Richardson on Cruise Missile Proliferation
August 4, 2006 :: Canberra Times :: Analysis
“How did the [Chinese] C-802 [CSS-N-8] anti-ship cruise missile—rated by experts as among the most lethal in the world—get into Hezbollah’s hands?” asks Michael Richardson, a research fellow at the Institute of South East Asian Studies in Singapore in today’s edition of The Canberra Times. He goes on to discuss the “extensive but little-known trade in increasingly sophisticated missiles that have the capacity to upset stability and the balance of power in conflict-prone areas of the world.” The supply trail runs from China to Iran and then into Lebanon either by sea or over land via Syria. Iran and Syria are Hezbollah’s allies against Israel and the U.S. China has used Israel as a military supplier in the past, but has political and energy interests in Iran and Syria that are now in conflict with those of Israel. The tale of the C-802, Richardson writes, “is a classic story about the dog-eat-dog nature of the global arms trade and the destabilising impact of weapons that are not effectively controlled by national regulation or international treaties and agreements.” At present, there is no ban on the proliferation of anti-ship cruise missiles such as the C-802. Richardson lays out a plausible and frightening scenario based on the disclosure early last year by officials of Ukraine’s recently installed democratic government of the illegal export of 20 Russian-made Kh-55SM cruise missiles, each with a range of 3,000 km:
The Kh-55 family of missiles is Russia’s main nuclear-armed cruise missile launched from the air by strategic bombers. The missiles, exported in 2000 and 2001, were diverted from Soviet stocks left behind after Ukraine declared independence in 1991 after the collapse of the Soviet Union. The illicit sale took place despite the fact that Ukraine was an regime member. Twelve of the Kh-55SMs reportedly went to Iran, six to China and two to Pakistan. Iran is alleged to have paid nearly $US50million ($A65.5million) for its missiles.
None of the Kh-55SMs from Ukraine had their 200 kiloton nuclear warheads. But the deal included the system for testing, programming and launching the missiles which had been in service for a number of years. China and Pakistan, both declared nuclear powers, evidently wanted to strip the missiles to copy and incorporate its design, propulsion and guidance components into their own efforts to develop long-range cruise missiles—a process known as reverse engineering.
Iran, too, may have similar interests in using some of the Kh-55SMs as a shortcut for developing a derivative long-range cruise missile—one capable of striking Israel from some 1500 km away. But having a dozen of the missiles could also enable Iran to fit the weapon to its Soviet built Su-24 strike aircraft or fire it from ships or land-based truck launchers.
Robertson concludes: “The ultimate nightmare for Israel and the U.S. would be a Kh-55SM-type missile, armed with an Iranian nuclear warhead.” (Article, Link)
» More stories on: Analysis, China, Cruise Missiles, Iran, Proliferation
U.S. Sanctions Indian Firms for Missile-Related Proliferation to Iran
July 31, 2006 :: Reuters :: News
The U.S. will impose sanctions on two private Indian companies for missile-related transactions with Iran, reports Reuters. The identity of the Indian firms has not yet been released, although one U.S. official said that the transfers took place in the first half of 2005 and involved “dual-use items related to missiles.” Since 2003, the U.S. has filed at least eight non-proliferations sanctions against at least seven Indian companies or persons, not including the two new firms. By comparison, the U.S. has sanctioned Chinese companies 70 times over the past six years. (Article, Link)
» More stories on: India, Iran, Proliferation
LA Times: North Korea-Iran Ties Strengthening
July 27, 2006 :: LA Times :: News
The Los Angeles Times today published a report on the growing ties between North Korea and Iran, including the possible sale of ballistic missiles to Tehran. The report quotes Israeli intelligence sources, who believe that the Islamic Republic recently bought 18 intermediate-range missiles from Pyongyang. In April 2006, Israeli intelligence chief Amos Yadlin stated that Israel had evidence that the sale had taken place, and that the 18 missiles in question were based on the Russian SS-N-6 submarine-launched ballistic missile. According to Yadlin, the North Korean variant has a range of 2,500 km, which would allow Iran to attack Israel and much of southern Europe. The Los Angeles Times also quotes Uzi Rubin, former head of the Israeli missile defense program, who recently stated that Iran is also interested in North Korea’s long-range Taep’o-dong 2 ballistic missile, which would greatly extend its striking power.
