Bolton Blasts Chinese Missile Proliferation
February 8, 2005 :: AP :: News
Undersecretary of State John Bolton publicly blasted China for its persistent and considerable transfers of missile technology to Iran, a state sponsor of terrorism, and other rogue states, in violation of its own non-proliferation pledges. Bolton delivered the firm remarks at a Japan-sponsored conference in Tokyo.
Bolton warned that the US would move aggressively to further sanction Chinese companies providing such transfers, as it has repeatedly in recent years, which he said also included Pakistan, North Korea and Libya:
“On numerous occasions we have expressed our concern about these entities to the Chinese government and have asked Beijing to subject exports by these serial proliferators to persistent and close scrutiny…Unfortunately, we continue to see transfers by these serious proliferators of missile-related items to rogue states and outposts of tyranny such as Iran.”
Update: February 9: Chinese arms control official Liu Zhixian explained that China exercises strict controls any transfers of missile technology to rogue states. (Article, Link)
» More stories on: China, Iran, Proliferation
Ukraine Reportedly Sold Nuclear-Capable Cruise Missiles to China, Iran
February 2, 2005 :: News
Ukrainian lawmaker Hryhoriy Omelchenko recently wrote a letter to newly elected President Viktor Yushchenko claiming that the government of Yushchenko’s predecessor, Leonid Kuchma, in collaboration with members of the military and the state arms company UkrSpetzExport sold some 20 air-launched Kh-55 and Kh-55M cruise missiles, which had the capability to carry nuclear weapons. Of these, six were sent to Iran and six to China, all between 1999 and 2001. The transfers, if true, would violate various non-proliferation agreements. Kuchma’s government is also believed to have sold advanced radar systems to Iraq in 2002, despite UN sanctions to the contrary. An American embassy spokesman in Kiev was quoted by the Associated Press as saying that the United States was “aware of the reports” of such sales and took them “very seriously.”
The Kh-55 cruise missile has a range of 3,000 kilometers, is capable of carrying a 200-kiloton nuclear warhead, and was developed for use on Russian Tupolev long-range bombers. In June 2004, Russia tested an air-launched Kh-55 which may well have been the Kh-55. (Article, Link)
» June 29, 2004: Russia tests air-launched cruise missile
» More stories on: China, Former Soviet Republics, Iran, Proliferation
U.S. Sanctions Major Chinese Firms for Proliferation to Iran
January 18, 2005 :: New York Times :: News
Earlier this month, the State Department yet again sanctioned seven Chinese companies for their illicit proliferation of ballistic missile aid to Iran, a state sponsor of terrorism. Sanctions were also applied against one firm based in Taiwan and one in North Korea. The notice in the Federal Register said that the nine were being penalized for transferring to Iran “equipment and technology controlled under multilateral export control lists.”
As President Bush observed a number of years ago, China is a “strategic competitor” of the United States. It would be well to remember this as we formulate a more aggressive anti-proliferation policies. The real sources of proliferation are Russia and China. It is from these countries that Iraq, Iran, Pakistan, and North Korea received the vast amount of missile technology and equipment. As the New York Times notes, the most recent round of sanctions will probably have little effect on any of these companies’ financial well being. And the companies’ ties to the Chinese government and military make such financial sanctions even less dubious of success. At some level, a policy decision to proliferate such technologies to these regimes has been made. Unless the Chinese government changes that policy, or unless we are willing to boldly identify it and employ more serious sanctions, we must resign ourselves to the inevitability of such proliferation. (Link)
» August 30, 2004: Photographs suggest changes to Shahab reentry device
» January 18, 2005: China says sanctions “not wise”
» September 27, 2004: Seven Chinese companies sanctioned
» November 18, 2004: Powell claims Iran modifying Shahabs to carry nuclear warhead
» More stories on: China, Iran, North Korea, Proliferation
Russia Backpedals Missile Proliferation to Syria, Hezbollah
January 13, 2005 :: News
The Russian newspaper Kommersant recently reported of Russian plans to sell a number of missile systems to Syria, a state sponsor of terrorism and in particular Hezbollah. These included the shoulder-fired SS-18 Igla anti-aircraft missiles, but also and more significantly, eighteen of Russia’s new and made-for-export SS-26 Iskander missile, and the S-300PMU-2 (SA-10) air and missile defense system, similar to that which rings Moscow, and other systems. The S-300PMU-2 system is one of Moscow’s most developed air and missile defense systems. The SS-26 has increasingly made the news for its touted capabilities to evade other air-defenses—possibly the U.S. Patriot interceptors—and the Russian’s plans to market it widely, including in the middle east. The export version of the SS-26 Iskander missile has a reported range of 280 km, sufficient for Syria to strike nearly all of Israel.
