| Country: |
Russian Federation |
| Alternate Name: |
Serb, R-27 |
| Class: |
SLBM |
| Basing: |
Submarine launched |
| Length: |
9.00 m |
| Diameter: |
1.50 m |
| Launch Weight: |
14200 kg |
| Payload: |
Single warhead (Mod 1 and 2); 3 MRV (Mod 3) |
| Warhead: |
Nuclear 1 MT (Mod 1 and 2); 3 at 200 kT (Mod 3). |
| Propulsion: |
2-stage liquid |
| Range: |
Mod 1 - 2500 km, Mod 2/3 - 3000 km |
| Status: |
Obsolete |
| In Service: |
1968-1996 |
Details
Russian Designation: R-27
The SS-N-6 was an intermediate-range, submarine-launched, liquid propellant ballistic missile. It represented a considerable leap forward in the Soviet Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile (SLBM), incorporating a second-stage engine, vastly superior range and accuracy, and Multiple Re-entry Vehicles (MRV). It used storable liquid propellants with a pre-launch time of roughly 10 minutes and a missile that could be launched from a submarine with an interval of 8 seconds between launches. It used an inertial guidance system.
There were three major versions of the SS-N-6, with a fourth version designed for attacking ship surveillance radars was cancelled during the design phase. Like all SLBMs, the purpose of the SS-N-6 was to place hidden nuclear missiles within close range of their targets while maintaining secrecy. The SS-N-6 was designed to destroy strategic land targets, but with its relatively limited (but still greatly improved) accuracy it could only really engage cities and other soft targets. The longer range enabled the submarine to strike US targets from well outside the range of anti-submarine defenses, even as far as some Russian territorial waters. It provided an effective pre-emptive and reprisal nuclear force.
The SS-N-6 had a launch weight of 14,200 and carried a payload of 650 kg. It was 9.0 m long and 1.5 m wide. The Mod 1 and 2 were equipped with single nuclear warheads with 1 MT yields. The Mod 3 could deploy three 200 kT MRV warheads against a target area. The Mod 1 had a range of 2,500 km and an accuracy limitation of 1,900 m CEP. The Mod 2 and 3 used a superior design that increases the range to 3,000 km (1,864 miles) and the accuracy to 1,300 m CEP. The SS-N-6 used a two-stage liquid propellant engine according to some accounts, a single stage by others.
The SS-N-6 began development in 1962 with flight tests beginning in 1966. The SS-N-6 Mod 1 entered service in the Soviet Union in 1968, with the Mod 2 and 3 entering in 1974. A total of 600 missiles were built and at the peak SS-N-6 missiles were carried on 34 boats. The SS-N-6 missiles were deployed on ‘Yankee 1’ submarines. This had been reduced to 12 boats and 192 missiles by 1991, and two boats and 32 missiles by December 1994. The last SS-N-6 compatible submarine was decommissioned in 1996.(1)
Footnotes
- Duncan Lennox, Jane’s Strategic Weapons Systems 46 (Surrey: Jane’s Information Group, January 2007), 583.
Overall Status and Numbers of Russian Forces
October 11, 2005 :: News
Russianforces.org reports on the recent START exchange data supplied by Russia on its ballistic missiles still in service:
In October 2005 the Russian strategic forces included 815 strategic delivery platforms, which can carry up to 3479 nuclear warheads.
[The] Strategic Rocket Forces have 545 operational missile systems that include missiles that can carry 1955 warheads. These include 85 R-36MUTTH and R-36M2 (SS-18) missiles, 129 UR-100NUTTH (SS-19) missiles, 291 road-mobile Topol (SS-25) systems, and 40 silo-based Topol-M (SS-27) systems.
There are, besides these, a number of sea-based missiles. (Article, Link)
» More stories on: Nuclear Weapons, Russia
» Missile details: SS-19 Mod 2, SS-20, SS-21 B, SS-N-5, SS-N-6
Interview: Ivanov on Chinese Relations, New Strategic Weapons
September 6, 2005 :: BBC Worldwide Monitoring :: News
Russian Defense Minister Sergey Ivanov gave a rare television interview, for the “Vesti Podrobnosti” television program on the RTR network, discussing the recent joint military exercise with China, Russian military doctrine and policy, and long term plans for Russian strategic forces. Comments of particular interest included Ivanov’s discussion of the “geopolitical” significance of Russian military exercises with China: that the exercises represented a certain “certain qualitative shift” in relations, and that China is a “strategic partner.” Ivanov seemed to bristle at suggestions that Russia was out of line to engage in such exercises: “we are, excuse me, a sovereign state and did hold and will hold military exercises with whoever we like.”
But also of interest are his comments about Russia’s strategic nuclear forces. When asked by the interviewer about “new weapons” to be the “object of pride of the Russian armed forces,” Ivanov’s response seemed curious, and perhaps was directed less to the Russian television-watching public and more to the American defense community. Ivanov stressed in particular the importance of remarks made by President Putin “about a year ago” at the Russian launch facility at Plesetsk. The remarks referenced are likely those Putin made at Plesetsk in February 2004, in conjunction with Russia’s own, major, strategic wargames. Putin, Ivanov said, “was absolutely right when he said that every comma, every letter and every word in it had a particular significance. I still cannot expand on the matter but we are seriously working on the development of fundamentally different types of weapons, which will ensure for us reliable and guaranteed security after 60 years, after 70 years, easily.”
