May 31, 2006 :: New York Times :: Analysis
Michael Gordon, writing in The New York Times, discusses the Pentagon’s plan to develop a non-nuclear version of the submarine-launched Trident II intercontinental ballistic missile that could be used to attack terrorist camps, enemy missile sites, suspected caches of biological, chemical or nuclear weapons, and other urgent threats. The article features portions of an interview with General James Cartwright, commander of U.S. Strategic Command, who explained the reasoning behind the move toward a non-nuclear system:
In looking for a new weapon, Cartwright said, his goal was a non-nuclear system that could respond to a threat in no more than an hour, including the time that would be needed to secure the president’s authorization to attack. … Neither bombers nor cruise missiles met Cartwright’s requirement because he reasoned that the threat might emerge in a region where the United States lacked bases or had few or no forces. It can take days for the United States to move aircraft and ships into a crisis zone and position them to strike. Bombers can attack remote targets from the United States or bases abroad, but it takes many hours to conduct such a mission. So the Strategic Command developed a plan to fit conventional warheads on existing Trident II ballistic missiles. … The weapon would give the president an option to respond quickly to the sort of immediate dangers that are most likely to become more common in the 21st century without taking the drastic step of resorting to a nuclear-armed ballistic missile.
Cartwright also outlined a number of measures that could be taken to reduce the risk of miscalculation by another nuclear power. The U.S. could notify Russia and other nations of all launches. It could allow foreign nations to monitor tests of the system. “We are going to put a target area in the ocean so people can actually see what it looks like when it hits the earth and don’t confuse this with a mushroom cloud,” Cartwright said. He added that the U.S. could also launch the missiles from parts of the ocean that would not put them on a trajectory toward Russian territory. The U.S. could also establish an American-Russian center where early warning data could be shared. (Article)
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