According to the Times, the North Korea-Iran nexus dates back to the 1980s when Pyongyang sold missiles and launchers to Tehran for use in the Iran-Iraq War. The two nations later collaborated on the development of Iran’s Shahab missiles, which are based on the North Korean No-dong. In recent years, satellites have spotted Iranian cargo planes at Pyongyang’s Sunan Airport, and U.S. intelligence now believes that Iran conducted a missile test on North Korea’s behalf on at least one occasion. Last week, reports emerged that Iranian observers had been on hand to witness North Korea’s July 4 test launch of seven long- and short-range missiles, including the Taep’o-dong 2. (Article, Link)
» More stories on: Iran, Israel, North Korea, Proliferation
» Missile details: SS-N-17, Tien Ma 1
Russia, India to Produce 1,000 BrahMos Cruise Missiles
July 22, 2006 :: BBC Worldwide Monitoring :: News
Russia and India plan to manufacture 1,000 BrahMos supersonic cruise missiles over the next 10 years through their joint venture company, reports the Indian news agency PTI. Of these 1,000 missiles, nearly 50 percent will be exported to client states. Russia and India have already invested $300 million in BrahMos Aerospace, which drew upon technological skills and capabilities from both countries to design, develop, and manufacture the missile. The 2,500-kg BrahMos has a strike range of 290 km and a maximum speed of Mach 2.8 (approximately one kilometer per second). (Article, Link)
» More stories on: Cruise Missiles, India, Proliferation, Russia
Israel-Lebanon Conflict Fueled by Iran
July 21, 2006 :: Analysis
The ongoing conflict in Israel and Lebanon demonstrates the widespread character of the war on terrorism, the expanding regional influence of Iran, and, more specifically, the Islamic Republic’s complete willingness to proliferate ballistic and cruise missile technology to terrorist entities it considers to be political and military allies.
Over the past week, Western intelligence officials and experts have concluded that the Iran-sponsored Lebanese terrorist organization, Hezbollah, has stockpiled enough firepower to sustain a protracted fight against the Jewish state that threatens all of northern Israel and possibly much further. Hezbollah (“The Party of God” in Arabic) is a Shiite organization that emerged during the Lebanese civil war in the early 1980s. It is the principal suspect for the 1983 suicide bombings of the U.S. embassy and Marine barracks in Beirut. Since the 1990s, Hezbollah has built up its forces in southern Lebanon with the help of Iran, and has been intermittently firing Katyusha rockets into northern Israel. The cheap, unguided, low-flying projectiles have a range of approximately 20 km and are capable of causing considerable damage when launched into dense civilian populations. Sources indicate that many of these rockets are manufactured in Iran. Over the past week, Hezbollah guerrillas have fired hundreds of Katyusha rockets into dozens of towns and cities across northern Israel, killing and wounding civilians in the heaviest bombardment in over a decade. Hezbollah is believed to have tens of thousands of Katyushas in its arsenal.
More worrisome than the unsophisticated Katyusha rockets are the larger, more powerful ballistic and cruise missiles that Hezbollah has obtained through Iran. Israeli intelligence believes that Hezbollah possesses hundreds of Iranian-made Fajr-3 and Fajr-5 short-range ballistic missiles, which have ranges of 40 and 75 km respectfully and allow the terrorist organization to strike deep inside Israel. On July 14, an Israeli air strike destroyed at least one Iranian-made Zelzal-2 short-range ballistic missile, according to the AP. According to officials from the Israeli Defense Force, an Israeli aircraft targeted a truck carrying an unknown number of Zelzal-2 missiles, and the force of the blast sent at least one missile flying into the air. The Zelzal-2 (“earthquake” in Farsi) is believed to have a range of anywhere from 120 to 400 km, and would be capable of striking Tel Aviv if launched successfully.
