| Country: |
People's Republic of China |
| Alternate Name: |
JL-1/JL-21/Giant Wave-1 |
| Class: |
SLBM |
| Basing: |
Submarine-launched |
| Length: |
10.70 m |
| Diameter: |
1.40 m |
| Launch Weight: |
14700 kg |
| Payload: |
Single warhead, 600 kg |
| Warhead: |
Nuclear 250 or 500 kT |
| Propulsion: |
2-stage solid |
| Range: |
2150 km |
| Status: |
Operational |
| In Service: |
1987 |
Details
The CSS-N-3, designated JL-1 by the PRC, is an medium-range, submarine-launched, solid propellant ballistic missile. The CSS-N-3 was designed by the People’s Republic of China (PRC) as its first submarine-launched ballistic missile. It was developed for use on the Xia-class nuclear submarine, and is believed to have been based upon technology taken from the
CSS-2. In order to develop an effective submarine-based nuclear force, the development of a solid propellant engine was considered a crucial element in the development of the CSS-N-3. As a result, missile development lasted until the mid-1980’s. The CSS-N-3 was used as the basis for the
CSS-5 land-based missile.(1)
The deployment of the missile on a submarine significantly increases the survivability of the missiles onboard, as nuclear submarines can be quickly moved and easily hidden. The mobility of a submarine could allow the missiles to be launched from locations close to the target, an advantage which would dramatically increase the effective missile range of the PRC ballistic missile force against targets on the East Coast of the United States. However, unlike the
CSS-NX-5 SLBM under development, the CSS-N-3 would have to leave PRC waters to conduct a strike against the United States, drawing it away from the protection of PRC military forces. Moreover, China only developed the CSS-N-3 for deployment aboard their Xia-class submarines. Though as many as three Xia-class submarines may have been built, only one is believed to have reached operational capacity. It can hold up to 12 CSS-N-3 missiles, but is not known to have ever conducted a deterrent patrol. Some speculation suggests that technical problems kept the Xia-class submarine from ever reaching full-operating capacity, thus leaving the CSS-N-3 similarly inoperable without a launch platform.(2)
The CSS-N-3 has a range of 2,150 km (1,336 miles) with an accuracy of 700 m CEP obtained from an inertial guidance system. It delivers a payload of a single warhead that weighs up to 600 kg, which is believed to carry a 250 or 500 kT yield nuclear device. As the CSS-5 is essentially a modified CSS-N-3, it is likely that the CSS-N-3 can be equipped with the same high explosive, EMP, submunition and chemical warheads. The CSS-N-3 has a launch weight of 14,700 kg, a length of 10.7 m and a width of 1.4 m. It uses a two-stage solid propellant engine which initiates after the missile leaves the water. The missile is cold-launched from a submarine canister.(3)
The CSS-N-3 entered development in 1967, though progress was slow due to difficulties mastering solid propellant technologies. It was first seen in a Beijing military parade in October 1984, with three test launches occurring in 1985. A multiple (probably three) missile test launch occurred in August 2001, showing that the PRC could successfully launch simultaneous strikes from one submarine. The CSS-N-3 entered operation in 1987 onboard a Xia-class submarine, with the first successful operational test launch in 1988. There are believed to be 15 to 20 CSS-N-3 missiles remaining.(4) These missiles may be stored on the single Xia-class submarine or possibly stored in caves near the submarine facility.(5) An upgraded version of the missile, the JL-1A , probably entered service around the same time as its land-based counterpart, the
DF-21A in 1996. Some reports suggest that the Xia-class submarine was outfitted for these newer missiles – which would leave the original missile without a launch platform. The Xia-class submarine will probably be replaced by the Type 094 submarine under construction, which will be equipped with the
JL-2 intercontinental-range SLBM.(6)
Footnotes
1.
Jane’s Strategic Weapons Systems, Issue 50, (Surrey: Jane’s Information Group, January 2009), 36-37.
2. Hans M. Kristensen, Robert S. Norris, Matthew G. McKinzie, “Chinese Nuclear Forces and U.S. Nuclear War Planning,” The Federation of American Scientists & the Natural Resources Defense Council, November 2006, p. 46 and 79-81, available at
http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/china/Book2006.pdf, accessed on 23 July 2010; “Annual Report to Congress: Military Power of the People’s Republic of China 2009,” Office of the Secretary of Defense, p. 24, available at
http://www.defense.gov/pubs/pdfs/China_Military_Power_Report_2009.pdf, accessed on 23 July 2010.
3. Jane’s.
4. ibid.
5. Hans M. Kristensen, et. al., p. 82.
6.
Jane’s.
2009 Report on Chinese Military Power
March 26, 2009 :: Department of Defense :: News
The Defense Department this week released its 2009 report, Military Power of the People's Republic of China, as mandated by Congress. The annual report describes China's continued development and deployment of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), the development of a new class of nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines, and the steady increase of medium range ballistic missiles near both the China-India border and the Chinese coast near Taiwan. China also continues to pursue both counterspace and cyberwarfare capabilities, which could threaten America's considerable reliance upon space and electronic assets.
As it does every year, the Chinese government reacted negatively to the report. Foreign Ministry spokesman Qin Gang suggested that the United States "drop the Cold War thinking and prejudices, stop releasing such China military reports and stop the groundless accusations over China."
Ballistic and Cruise Missiles
China, the report observes, "has the most active land-based ballistic and cruise missile program in the world."
