Analysis of North Korean Announcement
February 11, 2005 :: Analysis
On February 10, North Korea announced publicly for the first time what it had previously only stated in veiled terms, that it possesses nuclear weapons and has the intention to increase such capabilities.
Ben Johnson and Lieutenant Colonel Gordon Cucullu analyze the meaning of such an announcement, and its accompanying pull-out from negotiations, in today’s FrontPage Magazine. (Article, Link)
» More stories on: North Korea, Nuclear Weapons
Report: North Korea Purchased Nuclear Weapon
January 31, 2005 :: Reuters :: News
Reuters reports that North Korea may have purchased a complete nuclear weapon from either Pakistan or a former Soviet Union state, citing Washington and South Korean sources. (Article, Link)
» More stories on: North Korea, Nuclear Weapons
U.S. Sanctions Major Chinese Firms for Proliferation to Iran
January 18, 2005 :: New York Times :: News
Earlier this month, the State Department yet again sanctioned seven Chinese companies for their illicit proliferation of ballistic missile aid to Iran, a state sponsor of terrorism. Sanctions were also applied against one firm based in Taiwan and one in North Korea. The notice in the Federal Register said that the nine were being penalized for transferring to Iran “equipment and technology controlled under multilateral export control lists.”
As President Bush observed a number of years ago, China is a “strategic competitor” of the United States. It would be well to remember this as we formulate a more aggressive anti-proliferation policies. The real sources of proliferation are Russia and China. It is from these countries that Iraq, Iran, Pakistan, and North Korea received the vast amount of missile technology and equipment. As the New York Times notes, the most recent round of sanctions will probably have little effect on any of these companies’ financial well being. And the companies’ ties to the Chinese government and military make such financial sanctions even less dubious of success. At some level, a policy decision to proliferate such technologies to these regimes has been made. Unless the Chinese government changes that policy, or unless we are willing to boldly identify it and employ more serious sanctions, we must resign ourselves to the inevitability of such proliferation. (Link)
» August 30, 2004: Photographs suggest changes to Shahab reentry device
» January 18, 2005: China says sanctions “not wise”
» September 27, 2004: Seven Chinese companies sanctioned
» November 18, 2004: Powell claims Iran modifying Shahabs to carry nuclear warhead
» More stories on: China, Iran, North Korea, Proliferation
Rademaker Reminds of North Korean Threat
December 18, 2004 :: Reuters :: News
Asst. Sec. of State for Arms Control Stephen Rademaker warned yesterday that North Korea could, at any time, fire a long range ballistic missile, its Taepo Dong II, capable of delivering a nuclear warhead to parts of the United States.
The reminder of the threat came at a speech for the American Foreign Policy Council, and days after an unsuccessful attempt to test the missile defense system being deployed in Alaska and California. The three stage missile, Rademaker said, “could deliver a several hundred kilogram payload up to 15,000 kilometers.” (Article, Link)
» More stories on: North Korea
» Missile details: Taep'o Dong 2
CIA Report on Proliferation
November 24, 2004 :: New York Times :: News
In a report to Congress yesterday, the CIA said that North Korea had repeatedly threatened to test, or “transfer,” a nuclear weapon. Furthermore, North Korea could test a long-range ballistic missile at any time, “potentially capable of reaching parts of the United States with a nuclear-weapon-sized payload.” These threats took place in April, and again in August 2003.
The report also noted that Iran continues its ambitious nuclear program with significant aid from Pakistan, and that Beijing’s proliferation “remains of great concern.” Russia’s role in missile and nuclear proliferation, especially to Iran, was also discussed. (Article, Link)
» Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions
» More stories on: North Korea, Nuclear Weapons
Activity at North Korean Missile Base
October 27, 2004 :: The Chosun Ilbo (S. Korea) :: News
The South Korean Chosun Ilbo newspaper reports today that American, Japanese, and South Korean governments have observed increased activity at the Chongju missile base some 100km north of Pyongyang. The paper quotes a “high ranking” South Korean government source as saying on October 26 that
Beginning two to three days ago, North Korea has been showing moves that appear to be an attempt to test fire No Dong I and Scud Missiles, including the movement of a Scud missile mobile launcher from a missile base in Chongju, Northern Pyongan Province.
East Asia Intel reports that U.S. intelligence officials speculate that North Korea could attempt a launch so as to influence the approaching U.S. presidential election.
The Russian Itar Tass news agency quickly responded to the report with another, well-placed source in the North Korean government, who speculated that missile activity did not likely indicate any missile preparations, but was probably merely designed to be a response to the multi-country naval exercise currently taking place near Japan. The Russian paper quotes the North Korean as noting that, “If the Korean People’s Democratic Republic really intended to launch a missile, it would launch an anti-ship missile as usual from a base located on the Eastern coast."
North Korea’s Scuds and No Dongs are both believed to be derived from Russian missiles.
Similar reports of activity at North Korean missile bases also occurred at this time last month. (Link)
» Sep. 26: Increased activity at North Korean bases
» More stories on: North Korea
» Missile details: No Dong 1, No Dong 2, Scud B variant, Scud C variant
Iran Again Tests Shahab-3
October 20, 2004 :: AFP :: News
Defense Minister Ali Shamkhani announced that Iran had today again tested an upgraded version of its Shahab-3 ballistic missile, in the presence of observers. Shamkhani would not comment on the specific range or the location of the test, but Iran has previously claimed that the “strategic” missile has a range of 2,000km; Iran’s IRNA news agency last month quoted former president Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani that Iran possessed that capability. Such a range not only threatens Israel, but also U.S. bases in the region and parts of Europe. Rafsanjani also commented at the time, “Experts know that a country that possesses this [range] can obtain all subsequent stages in missile production.”