Hezbollah has also demonstrated that it possesses Iranian copies of Chinese cruise missiles. On July 14, Hezbollah guerrillas attacked Israel’s INS Hanit Eilat-class missile corvette with an Iranian-made Noor (Tondar) radar-guided anti-ship cruise missile, according to Jane’s Defense Weekly. The Noor is an Iranian copy of the Chinese C-802 (CSS-N-8), reported to have a range of approximately 200 km. Hezbollah guerrillas fired the missile from the Lebanese shore at the Hanit from a range of 16 km, which prevented the Israelis from activating the ship’s missile defense systems. A second Noor, also aimed at the Hanit, missed and instead hit a Cambodian merchant ship 60 km away, which sank although its crew members were rescued. Hezbollah is believed to possess dozens of Noor cruise missiles.
Finally, Iran’s well-trained Revolutionary Guard is believed to be providing on-the-ground military advisers to Hezbollah with some level of coordination with Syria, according to Anthony Cordesman, the respected Middle East expert at the Washington-based Center for Strategic and International Studies, as well as several U.S. officials. If this report is accurate, it means that the Islamic Republic has expanded well beyond its traditional role of financier, proliferator, and spiritual ally, and could in fact be the driving political and military force behind Hezbollah’s recent and future actions. (Link)
» More stories on: Analysis, Iran, Israel, Proliferation, Terrorism
» Missile details: Zelzal-1/2/3
Iranian Observers Present at Recent North Korean Missile Tests
July 20, 2006 :: Reuters :: News
Iranian observers were present at all of the seven recent missile tests by North Korea, according to the State Department. Speaking before a U.S. Senate hearing, Assistant Secretary of State Chris Hill, the chief U.S. negotiator with Pyongyang, confirmed that Iranian representatives had observed all seven tests, which included the launch of a Taep’o-dong 2 long-range ballistic missile, and six shorter-range No-dong and Scud missiles.
In recent weeks, U.S. officials have expressed serious concerns that cash-strapped Pyongyang has been attempting to sell its ballistic missiles and possibly nuclear material. “Our understanding is that North Korea has had a number of commercial relations in the Middle East with respect to missiles,” Hill said. The worry is that Pyongyang will proliferate its technology to rogue nations such as Iran, or transnational Islamic terrorist organizations. Hill and Senator George Allen (R-VA) noted that North Korea’s ties with Iran are of even greater concern now, as the Islamic militant group Hezbollah, backed by Iran, fires its Iranian-made rockets and cruise missiles at Israel. (Article, Link)
» More stories on: Iran, North Korea, Proliferation
» Missile details: No-dong 1, Tien Ma 1
Blank on Moscow’s Complacency Toward North Korea
June 24, 2006 :: Analysis
Stephen Blank, professor at the Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College, notes that Russia has displayed “amazing insouciance” toward the possible North Korean long-range missile test. Russian Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov recently referred to warnings of a possible test as “purely speculative,” while Russian President Vladimir Putin’s aide, Igor Shuvalov, referred to North Korea’s actions as a “psychological test.” Blank documents the Kremlin’s only complaint to date, the fact that nobody has formally notified it of any potential North Korean missile launch. Among Russian experts, the consensus seems to be that Pyongyang’s launch preparations are nothing more than the usual manifestations of political blackmail to secure economic advantages, or perhaps jealousy over the concessions that Iran has been gaining due to its own nuclear program. Blank notes that such conclusions indicate a “widening sphere of discord with Washington” over the issues of North Korea and proliferation and the North Korean. “Under these circumstances,” he writes, “it is reasonable to ask whose psyche needs testing: those who proliferate or those who remain in denial about proliferation’s ultimate consequences for them and everyone else.” (Article, Link)
» More stories on: Analysis, North Korea, Proliferation, Russia
