| Country: |
North Korea |
| Associated Country: |
Russia |
| Alternate Name: |
Hwasong 5 |
| Class: |
SRBM |
| Basing: |
Road mobile |
| Length: |
10.94 m m |
| Diameter: |
0.88 m m |
| Launch Weight: |
5860 kg |
| Payload: |
Single warhead, 985 kg |
| Warhead: |
HE, chemical, submunitions |
| Propulsion: |
Single-stage liquid |
| Range: |
300 km km |
| Status: |
Operational |
| In Service: |
1986 |
Details
The Hwasong-5 is a short-range, road mobile, liquid propellant ballistic missile. It is the North Korean ‘Scud B’ variant. It was designed from Russian built ‘Scud B’ missiles purchased from Egypt and reverse engineered. It can be launched from a North Korean built copy of the Russian designed ‘Scud B’ Transporter-Erector-Launcher (TEL) vehicle or from converted commercial trucks. It is likely equipped with an inertial guidance system.
The warheads on the North Korean ‘Scuds’ are probably HE, but it is also possible they have been fitted with chemical and biological weapons. The relative crudeness of the Scud design makes it unlikely that North Korea will equip it with a nuclear warhead; however, the design is fully compatible for such an addition. These systems are road mobile and well hidden in the mountainous terrain of North Korea. These missiles can easily reach their targets in Seoul, the capitol of South Korea. As their limited accuracy restricts their use to targeting civilian population centers, this is likely to be the extent of their deployment.
The North Korean Hwasong-5 has a length of 10.94 m, a diameter of 0.88 m, and a launch weight of 5,860 kg. Its payload carries a single warhead that can either be 985 kg HE, chemical, or submunitions. It has a range of 300 km (186 miles) with an accuracy of 450 m CEP. It uses a single-stage liquid propellant engine.
Development on the Hwasong-5 started in 1981 with the importation of a small number of Russian ‘Scud B’ missiles from Egypt, with flight testing beginning in 1984. Since then 7 flight tests have been reported while only three have been successful. It entered active service in 1986. The North Koreans have built an estimated total of 300 ‘Scud B’ missiles as well as the mobile launch systems, ending production in 1991 or 1992. A 2006 US report estimated the total number of 'Scud B,' 'Scud C,' and 'Scud D' missiles around 600. Reports indicate that there were some 120 ‘Scud B’ variants and 20 mobile launchers exported to Iran, as well as the setup of a manufacturing facility.
North Korea has been one of the primary nations for missile proliferation and it is believed that it has exported or planned to export ‘Scud B’ variants to Republic of Congo, Cuba, Ethiopia, Egypt, Iraq, Iran, Syria, Libya, UAR, Vietnam, and Yemen.(1)
Footnotes
- Duncan Lennox, Jane’s Strategic Weapons Systems 46 (Surrey: Jane’s Information Group, January 2007), 92-94.
Brown and Schlesinger on Need for Conventionally Armed ICBMs
May 22, 2006 :: Washington Post :: Analysis
Harold Brown and James Schlesinger, two former U.S. secretaries of defense, today published an op-ed in The Washington Post in support of deploying conventional warheads on U.S. ICBMs. The article begins with a detailed description of the very type of situation that would require such warheads.
Within the past hour, a terrorist organization, known to have acquired several nuclear weapons, has been observed by a U.S. imaging system loading the weapons onto vehicles and preparing to leave for an unknown destination. A delay of even an hour or two in launching a U.S. strike on that location could mean the group would depart, contact might be lost, and the weapons would be smuggled into the United States or an allied nation and detonated.
… If the terrorists were far from U.S. aircraft or cruise missiles, the only option available to the president would be to order the use of a ballistic missile—a land-based Minuteman or submarine-based Trident D5—either one of which could hit a target almost anywhere on the globe within a half-hour. One big problem, though: At present, all of these missiles are equipped only with nuclear warheads.
Would the president order a preventive nuclear strike in such circumstances? It’s conceivable, but very unlikely. There would still be doubts as to whether the intelligence was accurate, and even if it was, the consequences of an unprecedented action of this kind might well be regarded as unacceptable—in terms of the risk to innocent lives, of environmental damage and of the expected political repercussions around the world.
Brown and Schlesinger argue that the increasing likelihood of “scenarios requiring prompt, precise, non-nuclear strikes” justifies the Pentagon’s move to replace the nuclear warheads on two of the Trident D5 missiles on every strategic submarine with new highly accurate, conventional warheads. They note, however, that the proposal has been met with strong opposition, both domestically and internationally.
Some have argued that it is unwise to substitute conventional warheads for nuclear ones on strategic submarines even if it’s only on two missiles per submarine. They fear it could be the beginning of a wholesale attempt to replace nuclear capabilities with conventional weapons. Given that submarine-based warheads constitute roughly two-thirds of the U.S. deterrent, and are the component best able to survive, these capabilities should not be compromised, they maintain. But the concept does not require a reduction in submarine-based warheads. Additional nuclear warheads would be added to the remaining nuclear-armed missiles on each submarine to keep the number constant.
Others assert that mistakes could be made in the action messages conveyed to the submarines or that, for some other reason, the granting of a dual mission to strategic submarines could compromise the strict controls that ensure that nuclear missiles are not launched inadvertently. But the Navy has worked out both procedural and physical measures that will avoid any such problems, and it has high credibility in this regard. For decades during the Cold War the Navy maintained both conventional and nuclear versions of air defense missiles, cruise missiles, torpedoes and bombs on its ships and submarines without serious incident.
Still others are concerned that the launch of even one long-range ballistic missile, nuclear-armed or not, could trigger an adverse reaction from Russia and even a counter-launch if Russian leaders feared that they themselves were under attack. Past experience indicates that detection of a single missile launch (especially from a submarine operating area), even if detected and unannounced, might raise a diplomatic issue, but it wouldn’t trigger a military response. In any case, Russian leaders could be notified and the reasons for the strike disclosed as the missile neared its target.
(Article, Link)
» More stories on: Analysis
» Missile details: Scud B variant
Activity at North Korean Missile Base
October 27, 2004 :: The Chosun Ilbo (S. Korea) :: News
The South Korean Chosun Ilbo newspaper reports today that American, Japanese, and South Korean governments have observed increased activity at the Chongju missile base some 100km north of Pyongyang. The paper quotes a “high ranking” South Korean government source as saying on October 26 that
Beginning two to three days ago, North Korea has been showing moves that appear to be an attempt to test fire No Dong I and Scud Missiles, including the movement of a Scud missile mobile launcher from a missile base in Chongju, Northern Pyongan Province.
East Asia Intel reports that U.S. intelligence officials speculate that North Korea could attempt a launch so as to influence the approaching U.S. presidential election.
The Russian Itar Tass news agency quickly responded to the report with another, well-placed source in the North Korean government, who speculated that missile activity did not likely indicate any missile preparations, but was probably merely designed to be a response to the multi-country naval exercise currently taking place near Japan. The Russian paper quotes the North Korean as noting that, “If the Korean People’s Democratic Republic really intended to launch a missile, it would launch an anti-ship missile as usual from a base located on the Eastern coast."
North Korea’s Scuds and No Dongs are both believed to be derived from Russian missiles.
Similar reports of activity at North Korean missile bases also occurred at this time last month. (Link)
» Sep. 26: Increased activity at North Korean bases
» More stories on: North Korea
» Missile details: No-dong 1, No-dong 2, Scud B variant, Scud C variant