At this time, negative publicity may be sufficient reason for Russia to back out of the missile deal, but it nevertheless serves as yet another example of Russia’s long track record of being willing to proliferate missiles and missile technology throughout the world. (More »»»)
» January 12: Original report of planned missile sales by Russian newspaper Kommersant
» January 13: Ivanov denies plans to proliferate Iskanders to Syria
» January 12: Interfax: Colonel Vladimir Anokhin defends missile sales to Syria
» More stories on: Proliferation, Russia, Syria, Terrorism
» Missile details: SS-26
» Missile system details for: S-300P (SA-10 Grumble)
L.A. Businessman Charged with Aiding Iranian Missile Program
January 12, 2005 :: Newsday :: News
An Iranian-born American businessman has been charged with smuggling equipment to Iran to aid in their ballistic missile programs, according to a report by Newsday. Mohammad Farahbakhsh of Los Angeles has been charged with sending “pressure sensors and other equipment from Stamford to the United Arab Emirates, where they were to be shipped to Iran,” specifically to a company, the Shahid Hemmat Industrial Group, which has previously been sanctioned twice by the U.S. government for aiding Iranian missile development. Farahbakhsh is reportedly a so-called “dual citizen” in both Iran and the United States. (Article, Link)
» More stories on: Iran, Proliferation
Chinese Nuclear Weapon Plans in Libya Investigated
January 7, 2005 :: News
U.S. Intelligence is asking Pakistan to kindly convey written questions to the now infamous proliferator A. Q. Khan about how Libya managed to acquire a surprising level of nuclear and other missile capability, reports Geostrategy-Direct. The existence of such plans was previously reported in July of 2004. Of particular concern are how Chinese-language documents for the design for a nuclear warhead to be fitted on a missile, came to be found in Libya. Pakistan which has pardoned Khan, will also not permit U.S. officials to question him directly. Pakistan is said to be a friend of the United States in the war on terror and anti-proliferation efforts.
This latest incident only confirms that Pakistan is but an intermediary for the larger proliferation by China and Russia. It is no secret, after all, that Pakistan’s missile and nuclear programs were both heavily aided by China. U.S. Intelligence should probably not expect Pakistan to be too forthcoming with incriminating evidence. Perhaps the United States should rather ask China. (Article, Link)
» July 22, 2004: Libya had Chinese nuclear weapon blueprints, materials to build
» More stories on: China, Libya, Pakistan, Proliferation
New Publication: Getting MAD
December 14, 2004 :: Analysis
The latest in a series of books co-published by the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center and the Army War College’s Strategic Studies Institute has been released and is available in full online. Edited by Henry D. Sokolski, Getting MAD is a collection of timely essays about how one may think about nuclear proliferation and nuclear strategy today.
Claremont Institute Fellow Mark T. Clark contributes a chapter to the book, which considers the recent nuclear proliferation to a number of smaller regimes, and asks whether the cold war framework of purely offensive deterrence, namely mutually assured destruction, can be imposed upon them with any level of confidence—or even with a straight face. Do North Korea and Iran pursue nuclear weapons and the means to deliver them only to deter others? Clark concludes that “the idea that SNPs [small nuclear powers] are limited to some form of mini-MAD deterrent seems unreasonably optimistic. The optimism rests on the notion that because MAD, even its mini-version, would be so catastrophic that its realization is exceedingly remote, if not a virtual impossibility.”
