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The Galosh (SH-01/ABM-1) was a medium-range interceptor missile designed and manufactured by the Soviet Union. From 1972 to 1990, 64 Galosh interceptors were deployed around Moscow as part of System A-35 (the predecessor to System A-135, currently deployed).

In 1958, the Soviet Union began developing a surface-to-air missile system to defend its capital city against ballistic missile attack. Since the older V-1000 surface-to-air missiles, already deployed by the Soviets, were based on aerodynamics and could not operate outside the atmosphere, System A-35 required a new weapon.(1)

In 1960, work began on a new medium-range interceptor missile, the Galosh (SH-01/ABM-1). The missile was to be capable of intercepting its targets at a distance of over 90 kilometers, thus making it “exoatmospheric” or capable of operating outside the atmosphere.(2)

Sources indicate that, at the early stages of development, the Soviets planned to arm the Galoshes with conventional fragmentation warheads (although they were later fitted with nuclear warheads). The Soviet engineers designed the system to be able to intercept five or six targets simultaneously: two Galosh missiles were to be fired at each incoming warhead.(3)

In 1963, it was decided that the Galosh interceptors would be armed with high-yield nuclear warheads to compensate for any reduced accuracy in the radars. The following year, the Soviet engineers completed the revised preliminary design. Two nuclear warheads had been designed for the Galosh: the first had a higher neutron yield; the second had a higher X-ray yield.(4)

System A-35 was scheduled to be placed on active combat duty on November 7, 1967, but this timetable proved far too ambitious. The Galoshes were incapable of intercepting ballistic missiles with multiple reentry vehicles. In the end, a new strategy for System A-35 was developed, one that acknowledged the impossibility of building an impenetrable missile defense system, but rather concentrated on intercepting as many threats as possible.(5)

In 1972, the same year that the U.S. and the Soviet Union signed the ABM Treaty, System A-35 was approved for combat duty.(6) The now-active nuclear-tipped Galoshes were each 20 meters long with a range of over 300 kilometers. Each Galosh carried a 2- to 3-megaton nuclear warhead.(7) Its explosion was reportedly so powerful that the interceptor did not need to hit its target directly; the massive fireball would have destroyed anything in its vicinity.(8)

The missiles were deployed at eight battle stations situated along the perimeter of Moscow near Bereya, Solnechnogorsk, Klin, and Zagorsk.(9) As a precaution, the Soviets placed dummy missiles on the launch pads for the benefit of U.S. satellites. The nuclear-tipped Galoshes were kept unassembled in storage depots. Protocol specified that the missiles were to be installed on the launch pads only during periods of international tension. It remains unclear how many Galoshes were actually installed.(10)

During the late 1970s, the Soviets decided to replace System A-35 with a new two-tiered system, one capable of intercepting multiple targets and reentry vehicles. The Soviets correctly estimated that, although the Galoshes provided an adequate defense by 1950s standards, they was nearly useless against the nuclear forces of the U.S. in the 1970s.(11)

In 1979, the Soviets began to dismantle System A-35, while simultaneously constructing the new facilities for System A-135 and its Gazelle (SH-08/ABM-3) and Gorgon (SH-11/ABM-4) interceptors.(12) Despite their obsolescence, several Galosh interceptors remained in service for over a decade. System A-35 was finally removed from service in 1990.(13)

Footnotes

1. Pavel Podvig, ed., Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces (Cambridge, Mass: The MIT Press, 2001), 413.
2. William T. Lee, “A Short History of Soviet Missile Defenses,” The Washington Times, 15 March 1995; Podvig, 413-414.
3. Podvig, 413-414.
4. Podvig, 413-414.
5. Lee, “A Short History of Soviet Missile Defenses;” Podvig, 414-415. 
6. Podvig, 416.
7. James Hackett, “Moscow’s Overlooked Missile Defenses,” The Washington Times, 17 May 2000, 19; Hans M. Kristensen, Matthew G. McKinzie, and Robert S. Norris, “The Protection Paradox,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 60 (2004), 68-77; Duncan Lennox, “Battling with the Ballistic Threat,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, 20 March 1993; GlobalSecurity.org.
8. Hackett, 19.
9. Podvig, 416.
10. Lee, “A Short History of Soviet Missile Defenses;” Podvig, 416-417.
11. Podvig, 417; Steven J. Zaloga, “Moscow’s ABM Shield Continues to Crumble,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, 1 February 1999.
12. Christoph Bluth, “Russian Attitudes to Missile Defence,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, 1 January 1996.
13. Podvig, 417; Zaloga, “Moscow’s ABM Shield Continues to Crumble.”