Israel & U.S. Sign Agreement on David's Sling
The MDA announced today that an official agreement between Israel and the U.S. to develop the David's Sling missile defense system has been signed. Lt. Gen. Patrick O'Reilly signed for the U.S.; signing for Israel was Rear Admiral Ophir Shoham (Director, Directorate of Defense Research and Development), Tzahi Malach (Department of Finance, Ministry of Defense) and Ehud Shani, (Director General, Defense).
David's Sling will add a layer of missile defense between the Iron Dome system and the anti-ballistic missile Arrow interceptor system. Iron Dome is directed primarily at very short-range rockets with under 70km range, while David's Sling is meant to counter longer range missiles (up to 300 km or so) and slower cruise missiles. The Arrow system is meant to counter longer-range ballistic missiles. (Article, Link)
» Reuters Coverage
» IDF Expects Hamas to 'Test' Iron Dome
IDF Expects Hamas to 'Test' Iron Dome
As Israel proceeds with its planned deployment of the Iron Dome missile defense system along the Gaza border over the next few months, the IDF is preparing for the possibility of a spike in activity from "Hamas and other organizations."
Designed to defend against short-range Katyushas and similar missiles used in recent years by terrorist organizations like Hamas, Iron Dome has undergone extensive testing over the summer and will soon be deployed. It is unclear whether the IDF will deploy the system at key hot-spots on the Gaza border or will await site-specific deployment depending on shifting "operational requirements." (Article, Link)
New UAV Missile Defense Options
Two veterans from the early days of missile defense, Len Caveny and Dale Tietz, are proposing a focus on boost-phase intercepts using unmanned aerial vehicles. During the 1990s, the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization had proposed researching a similar approach. Tietz has said that 'Global Hawk' aircraft could provide surveillance and detection, and Predator drones could carry interceptors. "Unlike the 1990s, we now have fully functional high-altitude, long-endurance UAS [unmanned aircraft system] and the warfighting infrastructure to do the job."
The Missile Defense Agency has been testing 'sensor pods' placed on unmanned aircraft like General Atomics' 'Reaper,' and MDA Director Lt. Gen. Patrick O'Reilly has said that test-tracking of missile launches at a range of more than 600 miles has been successful. A range of successful intercept options will be dependent on upgrading the small and lightweight missiles carried by UAVs, as significant air speeds are required to intercept ballistic missiles, especially at longer ranges.
Caveny says that aggressive funding of short-term research and testing projects could yield a working "defense against North Korea in 18 months. Iran is more difficult and would take twice as long." The technological hurdles in identifying and tracking missile launches would be significantly reduced if "overhead" satellites are involved, said Caveny. A predator drone could carry four smaller interceptors, or a single large one.
As UAV technology improves and cost drops, theater missile defense against cruise and ballistic missiles provided by roving packs of unmanned aircraft is becoming more and more attractive.
(Article, Link)
New Missile Delivered to IRGC, Claims Iran
Local Iranian news sources are reporting Defense Minister Ahmad Vahidi's announcement that a "Fateh-110," a supposed third generation short-range Iranian missile, has been delivered to the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps.
If Iranian claims are correct—history ought to produce some skepticism—this would be a third generation version of the Fateh A-110, which is a short-range, solid-fuel, ballistic missile made by modifying the unguided Zelzal 2, by adding guidance and control systems. (Article, Link)
BMD in Europe
Fogh Rasmussen, head of NATO, was repeating last week what has become a frequent refrain among the Euro-diplomatic set: Russia must be part of any regional European missile shield. While senior U.S. officials have been paying lip service to Russian involvement in any missile shield, they have proceeded unilaterally with logistical groundwork like agreements about housing radar and interceptors with countries like the Czech republic, Hungary, and Poland, to name a few.
Russia, for its part, has been becoming increasingly vocal about its desire to re-start the whole process, or at least stop and reassess. Russian Defense Minister Anatoly Serdyukov, stressed last week that Moscow is interested in taking stock, jointly with the U.S., of likely missile threats and then discussing the deployment of missile defenses in Europe, somewhere other than the currently planned sites. He challenged especially U.S. claims that currently planned interceptors were merely part of the 'phased adaptive approach' outlined by Secretary Gates and President Obama over the last 18 months, and that the deployment of such interceptors was meant to counter medium-range ballistic threats from Iran, rather than a strategic move against Russia. Minister Serdyukov was blunt: "They [the U.S.] tell us their missile shield is not aimed against us, but we tell them our calculations show it is aimed against us." (Article, Link)
Israel Objects to Russian Cruise Missile Sales to Syria
Russia, citing a 2007 agreement with Syria, has said it will move forward with plans to sell P-800 Yakhont cruise missiles to Damascus. Israel, appealing to Russia's role as a regional power interested in stability, has said that the sale is "irresponsible," and Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman has said that a formal complaint will be lodged against Moscow.
