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Alternate Name:	SA-2 Guideline
Country:	Russia
Basing:	Land

Details

The S-75 (NATO: SA-2 “Guideline”) is a medium- to high-altitude mobile(1) surface-to-air missile system manufactured, deployed, and exported by the Russians. From the late 1950s to the 1980s, it served as the Soviet Union’s main anti-aircraft weapon. Although designed primarily for use against aircraft, the S-75 has been used in anti-missile roles, most notably in Iraq during the Persian Gulf War.(2)

 

The S-75 is an upgraded version of the S-25 (NATO: SA-1 “Guild”), the Soviet Union’s first surface-to-air missile system that was deployed around Moscow in 1954. The S-25 was large, expensive, immobile, and had limited performance capability.(3) By 1958, the Soviets had added the improved S-75 to their arsenal.(4) The S-75 used the new V-750 missile, which was almost twice as light as the V-300 missile used by the S-25.(5)

 

The initial V-750 missile was 10.6 meters long, 0.7 meters wide, and had a launch weight of 2,300 kilograms. It was powered by two stages—a solid propellant booster and a liquid propellant core—and guided by delta-shaped fins and wings.(6) It was equipped with a 195-kilogram high explosive warhead (although it is believed that a later version featured a 295-kilogram nuclear warhead). The S-75 was capable of destroying targets at an altitude of 27 kilometers and a range of 35 kilometers, thus giving it a kill radius of approximately 63 meters. At low and medium altitudes, it had a blast radius of 100-120 meters, while its maximum blast radius against a high altitude targets was 250 meters.(7)

 

The S-75 quickly became the Soviet Union’s main anti-aircraft weapon. The system was deployed around all major population centers, industrial complexes, and military bases. Between 1958 and 1964, U.S. intelligence identified over 600 S-75 launch sites.(8) Each S-75 site was capable of handling only one target at a time, although it did have the ability to launch three missiles at the same target simultaneously, and launch another three at the same target if the first salvo missed its mark.(9)

 

On May 1, 1960, the S-75 achieved notoriety when a V-750 shot down a high-altitude U-2 aircraft piloted by Gary Powers. During this same period, the Soviet Union began equipping its allies with S-75 missiles as part of the Cold War arms buildup. The system proved especially effective during the Vietnam War. From 1965 to 1973, Vietnamese-operated S-75s shot down an estimated 40 B-52 bombers.(10) Russia also sold the S-75 to China, which manufactured its own version, the Hongqi-1 (HQ-1); developed an upgraded version, the Hongqi-2 (HQ-2); and later used the S-75 as the basis of short-range ballistic missile known as the CSS-8 (also: M-7, “Project 8610”).(11)

 

Despite its widespread use throughout the Communist world, by the 1980s the S-75 had become outdated within the Soviet Union itself. It was soon replaced by the new S-300 surface-to-air missile, which featured an expanded range, altitude, and kill zone, as well as a high level of mobility.(12) Nevertheless, S-75 proliferation continued. Following the implosion of the Soviet Union in the late 1980s, Russia repackaged the outdated S-75s as a “rehabilitated and modernized” weapons system, and has been actively proliferating the missiles to dozens of nations throughout Asia, Europe, and the Middle East. Known as the “Volga-M,” this modernized S-75 features upgraded guidance technology, computer processing techniques, and other modern electronics.(13)

 

One of Russia’s most frequent S-75 customers was Iraq. Since the late 1980s, the S-75 served as one of Iraq’s two main surface-to-air missile systems. During the Persian Gulf War, the Iraqis launched S-75 as well as S-125 missiles against U.S. and coalition forces. Television coverage of the conflict indicates that Iraq used its S-75s not only against U.S. aircraft, but also against U.S. cruise missiles. Jane’s Defence Weekly notes that Iraq had most likely extended the range of these S-75s.(14)

 

