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News Archives: Testing - American

Simulation of North Korean Attack Shows Need for Layered Defense, Additional Interceptors

March 17, 2004 :: New York Times :: News

A missile defense simulation held in Washington invited a number of reporters to step into the roles of key strategic decisionmakers. In the simulation, a fictitious nation “Midland” located in the Sea of Japan—closely resembling North Korea—fires six missiles at the United States. All six are eventually intercepted, though the six American interceptors are depleted, and after one misses, the role-players were briefly faced with the need to choose between saving Anchorage and Boise, Idaho. Fortunately, the air borne laser which was part of the simulation destroyed two missiles, and disaster was averted.

The simulation should teach three clear lessons:

         1). The ballistic missile threat is quite real, as an all-too believable attack from a country in the Sea of Japan should demonstrate. Missile defense is therefore clearly needed, as well as clearly possible. Arguments that it is impossible to hit a bullet with a bullet are relics of the past, and should be regarded as such.
         2). The need for a layered defense. Were it not for air-borne lasers to knock out two of the missiles in their most vulnerable boost-phase, one of the missiles would have reached its target, and either Anchorage or Boise would have been destroyed.
        In his description of the event, missile defense opponent Bradley Graham of the Washington Post complains that the ABL was involved in the simulation, even though the ABL will not be part of the initial deployment in 2004. And indeed, there are good reasons for this, given the ABL’s limited capability. The need for a more reliable boost-phase interceptor, ideally one which is space-based, is the more logical policy pursuit.
         3). The third and most obvious lesson was the need for a greater numbers of interceptors. In the exercise, only six were available, and they were all very nearly depleted. In fact, the administration will probably deploy nine this year. Nevertheless, there is no reason to believe an attack upon the territorial US and our troops in the region would be limited to six or nine missiles.
        The reporters’ relish for the tension of the simulation threatens to obscure the fact that a failure to intercept a nuclear missile would probably result in a constitutional crisis. But another problem arises which is not considered. The prospect of such a “Sophie’s choice” between one city and another is exactly the sort of nuclear blackmail which the United States, defenseless against any such attack, is susceptible to. Would a president come to terms if North Korea threatened to obliterate a major U.S. city, and had the capability to fire off more missiles than we had interceptors?
        Caught up in the sensation of the exercise, both the New York Times and the Washington Post fail to note that the simulation closely follows upon a joint Russian-US missile defense exercise. The illustrated limitations no doubt pleased the Russians watching from Moscow eager for confirmation that the U.S. systems pose no threat to Russia’s still massive nuclear arsenal.  (Article, Link) 

First NATO-Russia Joint Missile Defense Exercise Should Raise Concern for Future of U.S. BMD

March 12, 2004 :: Jane's Information Group :: News

Under NATO auspices, the U.S. recently held a five-day joint missile defense exercise with Russia, lasting from March 8-12. The first such event was held at the U.S. space center in Colorado Springs, with some 60 participants from 10 NATO nations and Russia. While the exercise was quite limited, such cooperation should be viewed with some level of suspicion. Such joint exercises threaten to erode the sort of strategic clarity necessary to remember that Russia is not an ally, but indeed rather our “strategic competitor.” The concrete effect of such strategic obfuscation is that American missile defenses will not evolve into robust and comprehensive defenses capable of defending, but will be sharply limited to intercepting only second rate missiles from third rate countries.
        The Command Post Exercise (CPX) consisted of computer simulations designed to “test equipment compatibility and other technical issues” related to “theatre missile defense,” i.e., those systems capable of intercepting short-range missiles.
        Such cooperation has evolved from initial efforts in the mid-1990s under the Clinton administration. Missile defense cooperation may appear innocuous, even salutary. Yet there should also be a legitimate concern should these steps lead to more substantial cooperation, which prevents the limited missile defenses being deployed in Alaska and elsewhere from evolving into a defense capable of defending not only against rogue states, but especially against the Russian nuclear arsenal.
        Such a partnership would effectively treat Russia as no less a threat than other nuclear powers such as Britain or France. As such, we would not even attempt to evolve our defenses to a level capable of defending against Russia or China. So far from missile defense’s promise overthrowing the dangerous doctrines of mutually assured destruction (MAD) or “strategic stability,” partnerships with Russia in the area of missile defense would only ensure that teh former Soviet Union retains the ability to threaten America with nuclear weapons for decades to come.
        The NATO press releases emphasize the importance of “interoperability.” During the Cold War, interoperability, familiarily with allies’ systems, and interchangeable parts generally were important to unite NATO forces against a common enemy, the Soviet Union. Is America really prepared to trust the former Soviet Union as such an ally? We should not be.  (Article, Link) 