If it is this speech by Putin to which Ivanov referred, then he meant to underscore the revolutionary quality of the alleged maneuverable (perhaps hypersonic) warheads which could be launched by ballistic missiles, and which pose a major impediment to any American ballistic missile systems which are designed to intercept in the midcourse phase or later. Only a boost phase defense, which can destroy the launcher before it can release the maneuverable warhead or any decoys and countermeasures, could defend against such a threat. It is likely this ability in which Ivanov resides hope that Russia can maintain its offensive nuclear ability to strike the United States for the next 60 years, if the United States continues its decades-long delay of the deployment of strategic defenses.
Some excerpts from the Ivanov interview: (More »»»)
» February 8, 2005: Update on February 2004 test of maneuverable warhead
» More stories on: Maneuverable Warheads, Russia
» Missile details: SS-N-6, Taep'o-dong 2
Solovtsov Gives Overview of Russia’s Strategic Nuclear Forces
August 4, 2005 :: Interfax :: News
Colonel General Nikolai Solovtsov, head of Russia’s Strategic Missile Forces (RVSN), has laid out the military’s view of the overall role of the Missile Forces.
According to the Russian Interfax news agency, Solovtsov emphasized the Missile Forces’ purpose as a strategic deterrent, and the military’s confidence that they serve this role. The Missile Forces rely upon “an adaptive principle” of modernization, upgrading combat equipment, and building new and cutting-edge missile systems, which will continue to consist of both “stationary missile systems, or silos, boasting a high combat preparedness for immediate action, and highly-survivable mobile systems.” (More »»»)
» More stories on: Russia
» Missile details: SS-19 Mod 2, SS-20, SS-21 B, SS-N-6
Profile of Russian Saratov Missile Base
July 15, 2005 :: BBC Worldwide Monitoring :: News
The Russian weekly Argumenty i Fakty recently profiled the Russian Saratov Missile Base, where the SS-27 Topol-M intercontinental ballistic missile is deployed. The Topol-M represents the best in Russian ballistic missile technology, incorporating modern fuel and warhead designs, and featuring a range of 10,500 km. The Saratov base is operated by twelve regiments of the elite Strategic Missile Troops, most of whom have undergone twelve years of training (five at the university, and seven in the military). The profile also mentions the Topol-M’s much advertised ability to overcome the sort of missile defenses being deployed by the United States: “The US military have recently admitted that Topol-M has spoilt their ‘nuclear game’ and significantly reduced the efficiency of the US air [missile] defense on which billions of dollars have been spent.” An excerpt: (More »»»)
» More stories on: Russia
» Missile details: SS-N-6
Russia to Field New Set of Topol-M
May 17, 2005 :: RIA-Novosti :: News
RIA Novosti reports that Russia plans to arm a Strategic Missile Forces regiment in the Ivanovo Region with the mobile version of the SS-27 Topol-M missile system. The intercontinental-range solid-propellant Topol-M is said by RIA Novosti to be capable of avoiding space reconnaissance satellites and AWACS aircraft. In December 2004, the Topol-M underwent its fourth test launch. (Article, Link)
» More stories on: Russia
» Missile details: SS-N-6
Russia to Take Delivery of Additional Topol-Ms
February 1, 2005 :: BBC Worldwide Monitoring :: News
Itar-Tass provides an update on the planned delivery of additional Topol-M ballistic missiles in 2005, given by first deputy defense minister Colonel General Aleksandr Belousov. The military will acquire seven new Topol-M missiles of both the silo- and mobile-based types. Itar-tass quotes another Russian Defense ministry spokesman as saying that, “The troops will be getting between three and nine launchers a year. And the combined missile force stationed in Ivanovo Region will get mobile Topol-Ms first, with several Strategic Missile Troops divisions to be armed with them in total.” The Strategic Missile Troops will also take delivery of five space rockets, noted Belousov. (Article, Link)
» More stories on: Russia
» Missile details: SS-N-6
Jane’s: North Korea Deploying 2,500km Range Missile, Capable of Ship-Launch
August 3, 2004 :: Jane's Information Group :: News
Jane’s Defense Weekly reports that North Korea is deploying two different forms of a new missile system, with capabilities to strike both U.S military forces in Guam and Japan and also the continental United States. The new missile is believed to be based primarily upon the Russian R-27/SS-N-6 submarine launched missile, as well as some SS-N-5 technology and assistance from the Russian missile manufacturer VP Makeyev Design Bureau. The land-based mobile version of the missile has an estimated range of missile 2,500-4,000 km, and the submarine- or ship-based version some 2,500 or more.
