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News Archives: Policy

NFIRE Could Intercept Missile Target From Space by 2006

May 6, 2004 :: Global Security Newswire :: News

The Missile Defense agency is reportedly planning to test the Near Field Infrared Experiment (NFIRE) system in 2006, according to the Globalsecurity Newswire, citing an apparent email discussion among defense officials. The NFIRE has the potential to aid in the development of a space-based kill vehicle to be used to intercept a ballistic missile.
        The NFIRE spacecraft is said to be under construction and planned for launch in late 2005. The 2006 test, supposing it were to occur, would probably not involve an interception, except incidentally, but only the gathering of sensor data. The interceptor is said to not be capable of “weapon-like” movement; “There is a significant chance the KV will impact the target, but that is not our objective.”  (More »»») 

NY Times: This Time, Missile Defense Is For Real

May 4, 2004 :: New York Times :: News

The New York Times runs a piece noting the plans for missile defense deployment this year. Noting that “This Time It’s Real,” the article points to the problem which has thus far plagued missile defense, namely that while limited research and development have gone, nothing has actually been fielded. Such is true of the administrations of Bill Clinton, George H. W. Bush, and even the Reagan administration which began the Strategic Defense Initiative.
        The Bush administration has broken from the paralysis of inaction by committing to an actual deployment. The Times notes of critics’ claims that the land-based system to be deployed has been insufficiently tested, but it should be remembered that part of the purpose of the Fort Greeley Alaska deployment has always been to provide a test bed for further testing.
        The Times also remarks upon the relative quietude with which the deployment is proceeding, which has been happening with “little fanfare.” While the deployment is certainly deserving of fanfare, the fact that it has not elicited it is of a very secondary importance. For the first time in some 30 years, namely since the brief-lived deployment at Grand Forks, Nebraska in the mid 1970s, the United States will have some very limited defense against certain strikes.
        It must also be remembered that the Alaska and California deployments will and should be but the first step in an evolving and layered defense, which one day should protect the United States from any missile attack whatsoever. Quoted in the Times piece include critics Richard Garwin and Dean Wilkening, the latter of whom suggests that the 2004 deployment is politically rushed and remarks that “I simply don’t see the threat.” Such delusion seems almost inexplicable, when compared with the almost daily news of increasing proliferation of missiles around the world. (Article, Link) 

Hackett on the KEI

April 29, 2004 :: Washington Times :: Analysis

Writing in the Washington Times, James T. Hackett worries about the direction the Missile Defense Agency is taking by pursuing programs such as the Kinetic Energy Interceptor (KEI), a land-based boost phase system, while ignoring the technologies available for space-based systems like Brilliant Pebbles.
        Hackett also responds to MDA Director Kadish’s statement this week that because the Alaska ground-based interceptor and the Aegis sea-based deployments are on schedule, the United States would be fully protected from North Korea by the end of the year. Hackett responds that North Korea is believed to already have 8 nuclear weapons and to be producing more at the rate of 4-8 per year.
        Hackett argues that the KEI program diverts attention and resources from better programs and undermines better directed efforts:

Under Mr. Bush’s father, this concept [Brilliant Pebbles] was studied extensively, was found feasible, and much development work was done. Last year, that program was expected to receive $6 billion for further development over the next five years. That amount now has been cut to $843 million, with only $11 million for 2005. At the same time, more than $4.5 billion has been reallocated to the KEI program.

        Hackett points out that the object of the KEI, to intercept a missile in boost phase, is much better accomplished from space than from land. But the funds being poured into KEI should signal a greater warning to the future of effective missile defenses: “Worst of all, the KEI program is under Terry Little, a former Air Force official who allegedly said at a conference last year he is proud to be a liberal Democrat, missile defense skeptic, and opponent of weapons in space.” (Article, Link) 

Center for Security Policy on BMD Budget, KEI

April 28, 2004 :: Center for Security Policy :: Analysis

The Center for Security Policy weighs in on the fights in Congress over missile defense appropriations, with some harsh criticism of the current distribution of funds. The problem is the support of systems like the ground-based Kinetic Energy Interceptor, which is absorbing billions each year depriving far more effective programs from seeing the light of day.

        Illustrating the limitations of the KEI, the Center notes that:

In fact, KEI program manager Terry Little, has produced a chart which notes, with considerable understatement, that a “Risk Item” is the fact that “Geo-Political Basing Constraints are a Driver of KEI Military Utility.” Just how much so is revealed by Mr. Little’s assessment that in order to secure coverage of Iranian ICBM launch sites, the U.S. would have to deploy KEI systems in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Uzbekistan. Similar coverage of North Korea would require KEI deployments in Russia. Recent experience with at least some of these countries suggests that they may prove to be unreliable, or at the very least insecure, basing countries.