Such faith in the nuclear deterrence doctrines of the past rests upon the idea of that somehow merely technological advances in destructive capacity—the “nuclear revolution”—have somehow rendered obsolete the classical rules, ends, and possible outcomes of war. But human nature remains the same, and so do the purposes of strategy. It is for precisely these reasons that war, even nuclear war, is still possible even in the post-Cold War era. And it is for just this reason that missile defenses to defend against the inevitable proliferation of such technologies are so important. (Article, Link)
» Getting MAD in .pdf form
» Biography and writings by Mark T. Clark
» More stories on: Analysis, Nuclear Weapons, Proliferation
Iran Developing Longer Range Missiles
December 2, 2004 :: New York Times :: News
Citing an Iranian opposition group, the New York Times today reports that Iran is secretly developing a ballistic missile of considerably longer-range than that which it currently admits to having, in part with the aid of North Korean scientists. The dissident group, also said to be a terrorist group, says the new missile would have a range of more than 1,500 miles (2,400km). Iran has already tested versions of its Shahab-3/4 with a range of 2,000km. Such a range would give the terrorist sponsoring nation the capability to target much of Europe.
Today the U.S. State Department also slapped sanctions on four Chinese entities (including one state-run firm) and one North Korean company, for their aiding Iran with its missile and weapons programs. Iran’s nuclear and ballistic missile programs are not taking place in a vacuum, and their progress should come as no surprise. The proliferation of ballistic missile and weapons programs to Iran would seem to be a matter of high state policy for China and North Korea, as well as Russia, whose entities regularly receive similar sanctions and which is a primary contributor to Iran’s nuclear reactor programs.
Update: Dec. 3: Other reports include a more detailed description of the report by the National Council of Resistance of Iran. The council is said to have identified not one, but two longer-range missiles under development, calling them Ghadr 101 and Ghadr 110. Their ranges are said to be 2,500 and 3,000km, respectively. Reuters compares these missiles, being developed at the Hemmat Missile Industries complex, to the more advanced Scud E. Also of note is that the council described Iran’s August test of a Shahab missile as being of the Shahab-4, rather than the Shahab-3. Some have speculated that Iran’s retaining the same nomenclature for a more advanced missile may be part of a design to understate its capabilities. Iran has only admitted to having or pursuing missiles with a range of no more than 2,000km.
The council quoted by Middle East Newsline on December 2 describes the range of the Shahab-4 as between 2,000 to 3,000 kilometers—which may well be possible, but a 3,000km range for the Shahab-4 would seem to undercut the claim that a 3,000km range Ghadr missile would constitute a real improvement. (Article, Link)
» Dec. 2: State Dept. imposes sanctions on Chinese and North Korean entities
» Dec. 3: Reuters: two “Ghadr” missiles under development
» Dec. 3: Middle East Newsline: Iran-China satellite accord will aid Iranian missile accuracy
» More stories on: China, Iran, Proliferation
» Missile details: Shahab-3, Shahab-4
Powell: Iran Adapting Missiles to Carry Nuclear Warheads
November 18, 2004 :: Washington Post :: News
Departing Secretary of State Colin Powell recently remarked that Iran is preparing its missile systems to carry nuclear weapons. Despite the attention to the story, however, Powell’s comments do not constitute any new revelation. Nor should they come as any surprise, especially given the aid Iran has been receiving from abroad, and in particular from China and Russia. Unless and until one puts together the pieces to see the larger geopolitical alliances responsible for proliferation, one will continue to be surprised by these numerous and apparently unrelated stories. (More »»»)
» Nov. 18: Interfax: Russia will continue to aid Iran’s nuclear program
» Apr. 27: John Bolton: Russia China proliferating; Iran lying about peaceful character of nuclear program
» Nov. 18: Powell remarks on Iranian nuclear modifications to missiles
» More stories on: China, Iran, Nuclear Weapons, Proliferation
» Missile details: Shahab-3, Shahab-4
The Real Sources of Ballistic Missile Proliferation
November 11, 2004 :: Ha'aretz :: Analysis
An article in today’s Ha’aretz describes the work of a German scientist by the name of Robert Schmucker who has been making a case about the nature of ballistic missile proliferation, one which sounds similar to that so often made here, at Missilethreat.com. Namely, that the real sources of such a problem are less from the spontaneous research programs of rogue states, but rather primarily from the considerable, and perhaps not altogether unconscious, proliferation by China and Russia. An excerpt: (More »»»)
» More stories on: Analysis, China, Proliferation, Russia
