October 24, 2002 :: Department of Defense :: News
Nearly one year to the day after Secretary of Defense Donald Romsfeld warned of a ship based launch of a ballistic missile as already having taken place by an unidentified “rogue state,” Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz similarly observed the salience of this type of threat:
While much of the discussion of the ballistic missile threat is focused on outlaw states developing long-range ballistic missiles that could reach our shores and those of our friends and allies, let me share with you another possibility. We know that North Korea, Iran and Iraq are developing long-range ballistic missiles. That is the familiar line of threat development. But what is to stop such countries from launching shorter-range ballistic missiles that they already possess today from cargo ships near our shores, perhaps using non-state terrorist surrogates to attack without fingerprints. It’s not a far-fetched threat. The United States test launched a captured German V-2 rocket from the deck of a ship in 1947. And recently we have observed indications of an outlaw state attempting to do the same thing with a short-range ballistic missile from a ship.
Excerpt of transcript of question-answer period:
Question: Mr. Secretary, I’d like to ask you about the outlaw state that’s testing ballistic missiles on a ship and also about the possibility of one of these states being able to base ballistic missiles in a third country that may not even know that they’re being used as a platform for missiles aimed at the United States. Senator Wallop: Would you identify yourself? Question: Jamie Detterman, SpaceEquity.com. DepSec Wolfowitz: I think what it points out, and I think it should be a reminder to people on every side — I was about to say both sides of this debate, but I find it a multi-sided debate. Whatever position one holds, one I think should recognize the potential for things to develop in ways that we don’t anticipate, and the fact that if you stop and think about it, that concern that I mentioned which is a real one — As I said, we demonstrated it in 1947 and we aren’t the only ones who have thought about it, is something that requires thinking about missile defense in yet another difficult way. One could build the best possible defenses against intercontinental ballistic missiles and miss that possibility. I think as long as there are countries out there — and there are — who are as clearly determined as they are and they evidence it among other things, I mentioned the amount of resources they devote to being able to attack us. We need to be thinking ahead of them. We need to be thinking out of the box. We need to remember that there was a time when we said, I believe it was March of 1962, that it was inconceivable the Soviet Union would put missiles in Cuba. I believe in the 1980s when Saudi Arabia acquired long-range ballistic missiles from the Peoples Republic of China it took us completely by surprise. We think a relatively harmless surprise, but nonetheless a surprise. I think it is not an inappropriate assumption of planning when you’re dealing with countries that have demonstrated their intentions as clearly as the ones we’re talking about, to anticipate that they will look for any doors that are open and it’s got to be our job to try to close any doors that we can think of. Question: Mr. Secretary, Frank Gaffney from the Center for Security Policy. Congratulations. That was a terrific speech. Just picking up on that point, and in particular the threat of sea-launched ballistic missiles close by, I wonder if you might say a word about the recent tests of the Aegis components in the longer-range ballistic missile experiment that was done last week, and whether that creates a possibility — I was very heartened to hear you say that there might be one or two Aegis ships made available for missile defense on an emergency basis in 2004. But whether given the experience we’ve had with some intercepts against shorter-range missiles, but perhaps the kind that you’re, we have reason to fear being launched off our coast; and the performance of the sensor in the last test, whether there might be an option here, and whether you’re pursuing an option for earlier deployment than 2004 in case we need it. DepSec Wolfowitz: I think I’ll take that question for the record. [Laughter] 2004 strikes me as pretty stressful. And clearly it’s one of the things you look for. Intelligence isn’t perfect but intelligence can be pretty good. If you think that something is closer to reality then you start to do more jury-rigging and more emergency measures. There’s no question but that there is to some degree a competition. It is argued, I’m not completely sure I’m convinced, but the emergency deployment of JSTARS in Desert Storm, while very useful in Desert Storm, may slow down the longer-term development of JSTARS so there’s a balance that you’ve got to preserve. None of these things are simple. I would say in terms of the problem I mentioned about the possible ship-based missiles, it’s not one that I would want to divert large resources into right now based on what we think we know. But we’re always learning new things. Question: Karen Giafano with Reuters. Could you elaborate a little bit more on this issue of the potential for ship-based, for enemies to launch missiles in the near term. Are you raising this issue because theoretically it’s possible? In the environment since September 11th do you see this threat more clearly? Or do you actually have some evidence that something like this [inaudible]? DepSec Wolfowitz: I didn’t use the term near-term. I said it is a distinct possibility that not only we have thought of it, but other countries including some of the countries that we’re most concerned about now. As I said in answer to Frank Gaffney, I wouldn’t put it high on the list of a near-term concern, but it’s a reason to think about more than just long-range ballistic missiles as being a potential problem. One hopes, but one can’t count on it, that if that country or other countries were to develop it further, we would get further indication. But again, one has to recognize how often we learn about things, as Secretary Rumsfeld was fond of saying during the Ballistic Missile Threat Commission experience, we were presented some very interesting descriptions of the history of the development of the North Korean program, for example, or other countries’ programs and it looked as though you were getting a real-time video, so to speak, over the course of ten years with how their program progressed. It would be laid out in years. 1979 they did this, in 1986 they did that. In 1995 they did that. But when did we learn that they were doing these things? The answer was very often one or two years later. Sometimes we learned four years later. In one case, one particular country, we learned about a developing concern 13 years after that country had undertaken it. So one has to caveat all of these threats, but at the same time you have to make decisions about where to allocate resources. That’s what I was trying to get across.
(Article)» October 21, 2001: Rumsfeld: a rogue state has tested a ship-launched missile
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