Patriot (PAC-3) Missile Intercept Test a Success

March 4, 2004 :: Lockheed Martin :: News

A Patriot Advanced Capability 3 (PAC-3) missile interceptor successfully destroyed a mock tactical ballistic missile, known as a “Patriot-As-A-Target” (PAAT), during a test at the White Sands Missile Range. Two PAC-3 interceptors were “ripple fired”—that is, fired one after another, a few seconds apart, both independently tracking the incoming target and homing in on it. The first interceptor destroyed the target, in this case likely a modified PAC-2, which had been made to simulate a SCUD short range missile. The second missile subsequently self-destructed.
        The highly successful PAC-3 interceptor has performed in the recent Iraq war, and will now also be used for the MEADS defense system. (More »»») 

THAAD Renamed

March 1, 2004 :: Honolulu Advertiser :: News

The Theatre High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) missile defense program has apparently been renamed, but its acronym will remain the same. The “T” in THAAD will now stand for now “Terminal,” referring to the last phase in a ballistic missile’s flight in which the interceptor destroys it. The Honolulu Advertiser cites a February 26 MDA release that the change better reflects its role in the nation’s Ballistic Missile Defense System.
        A more complete explanation, however, may indicate that the change is more than bureaucratic: specifically, a belated updating of new policy language indicated by the December 16, 2002 National Security Policy Directive 23 of President Bush, which repudiated the artificial distinction between “theatre” and “national” missile defense. The reason THAAD was renamed, in other words, is because the term “theatre missile defense” is obsolete, made so by the 2002 withdrawal from the ABM Treaty.
        The terms “theatre” and “national” which came into use due to constraints imposed by the ABM Treaty of 1972, and became important when accords were signed in the 1990s which permitted the development of “theatre” systems capable of intercepting short-range missiles, and “national” defenses capable of intercepting long-range ICBMs. By only permitting theatre defenses, the sacrosanct doctrine of mutually assured destruction (MAD) with the former Soviet Union was left intact.
        Although the distinction between theatre (short-range) and national (long range) missile defenses is obsolete, this does not mean that reliance upon a policy of mutually assured destruction (MAD) has similarly gone by the wayside. The revised deployment will have its own revised vocabulary designed to articulate the application of MAD to changed circumstances. The “limited” ground based missile defense system to be deployed this year in Alaska is designed to intercept long range missiles, but it will have too few interceptors to intercept more than a handful. For the immediate future, the dangerous policy of MAD will apparently remain intact vis a vis those countries—currently, Russia and China—capable of producing enough ICBMs to overwhelm such “limited” defenses.
        Update: The March 3 edition of Inside Missile Defense notes that the tests this year will be the first in four years, and represent a substantially improved system. This, then, could be another impetus for a name change.  (More »»») 

Third Test Flight of GMD Missile Booster a Success

January 27, 2004 :: The Missile Defense Agency :: News

Yesterday’s test of a new booster rocket for the Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) system was a success. The test, Integrated Flight Test-13b, began with an Orbital booster rocket lifting off from the Kwajalein Atoll in the Pacific, and then traveling to a simulated intercept point some 800 miles downrange and at an approximate altitude of 170 miles. No intercept was attempted, although a target missile and a kill vehicle were simulated. The successful test follows another held on January 9. (More »»») 

Successful Test-Launch of GMD Booster

January 9, 2004 :: The Missile Defense Agency :: News

The MDA today conducted a simple booster verification test launch of the three stage Lockheed Martin booster, Booster Verification Test-5, which is to be used for the Ground-Based Midcourse defense system to be deployed this year in Alaska and California.
        A second booster for the GMD system is being built by the Orbital company, which is owned by Boeing. (Article, Link) 