One highlight of China's missile efforts is the development of an anti-ship variant of the CSS-5 ballistic missile. This anti-ship missile has a considerable range, of some 1,500 km. Its final stage is designed for maneuverable reentry, making its target more difficult to anticipate, and thus complicating defense against the missile. Such a missile could enhance the Chinese ability to attack ships at sea, including for example American aircraft carriers in the Taiwan Strait.
Unchanged from the 2008 report, China continues to deploy road-mobile solid-fueled ICBMs—most notably the DF-31A, which brings within range any location in the continental United States. The DF-31 and DF-31A are the newest and most sophisticated ICBMs in China's arsenal. Their mobility and solid-fuel engines also make them among the most survivable.
The Pentagon's estimate of China's inventory of CSS-2, CSS-3, CSS-4, DF-31, DF-31A and CSS-5 ballistic missiles remains unchanged in number from last year. China has, however, increased its inventory since 2007 of CSS-6s (from 315-355 to 350-400), of CSS-7s (from 675-715 to 700-750), and of DH-10 cruise missiles (from 50-250 to 150-350).
The JL-2 submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) is still being developed. Once completed, the JL-2 will be deployed aboard new JIN-class (Type 094) submarines. With a range of 7,200 km, the JL-2 would give China its "first credible sea-based nuclear strike capability."
China's industrial ability to produce and upgrade short- and medium-range ballistic missiles has also increased. The Pentagon estimates China could significantly increase the number of short range missiles it produces each year, and could even double the annual output of medium range missiles. The increased production capability may be designed to create a missile export market, thereby proliferating such systems abroad.
China continues to expand the force opposite Taiwan; seven brigades are now stationed nearby, comprising a total of 1,050-1,150 CSS-6 and CSS-7 short range missiles. China continues to augment its missiles within striking distance of Taiwan at the "rate of more than 100 per year."
Along its border with India, China has replaced its older liquid-fueled nuclear-capable CSS-3 intermediate range missiles with more sophisticated solid-fueled CSS-5 medium range missiles.
China continues to produce and purchase an array of sophisticated and accurate cruise missiles, including the DH-10 and YJ-62 land-attack cruise missiles and the Russian SS-N-22/SUNBURN supersonic air-launched cruise missile. The SS-N-27B/SIZZLER supersonic air-launched cruise missile is placed on China's KILO-class diesel electric submarines purchased from Russia. The YJ-62C, a new variant of the YJ-62, has a range of 150 nautical miles; China has reportedly deployed 120 of these to naval bases near Taiwan.
Submarines and Ships
China's growing submarine fleet could begin to pose a threat to the United States navy. Two new SHANG-class (Type 093) nuclear-powered attack submarines and one JIN-class (Type 094) submarine, previously scheduled to enter service last year, are now operational. The JIN-class is of particular interest, as it will be the deployment vehicle for the JL-2 ballistic missile now in development.
These newer submarines will supplement China's four older HAN-class nuclear attack submarines and China's one XIA-class sub. The DoD estimates that China has 13 SONG-class (Type 039) diesel-electric attack submarines, designed to carry the YJ-82 (CH-SS-N-7) anti-ship cruise missile. The next generation attack submarine is the YUAN-class SS: one of these is already operational and another is undergoing sea trials. Judging from China's purchase of diesel engines from Germany, the report estimates that China plans to build up to 15 additional YUAN-class attack submarines.
China's guided-missile destroyers have been hardened and are being given anti-aircraft capabilities, including both Russian and indigenous surface to air missiles (SAMs). These include the Russian SA-N-20 long-range SAM and China's own medium-range HHQ-16, a vertically launched naval SAM under development.
Space and Counterspace
Since China successfully tested a direct-ascent anti-satellite (ASAT) weapon in January 2007 using a ballistic missile, China has continued to pursue ASAT capabilities. The 2009 report describes China's interest in counterspace systems as "more than theoretical. In addition to the ‘kinetic kill' capability demonstrated by the ASAT test, the PLA is developing the ability to jam, blind, or otherwise disable satellites and their terrestrial support infrastructure."
China placed fifteen satellites into orbit in 2008, including four new remote sensing satellites, a manned spacecraft and a companion satellite, three communications satellites, and two satellites for meteorology. In April 2008, China launched its first data relay satellite, the TianLian-1.
Construction has begun for a new rocket launch facility near Wenchang to eventually place heavier payloads in space using its March V booster rocket (the world's largest) still in development.
China's first lunar probe, the Chang'e-1, continues to operate successfully. Its successor will launch in 2009 and will survey the moon surface. China, however, continues to "remain silent about the military applications of [its] space programs and counterspace activities."
Cyberwarfare
China continues to experiment with cyberwarfare. The PRC appears to have been the source of numerous cyber intrusions during 2008, including against computer systems owned by the U.S. Government. These hacks were intended to extract information rather than attack, but the logistics and skill-set required for each activity are similar.
Spending
China's defense spending grew 18% in 2008. China reports its annual military budget as $60 billion, but this number is widely recognized as understated. Pentagon estimates of actual military spending range from $105 to $150 billion. (Article, Link)
» More stories on: Analysis, China, Cruise Missiles, Taiwan
» Missile details: CSS-3 (DF-4), CSS-4 (DF-5), CSS-4 (DF-5A), CSS-5 (DF-21), CSS-5 Mod 2 (DF-21A/B), CSS-6 (DF-15/M-9), CSS-7 (DF-11), CSS-7 Mod 2 (DF-11A), CSS-8 (M-7), CSS-9 (DF-31/DF-31A), CSS-N-3 (JL-1), CSS-N-3 (JL-1A), CSS-NX-5/CSS-NX-4 (JL-2)
