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News Archives: Testing - American

THEL Test Successful

May 6, 2004 :: Northrop Grumman :: News

The Tactical High Energy Laser (THEL) successfully destroyed a rocket by means of a laser on May 4, reports its producer, Northrop Grumman in a press release today. The test is described as “history making,” because the rocket destroyed was “larger, faster and that flies higher than previous threats destroyed by the laser weapon demonstrator.” A previous test this past week succeeded in its primary goal of tracking the rocket but did not attempt to destroy it. The target rockets in both tests were 6 1/2 inches in diameter and 11 feet long.
        The interception comes as part of a series of tests begun on April 29. These specific tests were of a mobile form of the laser, called MTHEL, which will be the first version deployable of the weapons system. THEL is a collaborative effort between Israel and the United States, often tested at White Sands, New Mexico.
        In programs such as THEL, the speed of lasers permits rapid interception of both short range rockets with a short flight time, as in the case of Israel, but also the ability to destroy larger, even intercontinental ballistic missiles during their brief ascent, or boost phase. Whereas another land-based boostphase program, the Kinetic Energy Interceptor, must devise methods for the interceptor to achieve extremely high velocities in order to “catch up” with an enemy missile during a brief ascent window, lasers based on land or in space would permit much more comfortable reaction times. (Article, Link) 

Japan-U.S. Joint Test in 2005

May 6, 2004 :: Kyodo :: News

Japan and the United States are planning to conduct their first joint flight test in the second half of 2005 for sea-based missile interceptors. A second flight test would follow in 2006. (Article, Link) 

MDA Tests Long Range Air-Launch Target

May 3, 2004 :: The Missile Defense Agency :: News

The Missile Defense Agency today successfully conducted a demonstration launch of a Long Range Air Launch Target (LRALT) missile. The test involved the LRALT boosting a simulated reentry vehicle atop a converted Minuteman II missile stage. The simulated reentry vehicle would resemble one which might be fired from a hostile nation, and which would be used as a target in tests of missile defense interceptors. The LRALT was launched from a point just south of Midway Island to the vicinity of Kwajalein Atoll in the Marshall Islands. (Article, Link) 

THEL Tested at White Sands

April 30, 2004 :: Spacewar.com :: News

A test of the joint U.S.-Israeli anti-missile laser Nautilus was successfully conducted on April 30 at the White Sands U.S. Army base in New Mexico, reports the Jeruslaem Post. The Nautilus test was part of the umbrella THEL (Tactical High Energy Laser) project.
        The primary objective of locating the missile and tracking it was accomplished, though the secondary objective, to destroy it, was not attempted, according to an Army press release.
        The mobile version of the THEL has already been effective against short range Soviet-origin Katyusha rockets which are often fired at Israel from across the Lebanese border by Hezbollah groups. The THEL is expected to be battlefield ready by 2007.  (Article, Link) 

Simulation of North Korean Attack Shows Need for Layered Defense, Additional Interceptors

March 17, 2004 :: New York Times :: News

A missile defense simulation held in Washington invited a number of reporters to step into the roles of key strategic decisionmakers. In the simulation, a fictitious nation “Midland” located in the Sea of Japan—closely resembling North Korea—fires six missiles at the United States. All six are eventually intercepted, though the six American interceptors are depleted, and after one misses, the role-players were briefly faced with the need to choose between saving Anchorage and Boise, Idaho. Fortunately, the air borne laser which was part of the simulation destroyed two missiles, and disaster was averted.

The simulation should teach three clear lessons:

         1). The ballistic missile threat is quite real, as an all-too believable attack from a country in the Sea of Japan should demonstrate. Missile defense is therefore clearly needed, as well as clearly possible. Arguments that it is impossible to hit a bullet with a bullet are relics of the past, and should be regarded as such.
         2). The need for a layered defense. Were it not for air-borne lasers to knock out two of the missiles in their most vulnerable boost-phase, one of the missiles would have reached its target, and either Anchorage or Boise would have been destroyed.
        In his description of the event, missile defense opponent Bradley Graham of the Washington Post complains that the ABL was involved in the simulation, even though the ABL will not be part of the initial deployment in 2004. And indeed, there are good reasons for this, given the ABL’s limited capability. The need for a more reliable boost-phase interceptor, ideally one which is space-based, is the more logical policy pursuit.
         3). The third and most obvious lesson was the need for a greater numbers of interceptors. In the exercise, only six were available, and they were all very nearly depleted. In fact, the administration will probably deploy nine this year. Nevertheless, there is no reason to believe an attack upon the territorial US and our troops in the region would be limited to six or nine missiles.
        The reporters’ relish for the tension of the simulation threatens to obscure the fact that a failure to intercept a nuclear missile would probably result in a constitutional crisis. But another problem arises which is not considered. The prospect of such a “Sophie’s choice” between one city and another is exactly the sort of nuclear blackmail which the United States, defenseless against any such attack, is susceptible to. Would a president come to terms if North Korea threatened to obliterate a major U.S. city, and had the capability to fire off more missiles than we had interceptors?
        Caught up in the sensation of the exercise, both the New York Times and the Washington Post fail to note that the simulation closely follows upon a joint Russian-US missile defense exercise. The illustrated limitations no doubt pleased the Russians watching from Moscow eager for confirmation that the U.S. systems pose no threat to Russia’s still massive nuclear arsenal.  (Article, Link) 

First NATO-Russia Joint Missile Defense Exercise Should Raise Concern for Future of U.S. BMD

