February 10, 2010 :: Department of Defense :: Analysis
Part 3 of 3:
(Part 1; Part 2)
The final installment of Missilethreat's synopsis of the 2010 BMDR will focus on the last sections of the report—dealing with international cooperation and the missile defense bureaucratic organizational structure.
International Cooperation
As a broad statement of intent, the report reiterates a U.S. commitment to the fielding of "robust, pragmatic, and cost-effective" regional missile defenses as well as a commitment to "international cooperation." Regional deterrence and a re-tooling of export controls will be key aspects of the future U.S. approach to deployed missile defense abroad.
In Europe, NATO will dominate any missile defense processes. The expansion of missile defenses from the protection of forces to the protection of populations will be a possible avenue of future pursuit for the Defense department and American diplomats. NATO will also oversee the future development of an "integrated command and control system for missile defenses (Active Layered Theater Ballistic Missile Defense, or ALTBMD)." Defense will also work to equip allies with ships housing the Aegis system, with the possibility of missile defense capabilities in the future.
In East Asia, America's important and robust missile defense partnership with Japan will continue. In addition to Aegis BMD ships, Japan also has PAC-3 missile batteries deployed, "early warning radars, and a command and control system." On the technology front, the development of the SM-3 Block IIA interceptor is a joint project of the U.S. and Japan. The Republic of Korea (South Korea) has expressed interest in missile defenses, and is thus a possible future partner in the region. The U.S. will also continue to share information with Australia about regional missile threats and defense developments.
In the Middle East, Israel remains America's prime partner in missile defense. The two countries have in the past undertaken much mutual research and development, resulting in such technologies as Israel's Arrow missile defense system. Such cooperation is likely to continue. The missile defense future of the rest of the region is left quite vague by the report: "A number of states in the region are exploring purchases of some missile defense capability under the auspices of the foreign military sales (FMS) program."
America's strategy with Russia will be to include her "in a new structure of deterrence that addresses the emerging challenges to international peace and security posed by a small number of states seeking illicit capabilities." A successor agreement to the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty is the elephant in the room in this section, of course, but is left unmentioned. The report indicates a desire to negotiate some strategic balance of the offensive and defensive forces of both countries while establishing a mutual commitment to "deeper reductions in their nuclear arsenals." Echoing a policy-stance initiated by Ronald Reagan, the report closes its Russia section with the statement that the U.S. "will continue to reject any negotiated constraints on U.S. ballistic missile defenses."
America's Chinese strategy will continue its uneasy calibration of the competing goals of "strategic stability" and the protection of regional forces and allies against a growing Chinese missile threat.
Missile Defense Program Management
The BMDR makes clear that the Bush administration's policy of joint deployment and testing (as opposed to full testing for operability and then deployment—a much lengthier process) is to be abandoned for a new flight-testing schedule, joined with "models" and "simulations," prior to any deployment of assets. On the cost-effectiveness front, the report indicates the Defense department's desire to field cheaper missile defense assets that might achieve the same strategic goals as more costly ones—the example given is the possibility of substituting a yet-to-be-developed advanced SM-3 interceptor for the more expensive GBIs in Alaska and California.
The paragraph about "affordability" opens up a potentially wide field for politics. "Is the BMD system, as currently being developed, affordable from the larger perspective of the Department's and the nation's competing priorities?" The possibility of more robust regional missile defenses and a heightened deterrent effect are acknowledged as possible long-run cost-savers. Since regional defenses cannot be matched "one-for-one" with regional missile threats at a cost acceptable to the Department of Defense, the U.S. will attempt to leverage regional defenses with "risk management," including the pursuit of "a robust international norm against missile proliferation and technology transfer, effective action by members of the Missile Technology Control Regime, and diplomacy concentrated on particular countries of concern."
The report re-states Defense's arguments for zeroing the Multiple Kill Vehicle program, the Kinetic Energy Interceptor program, and for shelving the Airborne Laser program.
Entities such as the Missile Defense Advisory Board (including a chairman in the form of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, and members from, among others, the State Dept., the Military Departments, USSTRATCOM, and the NSC) will engage in "oversight and guidance in a collaborative mode."
Efforts will also be made to heighten the "external transparency" of Missile Defense Agency operations, testing, and acquisitions. (Article)
