August 4, 2006 :: Canberra Times :: Analysis
“How did the [Chinese] C-802 [CSS-N-8] anti-ship cruise missile—rated by experts as among the most lethal in the world—get into Hezbollah’s hands?” asks Michael Richardson, a research fellow at the Institute of South East Asian Studies in Singapore in today’s edition of The Canberra Times. He goes on to discuss the “extensive but little-known trade in increasingly sophisticated missiles that have the capacity to upset stability and the balance of power in conflict-prone areas of the world.” The supply trail runs from China to Iran and then into Lebanon either by sea or over land via Syria. Iran and Syria are Hezbollah’s allies against Israel and the U.S. China has used Israel as a military supplier in the past, but has political and energy interests in Iran and Syria that are now in conflict with those of Israel. The tale of the C-802, Richardson writes, “is a classic story about the dog-eat-dog nature of the global arms trade and the destabilising impact of weapons that are not effectively controlled by national regulation or international treaties and agreements.” At present, there is no ban on the proliferation of anti-ship cruise missiles such as the C-802. Richardson lays out a plausible and frightening scenario based on the disclosure early last year by officials of Ukraine’s recently installed democratic government of the illegal export of 20 Russian-made Kh-55SM cruise missiles, each with a range of 3,000 km:
The Kh-55 family of missiles is Russia’s main nuclear-armed cruise missile launched from the air by strategic bombers. The missiles, exported in 2000 and 2001, were diverted from Soviet stocks left behind after Ukraine declared independence in 1991 after the collapse of the Soviet Union. The illicit sale took place despite the fact that Ukraine was an regime member. Twelve of the Kh-55SMs reportedly went to Iran, six to China and two to Pakistan. Iran is alleged to have paid nearly $US50million ($A65.5million) for its missiles.
None of the Kh-55SMs from Ukraine had their 200 kiloton nuclear warheads. But the deal included the system for testing, programming and launching the missiles which had been in service for a number of years. China and Pakistan, both declared nuclear powers, evidently wanted to strip the missiles to copy and incorporate its design, propulsion and guidance components into their own efforts to develop long-range cruise missiles—a process known as reverse engineering.
Iran, too, may have similar interests in using some of the Kh-55SMs as a shortcut for developing a derivative long-range cruise missile—one capable of striking Israel from some 1500 km away. But having a dozen of the missiles could also enable Iran to fit the weapon to its Soviet built Su-24 strike aircraft or fire it from ships or land-based truck launchers.
Robertson concludes: “The ultimate nightmare for Israel and the U.S. would be a Kh-55SM-type missile, armed with an Iranian nuclear warhead.” (Article)
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