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SM-2 Flight Tests Successful

The U.S. Navy's guided missile destroyer USS Samson recently flight tested four Standard Missile-2 Block IIIB missiles.  The SM-2 Block IIIB has an infrared seeker and other notable enhancements.  The Standard Missile series has been the Navy's primary surface-to-air fleet air defense weapon for more than thirty years.  The SM-2 is currently operational on guided missile cruisers and destroyers in the U.S. Navy and is in use with seven allied countries. (Article, Link) 

» Missile system details for: Aegis Ship-Based BMD

Japanese Deployments

Jiji Press has reported that Japan deployed Patriot (PAC-3) missile defenses at the military base on the Ibarako prefecture, just north of Tokyo on Saturday.  This marks the fourth and final deployment of Patriots aimed at protecting Tokyo from North Korea and China.  The Japanese defense ministry has remarked that there is no "emergency significantly affecting the country's national security," but plans to further deploy the American developed PAC-3s at 11 Japanese bases by March 2011. (Article, Link) 

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» Missile system details for: Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3)

Reagan Monument Dedicated at Vandenberg

Lieutenant General Henry Obering, Director of the Missile Defense Agency, delivered the dedication speech at the unveiling of a new Reagan Monument at Vandenberg Air Force Base in Lompoc, California today.  Vandenberg, home to three interceptors residing in underground silos, seemed the perfect place to remember Reagan's own words on missile defense and to reinvigorate his SDI vision.  Speakers included Representative Trent Franks (R-AZ) and Riki Ellison, founder and president of the Missile Defense Advocacy Alliance. (Article, Link) 

» More stories on: Policy

North Korea Launches Short Range Rockets

Numerous news agencies report today that North Korea has launched various short-range missiles off its western coast.  The test comes a day after North Korean officials dissolved a group of experts gathered at a join industrial zone near the shared border.  South Korean officials have excused the test as "merely part of [North Korea's] ordinary military training" rather than an overt attempt by Kim Jong-Il to publicize the nuclear issue on the Korean peninsula. (Article, Link) 

» More stories on: Testing - Foreign, North Korea

Karako on 25th Anniversary of SDI

On the twenty-fifth anniversary of the Strategic Defense Intitiative, Tom Karako, director of programs for the Claremont Institute, writes in Investor's Business Daily comparing current missile defense policies with those begun by Ronald Reagan.  Excerpts:

 

...The Bush administration has taken important first steps toward national missile defense. It withdrew from the ABM Treaty in 2002 and has made tremendous progress in deploying missile defenses, two things Reagan did not do. Current programs deserve much praise, but nevertheless fall short of the threat-based defense SDI in important ways pursued by Reagan.

 

Reagan envisioned a defense that was strategic, oriented to stopping the most an enemy could threaten. SDI emphasized interceptors in low Earth orbit. Space-based interceptors formed the primary front line of a defense, intended to be supplemented by sea- and land-based interceptors.

 

By the early 1990s, SDI had advanced to the level of the major defense acquisition program, a constellation of small, space-based interceptors. The Brilliant Pebbles concept promised a cost-effective way to destroy missiles in their ascent or boost phase, when they are most visible and vulnerable.

 

As the Missile Defense Agency's historian has documented, the program was cut for political reasons just as it was nearing the deployment phase. Its technologies were, however, successfully space-tested by the Clementine and Astrid programs in 1994.

 

Some hesitation about space defenses comes from the idea that space is a weapons-free preserve. But the high ground of space is merely an extension of strategic geography, and has long been "weaponized."

 

Armies project power on land, navies on the high seas, aircraft in the atmosphere. Satellites and missiles do so above the atmosphere. Satellites that surveil the enemy or send GPS coordinates to a warfighter are no less weapons because they do not go "boom." If a satellite in orbit helps direct a laser-guided bomb to a target in Afghanistan, in exactly what sense is space not weaponized?

 

All ballistic missiles travel through space, and it makes sense to intercept them from and in space.  Putting interceptors closer to the paths of these missiles shortens the distance they must travel and widens the window of reaction time.

 

Orbited interceptors are already accelerated to 8 kilometers per second, and do not require a massive booster rocket. Any surface-based system, by contrast, retains the physical challenge of needing to be accelerated at a moment's notice. In missile interception, seconds matter. Basing in space buys time.

 

Orbital basing also increases the ability to destroy missiles in their boost phase. Unless they are close to the launch site, ground-based interceptors cannot reach missiles in their boost phase if launched inland. Orbits know no political boundaries, so orbiting interceptors could reach missiles in boost phase even if launched deep inside Iran, Russia or China.

 

...One may defend the modesty of the current approach on the ground that it is imprudent to irritate our strategic competitors in a time of war. But let us have no confusion about the degree to which some missiles retain a free ride to the American homeland.

 

Let us admit we intend to remain vulnerable to even accidental and unauthorized missiles coming from Russia or China. The path of deliberate minimalism is deterred from boldly pursuing the most effective missile defense systems. Such self-deterrence did not characterize Reagan or SDI.

 

As Secretary of State Rice remarked in February, "It is true that the United States once had a Strategic Defense Initiative, a program that was intended to deal with the question of the Russian strategic nuclear threat. This is not that program. This is not the son of that program. This is not the grandson of that program."

