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The Real Sources of Ballistic Missile Proliferation

November 11, 2004 :: Ha'aretz :: Analysis

An article in today’s Ha’aretz describes the work of a German scientist by the name of Robert Schmucker who has been making a case about the nature of ballistic missile proliferation, one which sounds similar to that so often made here, at Missilethreat.com. Namely, that the real sources of such a problem are less from the spontaneous research programs of rogue states, but rather primarily from the considerable, and perhaps not altogether unconscious, proliferation by China and Russia. An excerpt:


Examining North Korea and Iran’s missile technological development plans, Schmucker established that all the assumptions about these two states’ success in achieving an independent manufacturing capability for long-range missiles are groundless. He claims that these two missile programs are based on imported technology from Russia and China. The North Koreans did not develop the Nodong missile, whose reported range is 1,300 kilometers, but instead purchased a Russian missile - R-17 or R-19 - improved it with Chinese assistance and gave it a North Korean name. The Iranians did not develop the Shihab 3 either, but bought from North Korea the missile the latter had purchased from Russia, and gave it an Iranian name.

Schmucker bases his conclusion, among other things, on the small number of experiments the North Koreans and Iranians carried out on these missiles. He concludes that without massive Russian and Chinese aid, there is no future for the missile programs of both these states.

If Schmucker is right, then the focus of the efforts to prevent missile proliferation must change. No more concentrating only on pressuring Iran and North Korea. The focus must be shifted to applying pressure on Russia and China. Only the agreement of presidents Putin and Hu Jintao to stop the assistance and technology transfer could significantly curtail North Korea’s and—as a result—Iran’s program.

        Ha’aretz goes on to conclude that if Russia and China were to stem their proliferation, that the problem of Iranian missiles might cease. While it is true that this would help, it may also be that it is too late.

 (Article)

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