        At the same time that funding for the KEI is up, to 4.2 billion, programs such as Aegis, THAAD, and most importantly space-based interceptors, are being neglected.  (Article, Link) 

Kyl Says Democrats’ Amendments Would Stifle Missile Defense

April 28, 2004 :: Inside Defense :: News

At a breakfast sponsored by the National Defense University Foundation yesterday, Republican Senator Jon Kyl, of Arizona, warned that Democrats plan to put the brakes on the development of missile defense in upcoming budget battles on the FY-2005 national defense authorization bill and the defense appropriations bill, according to a report in Inside Missile Defense.
        Kyl said the Democrats’ opposition to missile defense, grounded in the belief that appropriations should go to either missile defense or counterterrorism - but not both, presents a “false dichotomy.”
        “I suspect the Democrats are trying to get to the right of the president for the war on terror, but they will try to take money from missile defense not adequately defended by Republicans or the president,” Kyl remarked. “But you can have both.”
        He also noted the importance of a “layered” defense, allowing missiles to be shot down during boost, midcourse, and terminal phases, and a “greater focus” on the role of a space component of missile defense.
        Michigan Senate Democrat Carl Levin, ranking member of the Senate Armed Services Committee, is reported to be leading the opposition to missile defense spending in hopes to derail $500 million for missile interceptors. Citing a General Accouting Office report, Levin said the program suffers from “testing shortfalls,” and alleged violations of acquisition laws. (Link) 

Kadish: U.S. Protected from North Korea by End of Year

April 27, 2004 :: Yahoo News :: News

Lt. Gen. Ron Kadish, director of the Missile Defense Agency, told reporters on Tuesday that by the end of the year, the United States should be able to defend against a North Korean ballistic missile attack, after the activation of ground-based interceptors in Alaska and California.
        Two more tests of the interceptors are set for this year, with one expected in late spring or early summer.  (Article, Link) 

Spring on 9-11 and Missile Defense

April 12, 2004 :: Fox News :: Analysis

Baker Spring of the Heritage Foundation weighs in on the recent debate over whether missile defense was too much a priority prior to September 11. (Article, Link) 

Kadish to Retire in September

April 9, 2004 :: News

The Missile Defense Agency announced that its Director, Lt. Gen. Ronald Kadish, will retire on September 1st, and that President Bush has nominated Air Force Major General Henry “Trey” Obering, MDA’s current Deputy Director to take his place, provided he is confirmed by the Senate. (Link) 

Holton on the Logic of Rice’s Would-Be Speech on Missile Defense

April 8, 2004 :: Analysis

Christopher Holton writes at Worldtribune.com on the criticisms NSA Rice has been receiving for her would be speech on missile defense. Holton correctly observes that such criticisms stem from, or are at least only consistent with, a faith in untenable policy of mutually assured destruction, but also points to statements by various prominent opponents of missile defense which contradict the basic suppositions for such a policy. (Article, Link) 

U.S., Russia Preparing to Sign Missile Defense Agreement

April 7, 2004 :: News

Russian Defense Minister Sergey Ivanov in Oslo reported that the U.S. and Russia are preparing to sign an agreement which would provide Russia access to U.S. missile defense technologies, and vice versa, and become a basis for the development of a joint missile defense system. Ivanov spoke of missile tracking systems, but indicated actual development could also take place. The comments came amidst his confirming that Russia would cooperate with the Bush Administration’s Proliferation Security Initiative, designed to intercept weapons of mass destruction and missiles before they can be transferred to, from, or between rogue states.
        One might well be suspicious of such cooperation with Russia. Agreements which would narrowly limit limit U.S. missile defenses or make their technologies intimate knowledge of Russia—and anyone Russia chose to give the information to—would effectively return us to a situation very similar to that under the ABM Treaty: namely, that America would not be able to defend against the arsenals of Russia and China. Anything which limits American missile defenses and prevents their becoming truly strategic defenses—a policy for which Russia has repeatedly called for since it became obvious the US would withdraw from the Treaty—will effectively maintain the Cold War policy of mutually assured destruction. True, limited defenses would not involve rogue states in such a policy of MAD, but it would remain essentially intact with regard to Russia and China.  (Article, Link) 

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