 

This is true. Twenty five years later, the S has been dropped from SDI. ...

 (Article, Link) 

» More stories on: Analysis, Policy, Space-Based Systems

Greenland’s Upgraded Early Warning Radar System

The construction phase of the improvements to the Upgraded Early Warning Radar at Thule Air Base in Greenland has now been completed.   The Missile Defense Agency awarded Raytheon the project in April 2006.  In a press release dated March 20, Raytheon vice president for National & Theater Security Programs Pete Franklin was quoted as saying, "The UEWR at Thule builds on the radars that we've already deployed to Beale Air Force Base, Calif., and Royal Air Force Fylingdales, U.K., and will add significantly more surveillance coverage for the U.S. missile defense mission." (Article, Link) 

» Missile system details for: Thule Early Warning Radar

Joseph and Crouch: Press Ahead with Defenses Despite Russia

Writing recently in the Washington Post, former Undersecretary of State Robert Joseph and former Deputy National Security Adviser J. D. Crouch discuss on Moscow's opposition to limited missile defense systems in the former Soviet bloc countries of Poland and the Czech Republic.  Joseph and Crouch, both now senior scholars at the National Institute for Public Policy, note that the arms race never materialized which missile defense opponents warned of when the United States withdrew from the 1972 ABM Treaty in 2002.  Today, one sees Russia vigorously opposing even a limited system of ten ground-based interceptors and radars. 

 

Today, the United States and Russia find themselves in opposition on the issue of deploying 10 missile interceptors and supporting radar to Europe -- an act of much less strategic consequence than abandonment of the ABM Treaty. Bush and his national security team have explained the concept, in considerable detail, to Russia's national security elite. Moscow objects by citing a threat to its own deterrent (an argument it knows has no merit) and the stationing of American forces near its borders (which reminds it of the painful loss of empire) and denies the existence of an Iranian missile threat.

 

Crouch and Joseph attribute Russia's stubborness to its wish to be a "major player," given that the technical capabilities of the ten interceptors are rather modest, and pose no real threat to Russia's strategic arsenal.  Crouch and Joseph note that the Bush administration has tried to persuade Russia with diplomatic efforts over the last seven years, but largely to no avail.  They conclude that the growing ballistic missile capabilities of Iran (acknowledged even by Russian military officials) make it imperative that the United States not give Russia a veto on the pursuit of these defensive capabilities. 

 

Instead of trying to persuade Russia to do something that it does not perceive to be in its interest, the United States should redouble its efforts to advance the two initiatives sponsored by Bush and Putin that do enjoy widespread support in both countries. The Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism has grown in a little over a year from 13 partners to more than 60. Russia has been a good partner because it is concerned about this threat. Similarly, Moscow has worked to put in place new approaches to expand the use of nuclear energy in a manner that meets energy and environmental goals and reduces the risk of proliferation. These joint efforts may provide a basis for building cooperation in other areas, perhaps setting a positive tone for the new Russian president.

 

On missile defense, the United States must move forward, just as Russia does when its vital interests are at stake. We should continue to be respectful and transparent about the need for our deployments but make clear that the United States will proceed without Moscow's cooperation. Going beyond current proposals for cooperation would encourage Russia to be even more intransigent, playing to its instinct to drive wedges between the United States and its allies, and would foster the Kremlin's policy to run out the clock in the hope that the next U.S. administration will abandon the effort in Europe.

 

Full text of article: (More »»») 

» More stories on: European Missile Defenses, Russia

Cheney Remarks on 25th Anniversary of SDI

Vice President Dick Cheney spoke on the continued need for ballistic missile defense at an event in Washington DC by the Heritage Foundation commemorating the twenty-fifth anniversary of Ronald Reagan's March 23, 1983 speech announcing the Strategic Defense Initiative, a program to research and develop ballistic missile defense technologies. 

 

There is still a great deal yet to accomplish in the field of missile defense. But we're a lot farther along than we would have been if Ronald Reagan hadn't set this effort in motion 25 years ago. At the end of his address to the nation, Reagan said, "Tonight we're launching an effort which holds the promise of changing the course of human history. There will be risk, and results take time. But I believe we can do it." Well, time has shown that he was right. We can do this. We are well along in making good on the promise of strategic defense. The project gathers together American idealism, American ingenuity, and American optimism. And that is an unbeatable combination.

 

Vice President Cheney spoke of the importance of Reagan's first steps toward missile defense in the face of a growing Soviet threat, and the threat today from numerous missile-capable countries.  

 

Full text of the remarks: (More »»») 

» Video of Cheney remarks on missile defense

» More stories on: Policy

Bulava Missile Development Continues

Pavel Podvig of RussianForces.org reports that during the meeting of the Military-Industrial Commission (VPK) during the last week in February, the commission agreed to continue the Bulava missile defense program.  However, neither the Bulava (SS-NX-30) missile nor the Yuri Dolgorukiy "Project 955" submarine will be deployed this year, as previously expected by Yuri Solomonov.  The year 2012 may be the newest date for the deployment of the Bulava. (Article, Link) 

» More stories on: Russia

» Missile details: SS-NX-30