 2004.
[12] Bill Gertz, "N. Korea, Al Qaeda Union A Threat," The Washington Times, 1 April 2004.