» Missile details: Tien Ma 1
Polish Analyst: Russia May Send S-300 Missiles to Iran via Belarus
June 7, 2006 :: BBC Worldwide Monitoring :: Analysis
Russia may export S-300 air/missile defense interceptors to Iran via Belarus, writes Polish analyst Piotr Koscinski on the Rzeczpospolita newspaper website. Koscinski cites the Russian publication Vzglyad, which published an article in April 2006 suggesting that Belarusian President Aleksandr Lukashenka himself would be the go-between for the transaction. The move would allow Russia to categorically deny the sale of these weapons to Iran, and maintain its image within the G-8 and on the world stage. According to Jane’s Intelligence Digest, an Iranian military delegation visited Minsk in January 2006, and negotiations surrounding the transfer of S-300 systems took place. According to Aleksandr Rakhimchyk, deputy director of the Moscow-based Institute of Military and Political Analysis, if Iran receives Russian-made S-300 systems, the U.S. would not be able to carry out a military operation against the Islamic Republic “without suffering significant losses.” (Article, Link)
» More stories on: Analysis, Former Soviet Republics, Iran, Proliferation, Russia
» Missile system details for: S-300P (SA-10 Grumble), S-300V (SA-12A Gladiator, SA-12B Giant)
Henderson on Saudi-China-Pakistan Missile Ties
April 23, 2006 :: Analysis
Simon Henderson, a senior fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, recently commented on missile ties between Saudi Arabia, China, and Pakistan. The Saudis currently possess an arsenal of aging Chinese-designed CSS-2 missiles, purchased from China in the 1980s. Riyadh hopes to upgrade this arsenal with modern Chinese-designed missiles and perhaps nuclear warheads to create a deterrent against Iran. Henderson speculates that the Saudis will attempt to acquire from Pakistan both Chinese-designed missiles and dual-key Pakistani nuclear warheads. Under such a system, Saudi Arabia would have the key that controls the missiles, while Pakistan would have the key that controls the warheads. The result would technically not breach the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, and perhaps evade Chinese international obligations against the transfer of ballistic missiles. However, a nuclear-armed Saudi Arabia would severely undermine U.S. diplomatic efforts to block Iran’s nuclear weapons program, and dramatically alter the regional balance of power.
Henderson notes that Saudi Arabia’s King Abdullah visited Pakistan in February 2006, on his way back from China. In addition, Crown Prince Sultan, the Saudi defense minister, was in Pakistan in April. On Sultan’s previous trip to Pakistan in 1999, he toured Pakistan’s Kahuta uranium enrichment and missile production center, where he was escorted by the then director, the nuclear proliferator A.Q. Khan. (Article, Link)
» More stories on: Analysis, China, Pakistan, Proliferation
» Missile details: CSS-2
Six Chinese Companies Sanctioned for Proliferation
January 1, 2006 :: Interfax :: News
The U.S. has placed six Chinese state-owned companies under sanctions for selling WMD materials to Iran. According to Interfax, the materials included cruise and ballistic missile systems. Under the terms of the Iran Nonproliferation Act, the six companies will be prohibited from doing business with the U.S. government, and U.S. firms will not be allowed to sell “sensitive products,” meaning equipment that can be converted into WMD or delivery systems, to these companies. The Iran Nonproliferation Act was set up to deter international support for Iran’s nuclear, chemical, biological and missile programs.
The six companies are China National Aerotechnology Import Export Corp (CATIC), China North Industries Corporation (NORINCO), Zibo Chemet Equipment Co, Hongdu Aviation Industry Group (HAIG), Ounion International Economic and Technical Cooperation Ltd, and Limmt Metallurgy and Minerals Company Ltd. CATIC, NORINCO and Zibo have been sanctioned in the past. This is the fifth time Zibo and Norinco have been sanctioned, since May 2002 and June 2003 respectively. CATIC was previously sanctioned in December 2004. (Article, Link)
» More stories on: China, Proliferation