Following the Gulf War, Iraq began converting the Russian-made S-75 into a short-range, road mobile, liquid propellant ballistic missile known as the Al Samoud. Described as a “scaled down Scud with S-75 engines,” the Al Samoud had an estimated range of 200 kilometers and was designed primarily for use against strategic targets. It is instructive to compare the range of the original S-75 (60 kilometers) with that of the Al Samoud (200 kilometers) to underscore the danger of SAM proliferation to rogue nations. Iraq’s Al Samouds were constructed at the Ibn al Haytham missile facility, northwest of Baghdad and, during the recent Iraq War, were fired at U.S. and coalition forces.(15)

 

Like Iraq, Russia itself has found creative uses for its supply of outdated S-75 missiles. In mid 2004, Russian forces announced the near-completion of two new target missiles based on the S-75: the RM-75MVU-1 low-altitude missile and the RM-75VU-1 high-altitude missile. Following the successful completion of a series of state tests, Russia will use the RM-75MVU-1 and the RM-75VU-1 to test new surface-to-air missile systems being designed by the Almaz research and production association.(16)

 

In addition to its non-SAM roles, the S-75 remains in service throughout Russia. About 120 missile sites are still believed to be operational.(17)

 

 

 

 

Footnotes

 

1. It is important to note that the S-75 should be considered a “mobile” system only in comparison with the S-25, which was mounted in a concrete foundation and therefore completely immobile. While the S-75 was technically mounted on wheeled chasses, it lacked speed and ability and was designed primarily for stationary deployment. Thus, the “mobility” of the S-75 should not be confused with later systems such as the S-300 and S-400, which were designed for road-mobile operations. For further explanation, see: “Antiaircraft Missile Complexes of the Ground Forces,” Tekhnika i Vooruzenie, 6 November 2003.
2. Craig Hoyce and James O’Halloran, “Iraqi Air Defence-Fortress Iraq,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, 29 May 2002. 
3. GlobalSecurity.org.
4. “Antiaircraft Missile Complexes of the Ground Forces,” Tekhnika i Vooruzenie, 6 November 2003; S. Ganin, V. Korovin, A. Karpenko, R. Angelsky, “Russian Anti-Aircraft Missile Complexes,” Aviatsiya i Kosmonavtika, 12 November 2002.
5. S. Ganin, V. Korovin, A. Karpenko, R. Angelsky, “Russian Anti-Aircraft Missile Complexes,” Aviatsiya i Kosmonavtika, 12 November 2002.
6. GlobalSecurity.org.
7. GlobalSecurity.org.
8. S. Ganin, V. Korovin, A. Karpenko, R. Angelsky, “Russian Anti-Aircraft Missile Complexes,” Aviatsiya i Kosmonavtika, 12 November 2002; GlobalSecurity.org.
9. GlobalSecurity.org.
10. David C. Isby, “Russia to Export SAMs to Vietnam,” Jane’s Missiles and Rockets, 24 September 2003; Anatoly Yurkin, “US Sought to Steal Soviet S-75 System after U-2 Failure,” Itar-Tass, 1 May 2000. 
11. Steven J. Zaloga, “Back-Door BMS: The Proliferation Threat Posed by Converted SAMs,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, 1 April 1999, p. 56.
12. S. Ganin, V. Korovin, A. Karpenko, R. Angelsky, “Russian Anti-Aircraft Missile Complexes,” Aviatsiya i Kosmonavtika, 12 November 2002.
13. Tony Cullen, “Advances in Air Defence,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, 12 March 1994, p. 17.
14. Craig Hoyce and James O’Halloran, “Iraqi Air Defence-Fortress Iraq,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, 29 May 2002.
15. “Iraq Fields Extended-Range SA-2,” Jane’s Missiles and Rockets, 1 October 1999; David C. Isby, “Desert Fox Delays Iraq’s Offensive Missile Programmes,” Jane’s Missiles and Rockets, 1 March 1999, p. 56; David C. Isby, “Iraq Continues Tests of Al Samoud SSM,” Jane’s Missiles and Rockets, 1 August 2000; “UN Checks Iraqi Missile and Subsystem Facilities,” Jane’s Missiles and Rockets, 1 March 2003; “UNSCOM Reveals Iraq’s Secret Missile,” Jane’s Missiles and Rockets, 1 March, 1999, p. 56.
16. “Russian Aerospace Company Almost Ready to Test Two New Target Missiles,” Interfax-AVN, 1 July 2004; “Development of New Target Missiles Is Being Finished,” Voyenno-Promyshlenny Kurier, 7-13 July 2004, p. 4; “Guided Missile of the S-75 Antiaircraft Missile Complex, Which Has Been Removed From the Arsenals, Will Become the Basis for New RM-75 Target Missile,” Krasnaya Zvezda, 27 March 2004, p. 3.
17. “RD-75 Ranging Radar in Russian Service” Jane’s Missiles and Rockets, 1 November 2000; NTV (Moscow), 6 September 1997.

