August 31, 2004 :: News
Six years ago today, in 1998, North Korea surprised the world with the launch of long range Taepo Dong I missile, which traveled over Japan and eventually fell into the Pacific. Mainstream intelligence analysts were flummoxed; since North Korea had hitherto only tested its much more primitive No Dong missile, they were not considering other possibilities. Thus providing an example of what the 9-11 Commission would later term a “failure of imagination.”
In fact, the launch was of an SLV, a space launch vehicle, designed to put into orbit a small radio broadcasting the immortal hymns of Kim Jong Il. This simply means that the missile was put on a slightly different trajectory, to go into orbit rather than deliver a warhead to another spot on the ground. That the launch failed did not diminish the importance of the test for military applications, showing that North Korea had the capability for long range missiles—even if in this case the final stage did not reach orbit.
The launch did not come as a complete surprise to all parties, however, especially the nine members of the Rumsfeld Commission, who just weeks before had completed their report warning that a rogue nation could deploy an intercontinental range missile—the Taepo Dong I classified as such, by virtue of its range—within five years of doing so, if only by strapping together smaller and fairly primitive Scud missiles. The test, in combination with the Rumsfeld Committee’s bold but unanimous report, were instrumental in reenergizing the push for missile defenses. The next year, Congress passed and Clinton signed H.R. 4—”The National Missile Defense Act of 1999”—into law, which stated that it is the policy of the United States to deploy a missile defense as soon as technologically feasible. Clinton signed the law because it was politically impossible to do otherwise. While the law stated that missile defenses should be deployed when technologically feasible, Clinton added four reasons that would guide any decision about whether or not to deploy, namely four good enough excuses to provide a basis for why he would not carry this law into execution. The same law is frequently cited as the basis for the Bush administrations beginning to deploy a limited system in Alaska, due later this year if all goes as planned.
» Rumsfeld Report text
» National Missile Defense Act of 1999 text
» More stories on: North Korea
» Missile details: Taep'o-dong 1 SLV, Taep'o-dong 1