Besides the indication of Russian proliferation, the significance of such a ship-launched missile to North Korea is the very scenario so often discussed here on Missilethreat.com: a ship-launched ballistic missile attack upon the United States. Defense Secretary Rumsfeld spoke of such a threat in October 2001, and Assistant Secretary of Defense Wolfowitz has since warned of the same. Such a prospect points to the need for a much more robust missile defense architecture, which includes space based systems. The long range midcourse interceptors to be deployed in Alaska and California would not have sufficient time to meet and destroy such a missile. A space based laser, reacting at the speed of light, is one serious alternative.
Update: August 4: The Russian Interfax news agency quotes “Admiral Eduard Baltin, ex-commander of the Black Sea Fleet, Hero of the Soviet Union,” as having “ruled out” the possibility of the transfer of Russian SS-N-6 missile technology to North Korea, and calling the reported transfers “absurd.”
Update: August 5: New York Times coverage of the story cites an unnamed official dismissing concern about the newly deployed missiles: “There is no way this can hit the mainland.” The story improperly dismisses the sea-launched version of the missile, weakly citing “doubts” that its purpose was to be launched from a freighter, and pointing out that North Korea has no submarines. Such slight of hand ignores entirely that there are two versions of the missile, one of which is designed to be launched by sea. The initial report by Jane’s Defense Weekly, cited by the New York Times, had correctly observed that “Both these new land- and sea-based systems appreciably expand the DPRK’s ballistic missile threat…The missile capable of being launched from submarines of ships is potentially the most dangerous.” (Article, Link)
» AFP summary of Jane’s report
» Globalsecurity.org description of “No Dong B”
» More stories on: North Korea, Proliferation, Russia
» Missile details: SS-N-5, SS-N-6
North Korea Building More Bases for “New” Missiles
May 4, 2004 :: The Chosun Ilbo (S. Korea) :: News
North Korea is currently building additional bases for mobile intermediate range missiles with a range of 4,000km which are capable of reaching Hawaii, reports the South Korean Chosun Ilbo newspaper. United States intelligence satellites have identified some 10 new ballistic missiles and launchers at two locations which were not their previously, said an unidentified official: “One of the new bases was in Yangdok, 80 kilometers east of the capital Pyongyang, and the other was in Hochon in South Hamgyong province, the official said.” The same source noted that “these bases are assumed to be the bases for new ballistic missiles and not for Scuds or Ro Dong-1 missiles.”
The Chosun Ilbo reports further that these new missiles may be of Russian origin:
The new ballistic missile is presumed to be a modified model of the former Soviet Union’s SS-N-6 submarine-launched ballistic missile, and was originally expected to be revealed to the public at the 9 September festival [founding anniversary of the DPRK] in 2003. North Korea, however, only moved 10 of these missiles and five mobile launching pads to the Mirim Airport, where the parade was prepared, but did not actually show them during the parade.
This missile is 12 metres long and 1.5 metres wide, and is thus shorter than the Ro Dong-1 (15 metres long) and Taepo Dong-1 (23 metres), but its range is much longer and is evaluated to be more advanced in technology.
Relevant authorities believe that former Soviet missile scientists may have directly participated in the development or at least Russian technology was utilized in [the building of the] missile, whose development started in the early 1990s and whose existence was first confirmed by ROK and US intelligence authorities in 2000.
(Article, Link)
» Description of new missile, “No-Dong B”
» Chosun Ilbo text, via Financial Times (subscription)
» More stories on: North Korea, Proliferation, Russia
» Missile details: SS-N-6
Russia Deploys New Regiment of Topol-M SS-27 ICBMs; More Advanced Missiles Yet to Come
December 21, 2003 :: London Guardian :: News
On Sunday, December 21, Russia’s Strategic Rocket Forces formally deployed a new regiment of six silo-based Topol-M (SS-27) intercontinental ballistic missiles, armed with a single warhead each. Announcement of the deployment comes just ten days after a test of the SS-N-30 SLBM. The deployment supplements three additional regiments at the Tatishchevo base, bringing the total number of operationally deployed Topol-M missiles to 36. Tatishchevo is located in the Saratov region, in the southwest part of Russia, next to Kazakstan. (More »»»)
» November 11: Janes: Fifth Topol-M deployment anticipated
» Xinhau: Putin: Russia will maintain strategic momentum
» Map and information for Tatishchevo missile base in Saratov
» More stories on: Proliferation, Russia
» Missile details: SS-N-6
Second Russian Ballistic Missile Test in a Week
December 11, 2003 :: NTI :: News
Only six days after an SS-19 ICBM test launch, Russia has again reportedly tested yet another. According to the Nuclear Threat Initiative, Russian radio reported that an SS-27 (“Topol M”) variant, the SS-N-30 Bulava (equipped as an SLBM) was tested today from the Russian Dmitriy Donskoi Typhoon-class nuclear submarine, launched from the North Sea to the Kamchatka Peninsula. The SS-27 is Russia’s single most advanced ballistic missile. (Link)
» More stories on: Russia, Testing - Foreign
» Missile details: SS-N-6, SS-26
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