On October 7, Nasser Maleki, the deputy director of Iran’s aerospace industry organization, commented that “Very certainly we are going to improve our Shahab-3 and all of our other missiles.”
Iran’s ballistic missile development has been steady, and not without foreign help. The recent upgrades to the Shahab-3 are believed to be due in part to Chinese assistance, including a more accurate guidance system and an improved warhead more suited to carryign chemical weapons. Hours after today’s test, the Moscow News carried a piece boasting that the Iranian Shahab-3, and the North Korean No-Dong from which it was partly derived, both employ Russian missile technology. (Article, Link)
» Iran’s Revolutionary Guard acquiring greater control
» Oct. 20: Moscow News: Russian missile tech used for Iranian, North Korean advances
» More stories on: Iran, North Korea, Proliferation, Russia, Testing - Foreign
» Missile details: Shahab 3, Shahab 4
Superpower Proliferation to Iran: Seven Chinese Companies Sanctioned; Three from Former Soviet Union
September 27, 2004 :: Washington Times :: News
The State Department imposed sanctions on fourteen firms or individuals today for illicit proliferation, seven of which were on Chinese companies. The Chinese companies were sanctioned for the proliferation of unconventional weapons and missile technology to Iran.
In addition, one Belarusian, Russian, and Ukrainian companies were also sanctioned, as well as one from North Korea. Each of these entities was charged with selling materials to Iran.
State Department spokesman Richard Boucher commented on the Chinese companies that “There was credible evidence that these entities had transferred one of several categories of items to Iran” since January 1999. “That would be equipment listed on multilateral export lists, items that have a potential of making a contribution to weapons of mass destruction or cruise or ballistic missiles.” (More »»»)
» VOA: Fourteen firms or individuals sanctioned
» Sep. 29, 2004: 100 tons of S. Korean dual-use sodium cyanide reached N. Korea by way of China
» More stories on: China, Iran, North Korea, Proliferation, Russia
Fisher on North Korean Missile Threat
September 3, 2004 :: Inside the Ring (Washington Times) :: News
In their weekly column, Inside the Ring, Bill Gertz and Roman Scarborough cite military specialist Richard D. Fisher on the threat from North Korea’s new long-range missile. The missile is that which was recently reported to have been derived from the Russian SS-N-6, from which North Korea is said to have built both a land- and ship-based version.
The columnists note that although the CIA had expected the missile to be displayed in a military parade during September 2003, the display did not take place.
Mr. Fisher also notes that the ship-launch scenario is North Korea’s “simplest option,” whereby they could load the missile onto a merchant ship and launch it against an American coastal city from a comfortable range.
In the past, officials including Donald Rumsfeld have spoken of an unnamed rogue state having tested a ship-launched missile. The columnists positively identify Iran as the nation who tested a ballistic missile in the late 1990s from a merchant vessel. (Article, Link)
» More stories on: Iran, North Korea, Ship-Launched Threat
Sixth Anniversary of North Korean ICBM Launch
August 31, 2004 :: News
Six years ago today, in 1998, North Korea surprised the world with the launch of long range Taepo Dong I missile, which traveled over Japan and eventually fell into the Pacific. Mainstream intelligence analysts were flummoxed; since North Korea had hitherto only tested its much more primitive No Dong missile, they were not considering other possibilities. Thus providing an example of what the 9-11 Commission would later term a “failure of imagination.”
In fact, the launch was of an SLV, a space launch vehicle, designed to put into orbit a small radio broadcasting the immortal hymns of Kim Jong Il. This simply means that the missile was put on a slightly different trajectory, to go into orbit rather than deliver a warhead to another spot on the ground. That the launch failed did not diminish the importance of the test for military applications, showing that North Korea had the capability for long range missiles—even if in this case the final stage did not reach orbit.
The launch did not come as a complete surprise to all parties, however, especially the nine members of the Rumsfeld Commission, who just weeks before had completed their report warning that a rogue nation could deploy an intercontinental range missile—the Taepo Dong I classified as such, by virtue of its range—within five years of doing so, if only by strapping together smaller and fairly primitive Scud missiles. The test, in combination with the Rumsfeld Committee’s bold but unanimous report, were instrumental in reenergizing the push for missile defenses. The next year, Congress passed and Clinton signed H.R. 4—”The National Missile Defense Act of 1999”—into law, which stated that it is the policy of the United States to deploy a missile defense as soon as technologically feasible. Clinton signed the law because it was politically impossible to do otherwise. While the law stated that missile defenses should be deployed when technologically feasible, Clinton added four reasons that would guide any decision about whether or not to deploy, namely four good enough excuses to provide a basis for why he would not carry this law into execution. The same law is frequently cited as the basis for the Bush administrations beginning to deploy a limited system in Alaska, due later this year if all goes as planned. (Link)
» Rumsfeld Report text
» National Missile Defense Act of 1999 text
» More stories on: North Korea
» Missile details: Taep'o Dong 1 SLV, Taep'o Dong 1
