May 22, 2006 :: Washington Post :: Analysis
Harold Brown and James Schlesinger, two former U.S. secretaries of defense, today published an op-ed in The Washington Post in support of deploying conventional warheads on U.S. ICBMs. The article begins with a detailed description of the very type of situation that would require such warheads.
Within the past hour, a terrorist organization, known to have acquired several nuclear weapons, has been observed by a U.S. imaging system loading the weapons onto vehicles and preparing to leave for an unknown destination. A delay of even an hour or two in launching a U.S. strike on that location could mean the group would depart, contact might be lost, and the weapons would be smuggled into the United States or an allied nation and detonated.
… If the terrorists were far from U.S. aircraft or cruise missiles, the only option available to the president would be to order the use of a ballistic missile—a land-based Minuteman or submarine-based Trident D5—either one of which could hit a target almost anywhere on the globe within a half-hour. One big problem, though: At present, all of these missiles are equipped only with nuclear warheads.
Would the president order a preventive nuclear strike in such circumstances? It’s conceivable, but very unlikely. There would still be doubts as to whether the intelligence was accurate, and even if it was, the consequences of an unprecedented action of this kind might well be regarded as unacceptable—in terms of the risk to innocent lives, of environmental damage and of the expected political repercussions around the world.
Brown and Schlesinger argue that the increasing likelihood of “scenarios requiring prompt, precise, non-nuclear strikes” justifies the Pentagon’s move to replace the nuclear warheads on two of the Trident D5 missiles on every strategic submarine with new highly accurate, conventional warheads. They note, however, that the proposal has been met with strong opposition, both domestically and internationally.
Some have argued that it is unwise to substitute conventional warheads for nuclear ones on strategic submarines even if it’s only on two missiles per submarine. They fear it could be the beginning of a wholesale attempt to replace nuclear capabilities with conventional weapons. Given that submarine-based warheads constitute roughly two-thirds of the U.S. deterrent, and are the component best able to survive, these capabilities should not be compromised, they maintain. But the concept does not require a reduction in submarine-based warheads. Additional nuclear warheads would be added to the remaining nuclear-armed missiles on each submarine to keep the number constant.
Others assert that mistakes could be made in the action messages conveyed to the submarines or that, for some other reason, the granting of a dual mission to strategic submarines could compromise the strict controls that ensure that nuclear missiles are not launched inadvertently. But the Navy has worked out both procedural and physical measures that will avoid any such problems, and it has high credibility in this regard. For decades during the Cold War the Navy maintained both conventional and nuclear versions of air defense missiles, cruise missiles, torpedoes and bombs on its ships and submarines without serious incident.
Still others are concerned that the launch of even one long-range ballistic missile, nuclear-armed or not, could trigger an adverse reaction from Russia and even a counter-launch if Russian leaders feared that they themselves were under attack. Past experience indicates that detection of a single missile launch (especially from a submarine operating area), even if detected and unannounced, might raise a diplomatic issue, but it wouldn’t trigger a military response. In any case, Russian leaders could be notified and the reasons for the strike disclosed as the missile neared its target.
(Article)
» More stories on: Analysis
» Missile details: Scud B variant