Russia, denying the premise that Syrian arms will possibly be transferred to Hezbollah, maintains that it is nothing other than an ordinary arms sale and complaints about it threatening regional stability are overblown. Israel, still technically at war with Syria, maintains otherwise.
The Yakhont (known as the "Oniks" at home in Russia; designated the SS-N-26 by NATO) cruise missile is approximately 9 meters in length and has a range of 120 km at low altitude and a range of 300 km at high altitude. Its minimum range is thought to be 50 km. (Article, Link)
» Reuters: Israel to Lodge Complaint with Russia
» Cruise missile details: SS-N-26
No New START Ratification Before Nov. 2
John Kerry is saying that it would be a mistake to push the New START treaty to the Senate floor in the coming weeks, given the political climate with upcoming elections. The goal of the senior Democrat on the Foreign Relations Committee seems to be to report it out of committee and then wait for a lame duck session to open debate for full ratification.
This ratification debate has now persisted much longer than many had anticipated, with controversy surrounding concerns about the possibility of the treaty's link to future development and deployment of U.S. missile defenses. Also tied up with treaty ratification is the desire of some, like Arizona's Jon Kyl, to get some concrete commitments from the administration regarding the funding of nuclear force modernization. (Article, Link)
Foreign Relations Committee Sends New START to Floor
The Senate Foreign Relations Committee has reported the New START treaty to the floor of the Senate. Three Republicans voted in favor with their Democratic colleagues on the committee, Richard Lugar (Indiana), Bob Corker (Tennessee), and Johnny Isakson (Georgia). The four who voted against were James Risch (Idaho), John Barosso (Wyoming), Roger Wicker (Mississippi), and James Inhofe (Oklahoma); Jim DeMint (South Carolina) missed the vote, without comment.
Senator Lugar worked with Senator Kerry to try and win support from his Republican colleagues by shaping the resolution of ratification language to address concerns about nuclear force modernization, the status of future development of U.S. missile defenses, and the restriction of long-range non-nuclear missiles. Resolutions of ratification set forth the Senate's understanding of what they're ratifying, even though they don't alter actual treaty language. Historically, resolutions of ratification have been much more than mere rhetoric.
Ratification now proceeds to the floor of the Senate, but is unlikely to be taken up until after the mid-term elections. New START, like all treaties, will need 67 votes for ratification. (As things stand now, that would mean eight votes from Republicans.) (Article, Link)
Israel Developing Electronic Missile Defense
The Jerusalem Post reports that the Israeli Navy is working on a new technology that would help protect its smaller patrol boats from missiles launched by Hezbollah or Hamas. The system would detect an incoming missile and then divert it off course by manipulating the missile's guidance mechanism electronically.
(Article, Link)
Taiwan to Install PAC-3 Shield
Reuters reports that Taiwan will be installing PAC-3 missile batteries, sold to them by the U.S., to act as a deterrent against the more than 1,000 missiles China has aimed across the strait. More than PAC-3 batteries would be needed to withstand a full barrage from China—but such incremental (and ultimately insufficient) steps by Taiwan may be the only option available given the uneasy strategic dance currently underway between the U.S., Taiwan, and China over the Taiwan strait.
(Article, Link)
» China Talks Missile Redeployment — Taiwan
DoD's Annual Report on China
The Department of Defense has again released its annual report on China's military capabilities, titled "Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China" (a slightly more sanguine title compared to that of recent years: "Military Power of the People's Republic of China").
Cruise Missiles and SRBMs
Much remains unchanged from last year. China still "has the most active land-based ballistic and cruise missile program in the world." Cruise missile production and acquisition continues apace. The indigenous DH-10 land-attack and YJ-62 anti-ship cruise missiles, along with the Russian-made SS-N-22 (Sunburn) and SS-N-27B (Sizzler), can be found at land launch sites and on missile destroyers and diesel electric submarines.