Aegis Missile Defense Test Successful

December 11, 2003 :: Department of Defense :: News

The Missile Defense Agency and the Navy today conducted the fourth test of the Aegis sea-based missile defense system, which was a success. The test involved the launch of a short range target missile from Kauai, Hawaii. Some two minutes later, a Standard Missile-3 (SM-3) interceptor was launched from the USS Lake Erie Aegis cruiser. Two minutes after this, the SM-3 intercepted and destroyed the target missile with its own kinetic force.
        Before the USS Lake Erie launched its SM-3 missile, however, it received additional tracking information conveyed from another Aegis destroyer, the USS Russell, located near the island of Kauai, to serve as a test of coordinating multiple sources of tracking information.
        After being put onto the right course by the SM-3 missile, the kinetic warhead tracked and closed upon the target missile, finally impacting it at an altitude of 137 km and at a closing speed of some 3.7 km/sec.
        The Aegis system is one of the many “hit to kill” technologies which demonstrates time and again it is indeed possible to “hit a bullet with a bullet.” The sea-based system is but one important part of the layered defense necessary to protect the United States.
        Update: The director of the Pentagon’s Office of Operational Test and Evaluation, Thomas Christie, told Inside the Pentagon in a December 15 interview that the Aegis Test was a “success.”
        “It showed you can…pick up the [enemy] missile after it was launched, with the destroyer passing information to the cruiser, which had the Standard Missile-3 intercept the target,” the Pentagon’s top test official noted.
        Christie also said the intercept gave the Pentagon confidence in its plan for a layered missile defense system that utilizes different components at different stages of the operation.  (Article, Link) 

Lockheed to Produce Targets for MD Tests

December 9, 2003 :: San Diego Union Tribune :: News

The Department of Defense announced that the Missile Defense Agency has awarded a contract to Lockheed Martin for the MDA Targets and Countermeasures Program. The contract has the potential to last up to 10 years and be worth a maximum of 4.6 billion. Lockheed would produce the “dummy” interceptor targets and countermeasures which are used to develop and test the wide array of missile defense systems.
        The testing of countermeasures and finding ways to overcome them is of special importance. Countermeasures are systems used by the missile to distract attention from itself or confuse missile defenses. They are thus potential means of circumventing or complicating missile interception. While advanced countermeasures are unlikely to be used by “rogue” states, they are a possibility with Russia and China.
        In sum, the flurry of contracts over the past two weeks represent a serious concern with serious programs. While more attention should be be given advanced programs in space, the attention to continued testing and boost phase defenses continues along the right path. (Article, Link) 

Major MDA Contract for Boost-Phase Interceptor

December 3, 2003 :: San Diego Union Tribune :: News

After an eight month competition with Lockheed Martin, the Missile Defense Agency has awarded an eight-year, 4.5 billion dollar contract to Northrop Grumman to produce an interceptor to destroy ballistic missiles during their boost-phase. This is the MDA’s first “capability-based” contract, and involves a design that would have been banned under the old ABM Treaty.
        The contract is to produce a ground-based Kinetic Energy Interceptor (KEI). Its use of kinetic energy simply means that the interceptor would physically impact the missile: “hit-to-kill” technology. Unlike the Ground-Based Interceptor (GBI) being constructed in Alaska which would intercept long-range missiles during their midcourse phase in space, the KEI, while ground-based is designed to intercept missiles in their boost phase, that is, during their ascent. As the boost phase for even a long-range missile is no more than roughly five minutes, the KEI would have to be located near enough the launch site of the enemy missile in order to still reach it during that phase. It also has to accelerate very fast, perhaps as much as 5,000 miles per hour. This particular interceptor design would be compatible of being launched from either land or sea. It would be capable of being loaded onto aircraft and deployed anywhere in the world. Northrop Grumman will likely initially produce five mobile launchers for the KEI.
        A layered-defense is ultimately necessary, but interception during the boost-phase has a number of advantages. It is during this phase that a missile is at its most vulnerable: during ascent a missile is moving at a slower speed; the body of the missile is under considerable pressure; its exhaust plumes make it more visible and thus trackable; its fuel tanks, which are still attached, constitute a larger target; no countermeasures or decoys can be deployed, and of course should the interception fail, time remains for a second attempt in the midcourse or terminal phases. (Article, Link) 

First MD Brigade Activated

October 25, 2003 :: Army News Service :: News

In anticipation of the Alaska Ground-Based missile defense system’s activation at the end of 2004, the first missile defense brigade has been activated at Peterson Air Force Base, in Colorado. Composed of both National Guardsmen and regular Army soldiers, the brigade will integrate the Fort Greely, Alaska system with the overall tracking systems of Northern Command based in Cheyenne mountain.
        The comments of Lt. Gen. Joseph M. Cosumano Jr., the commanding general of U.S. Space and Missile Defense Command, are particularly noteworthy, as they reflect the bankruptcy of mutually assured destruction: “The missile defense strategy of the 20th century was largely based on the concept that rational countries won’t attack each other. We’ve learned in the 21st Century that that those theories don’t apply anymore. Hostile states, and even non-state hostile groups, now either have or are working on long-range missiles. This activation today of an important part of our homeland defense strategy allows us to defend against that threat.”  (Article, Link) 

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