June 12, 2007 :: Stratfor :: Analysis
George Friedman of Stratfor analyzes Russia's past hostility to ballistic missile defense and the nature of Russian hostility to the current American plan to construct such a system in the Czech Republic and Poland. Friedman characterizes both the Russian opposition to the plan and its counter-proposal as carefully constructed steps to strain Washington-Warsaw relations and regain influence in Central Europe and the Former Soviet Union.
Historically, Russia has opposed BMD because it would destroy the concept of mutually assured destruction. Since the USSR lacked the economic and technological ability to match the U.S. if it built such a system, Soviet policy makers aggressively combated and killed Reagan's "Star Wars" plan. However, the nature of the opposition has changed. The current U.S. plan uses ten interceptors, hardly enough to diminish Russia's tremendous nuclear deterrent.
Russia has long resented NATO's eastward expansion into its former sphere of influence, but could do little to resist the trend while recovering from the fall of the USSR. "The Russians believed they had an understanding with NATO and the United States, dating back to the fall of the Soviet Union, that NATO would not be extended into Central Europe—and certainly never into the FSU." As its economy has improved, Russia is increasingly verbalizing that grudge, and pushing against that trend. Russia opposes the current missile defense plan not because of historical reasons, explains Friedman, but specifically because of missile defense:
[A]s a symbol of a Polish-U.S. alliance that transcends NATO, it is absolutely vital. The Poles wanted the missiles in their country to symbolize the link, and the Americans wanted them there for the same reason. As long as that link exists, the Poles feel secure, and as long as the Poles feel secure, they will be a thorn in the side of the Russians. The Russian goal of exerting a sphere of influence in the FSU has a broader component. Russia does not expect to regain influence in most of Central Europe— Serbia possibly excepted. It does want the Central Europeans to be sufficiently wary of the Russians as to exercise caution.
Such an alliance would embolden Warsaw and Washington to furthur engage in pro-Western agitation, especially in Ukraine. "Of all of the former European satellites, Poland has been the most openly anti-Russian and the most active in supporting forces in the FSU that also are resisting Russian resurgence."
After feigning outrage over the U.S. plan for months, Russia abruptly changed face and issued a counter-proposal at the G-8 meeting that would place the U.S.'s missiles in Iraq or Turkey and use a pre-existing Russian radar facility in Azerbaijan instead. The proposal masterfully portrays Russia as cooperative and flexible, while leaving the U.S. in a difficult position. Despite the fact that the radar facility is far too close to Iran and the Middle East to prove as efficient as the current plan, "by rejecting the proposal, Washington would look hostile and uncompromising. Accepting it would mean basing the missiles near the Iranian border, possibly too close to intercept long-range missiles fired from there. Using Russian radar—which currently is insufficient for U.S. needs—would make the entire system dependent on Russian cooperation. And pulling the system from Poland would be a signal to Central Europe that military agreements with the United States are subject to negotiation with the Russians. That, of course, is exactly the signal Putin wants sent." Friedman concludes, "The Russians now have very little to lose and quite a bit to gain from confrontation." (Article)
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