A formidable number of short-range ballistic missiles remain deployed along the Taiwan strait ("between 1,050 and 1,150 CSS-6 and CSS-7[s]"—a number that hasn't changed since last year's report). Perhaps of most strategic concern to the U.S. is the continued development of an anti-ship ballistic missile based on the medium-range ballistic missile, the CSS-5—when outfitted with a planned maneuverable warhead, this missile could threaten U.S. aircraft carriers at ranges of up to 1,500 km.
ICBMs
The sophisticated, road-mobile, solid propellant DF-31 and DF-31A intercontinental-range ballistic missiles put most, if not all, of the continental U.S. within China's reach. China is believed to be working on a third road-mobile ICBM with MIRV (multiple independently targeted re-entry vehicles) capability, making it harder to intercept.
The Navy and "Anti-Access"
It is possible that China might start construction of an indigenous aircraft carrier by the end of the year, which would be the culmination of years of R&D. China continues the development of its JIN-class nuclear ballistic missile submarines, with one in active service, another in production, and likely plans for three more on top of these two.
While all of these military developments will of course help China pursue its interests more freely in its own backyard, it is safe to say that the leading technological edges of China's military R&D and production are focused on a possible confrontation with the U.S. over Taiwan. This is especially true of the Chinese navy—the push to make it more of a "blue water" force has as its end an expanding defensible maritime perimeter. China's ultimate goal will be to dominate both its "first" and "second" island chains. The first island chain is bounded in the south by Vietnam and Malaysia and in the north by the edge of the East China Sea. The second island chain stretches from open water to the east of central Japan down to the Northern Marianas, then Guam, Micronesia, Palau, and with a terminus in eastern Indonesia.
The goal in any possible conflict with the U.S. will be "area-denial" and "anti-access," achieved through a combination of longer-range ICBMs serving as broad nuclear deterrents; anti-ship cruise missile capability from attack submarines; and longer-range anti-air and anti-ship missiles deployed on missile destroyers. A concentration on a variety of measures to blunt the effectiveness of opposition forces' missile defenses (such as MIRVs, decoys, and anti-satellite measures) will augment these assets. Additionally, in much of the Chinese military literature that focuses on analysis of recent western military campaigns (most notably, U.S. and coalition military activity in Iraq), there is an emphasis on the strategic importance of 'blinding' and 'deafening' opposition forces by attacking communications and surveillance satellites. A final component of Chinese anti-access and area-denial strategy is a limited missile defense system, with a focus on defending against cruise missiles with Russian-made SAMs and some limited ability to intercept ballistic missiles.
Nuclear Forces
China's overall nuclear arsenal appears much the same as it did last year, except for the addition of about 10 solid-fueled, road-mobile DF-31 and DF-31A ICBMs. Increased output and deployment of these ICBMs is expected, as is the upgrading and continued production of more CSS-3s, CSS-4s, and CSS-5s. The JL-2 submarine-launched ballistic missile, which would give China (in the words of DoD's 2009 report) its "first credible sea-based nuclear strike capability," appears to have encountered significant developmental setbacks, "failing several of what should have been the final round of flight tests."
Possible Limitations
The Defense Department's report cautions that insofar as China "remains untested in modern combat," it is difficult to assess properly, from the outside, China's true military capabilities. While military spending in China remains robust and technological advancements proceed, truly effective operational capabilities are hard to gauge. As just one example, the true viability of a submarine-based nuclear capability remains dependent on China's ability to master command and control of such an operation. "The PLA has only a limited capacity to communicate with submarines at sea, and the PLA Navy has no experience in managing a SSBN fleet that performs strategic patrols with live nuclear warheads mated to missiles." (Article, Link)
ABL Test Fails
The Missile Defense Agency tried unsuccessfully to shoot down a simulated ballistic missile target on Wednesday off the coast of California near the Point Mugu Air Station. The Airborne Laser system aboard the Boeing 747 successfully tracked and engaged the missile but failed to destroy it. This glitch comes after repeated postponements of this longer range test of the system. This test was at a distance of 100 miles, and followed a successful test earlier this year from 50 miles.
ABL funding for this year will run out in September; it has some allies in Congress, but this latest setback makes its future uncertain, especially after it was downgraded from a possibly operational defense project to a 'testbed' in Secretary Gates' 2009 defense budget. (Article, Link)
» ABL Test Postponed
» Missile system details for: Airborne Laser (ABL)