S-75 (SA-2) Missiles May Become Targets for Russian Missile Defenses

October 12, 2004 :: Interfax :: News

Russian S-75 air defense interceptors may have their more primitive liquid-fueled engines replaced by newer and more sophisticated “scramjet” engines, which will allow them to serve as future targets for Russian missile defense tests, reports Interfax, citing a “source in the Russian defence industry.”
        “With the scramjets installed, the missile’s flight will become stable in terms of speed and altitude and the range and the cruising speed will increase,” the source is quoted as saying, adding that the missile will be capable of flying at twice the speed of sound, and have an extended range of 70 km even at low altitudes. The improved missile targets are said to likely attract other customers as well, perhaps foreign. The S-75 has been widely proliferated around the world; some S-75 missiles were recently discovered in Iraq; a number had been used against American troops in the first Gulf War. The S-75 or SA-2 is the interceptor which shot down Gary Powers’ U-2 plane. Some 120 sites armed with the S-75 may still be operational across Russia.
         In the article, Russia is called the leader in scramjet technology. The recent American X-43 hypersonic test also employed a scramjet engine. Scramjet technology has also been suggested as a possible means by which Russian warheads could evade future American missile defenses. (Article, Link) 

» S-75 among other systems tested in Russian military exercise

» More stories on: Russian Missile Defenses

» Missile system details for: S-75 (SA-2 Guideline)

Duelfer Report: Russia Aided Iraq Missile Programs

October 8, 2004 :: The Moscow Times :: News

According to a report recently presented to the U.S. Congress by U.S. weapons inspector Charles Duelfer, Russian engineers were traveling to Iraq to aid Saddam Hussein’s missile program from 1999 and 2003. Hussein had requested Russian help and missile systems—and in some cases received them. North Korea also helped Iraq develop its Al-Samoud 2 missiles.
        In addition, the report notes that Iraq wanted to acquire the Russian air defense system, the S-300, apparently via a son of former Syrian Defense Minister Mustafah. The report did however say that an Iraqi engineer had “gained access” to an S-300 system.

An excerpt of the report:

• ISG uncovered evidence that technicians and engineers from Russia reviewed the designs and assisted development of the Al Samud II during its rapid evolution. ISG also found that Iraq had entered into negotiations with North Korean and Russian entities for more capable missile systems.
• According to contract information exploited by ISG, Iraq imported at least 380 SA-2/Volga [a.k.a., S-75] liquid-propellant engines from Poland and possibly Russia or Belarus. While Iraq claims these engines were for the Al Samud II program, the numbers involved appear in excess of immediate requirements, suggesting they could have supported the longer range missiles using clusters of SA-2 engines. Iraq also imported missile guidance and control systems from entities in countries like Belarus, Russia and Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY).

 (Article, Link) 

» Key Findings of Duelfer Report

» Vol. 2 of Duelfer Report, on Iraqi missile systems and nuclear programs

» More stories on: Former Soviet Republics, Proliferation, Russia

» Missile details: Al Samoud

» Missile system details for: S-75 (SA-2 Guideline), S-300V (SA-12A Gladiator, SA-12B Giant)