March 12, 2004 :: Jane's Information Group :: News

Under NATO auspices, the U.S. recently held a five-day joint missile defense exercise with Russia, lasting from March 8-12. The first such event was held at the U.S. space center in Colorado Springs, with some 60 participants from 10 NATO nations and Russia. While the exercise was quite limited, such cooperation should be viewed with some level of suspicion. Such joint exercises threaten to erode the sort of strategic clarity necessary to remember that Russia is not an ally, but indeed rather our “strategic competitor.” The concrete effect of such strategic obfuscation is that American missile defenses will not evolve into robust and comprehensive defenses capable of defending, but will be sharply limited to intercepting only second rate missiles from third rate countries.
        The Command Post Exercise (CPX) consisted of computer simulations designed to “test equipment compatibility and other technical issues” related to “theatre missile defense,” i.e., those systems capable of intercepting short-range missiles.
        Such cooperation has evolved from initial efforts in the mid-1990s under the Clinton administration. Missile defense cooperation may appear innocuous, even salutary. Yet there should also be a legitimate concern should these steps lead to more substantial cooperation, which prevents the limited missile defenses being deployed in Alaska and elsewhere from evolving into a defense capable of defending not only against rogue states, but especially against the Russian nuclear arsenal.
        Such a partnership would effectively treat Russia as no less a threat than other nuclear powers such as Britain or France. As such, we would not even attempt to evolve our defenses to a level capable of defending against Russia or China. So far from missile defense’s promise overthrowing the dangerous doctrines of mutually assured destruction (MAD) or “strategic stability,” partnerships with Russia in the area of missile defense would only ensure that teh former Soviet Union retains the ability to threaten America with nuclear weapons for decades to come.
        The NATO press releases emphasize the importance of “interoperability.” During the Cold War, interoperability, familiarily with allies’ systems, and interchangeable parts generally were important to unite NATO forces against a common enemy, the Soviet Union. Is America really prepared to trust the former Soviet Union as such an ally? We should not be.  (Article, Link) 

Patriot (PAC-3) Missile Intercept Test a Success

March 4, 2004 :: Lockheed Martin :: News

A Patriot Advanced Capability 3 (PAC-3) missile interceptor successfully destroyed a mock tactical ballistic missile, known as a “Patriot-As-A-Target” (PAAT), during a test at the White Sands Missile Range. Two PAC-3 interceptors were “ripple fired”—that is, fired one after another, a few seconds apart, both independently tracking the incoming target and homing in on it. The first interceptor destroyed the target, in this case likely a modified PAC-2, which had been made to simulate a SCUD short range missile. The second missile subsequently self-destructed.
        The highly successful PAC-3 interceptor has performed in the recent Iraq war, and will now also be used for the MEADS defense system. (More »»») 

THAAD Renamed

March 1, 2004 :: Honolulu Advertiser :: News

The Theatre High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) missile defense program has apparently been renamed, but its acronym will remain the same. The “T” in THAAD will now stand for now “Terminal,” referring to the last phase in a ballistic missile’s flight in which the interceptor destroys it. The Honolulu Advertiser cites a February 26 MDA release that the change better reflects its role in the nation’s Ballistic Missile Defense System.
        A more complete explanation, however, may indicate that the change is more than bureaucratic: specifically, a belated updating of new policy language indicated by the December 16, 2002 National Security Policy Directive 23 of President Bush, which repudiated the artificial distinction between “theatre” and “national” missile defense. The reason THAAD was renamed, in other words, is because the term “theatre missile defense” is obsolete, made so by the 2002 withdrawal from the ABM Treaty.
        The terms “theatre” and “national” which came into use due to constraints imposed by the ABM Treaty of 1972, and became important when accords were signed in the 1990s which permitted the development of “theatre” systems capable of intercepting short-range missiles, and “national” defenses capable of intercepting long-range ICBMs. By only permitting theatre defenses, the sacrosanct doctrine of mutually assured destruction (MAD) with the former Soviet Union was left intact.
        Although the distinction between theatre (short-range) and national (long range) missile defenses is obsolete, this does not mean that reliance upon a policy of mutually assured destruction (MAD) has similarly gone by the wayside. The revised deployment will have its own revised vocabulary designed to articulate the application of MAD to changed circumstances. The “limited” ground based missile defense system to be deployed this year in Alaska is designed to intercept long range missiles, but it will have too few interceptors to intercept more than a handful. For the immediate future, the dangerous policy of MAD will apparently remain intact vis a vis those countries—currently, Russia and China—capable of producing enough ICBMs to overwhelm such “limited” defenses.
        Update: The March 3 edition of Inside Missile Defense notes that the tests this year will be the first in four years, and represent a substantially improved system. This, then, could be another impetus for a name change.  (More »»») 

Third Test Flight of GMD Missile Booster a Success

January 27, 2004 :: The Missile Defense Agency :: News

Yesterday’s test of a new booster rocket for the Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) system was a success. The test, Integrated Flight Test-13b, began with an Orbital booster rocket lifting off from the Kwajalein Atoll in the Pacific, and then traveling to a simulated intercept point some 800 miles downrange and at an approximate altitude of 170 miles. No intercept was attempted, although a target missile and a kill vehicle were simulated. The successful test follows another held on January 9. (More »»») 

Successful Test-Launch of GMD Booster

January 9, 2004 :: The Missile Defense Agency :: News

The MDA today conducted a simple booster verification test launch of the three stage Lockheed Martin booster, Booster Verification Test-5, which is to be used for the Ground-Based Midcourse defense system to be deployed this year in Alaska and California.
        A second booster for the GMD system is being built by the Orbital company, which is owned by Boeing. (Article, Link) 

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