August 1, 2006 :: RIA-Novosti :: News
General Yuri Baluyevsky, Russia’s Chief of Staff and First Deputy Defense Minister, published a lengthy and important article in the Voyenno-Promyshlenny Kurier on July 26 criticizing steps by the U.S. to move toward a more defensive posture. Balueyvsky criticizes in particular recent discussions about deploying missile defense assets in Eastern Europe. The Chief of Staff accuses Washington of attempting to achieve “absolute supremacy in the military sphere” and condemns its “brute force in dealing with complicated international issues.” Baluyevsky notes that while the U.S. might appear to be deploying missile defenses to protect against strikes from Iran and North Korea, its real enemies are Russia and China, against whom the systems are allegedly designed to defend.
Baluyevsky writes that “the world is essentially back to square one—that latter being the situation of America’s nuclear monopoly of the 1940’s.” The U.S. plan to deploy interceptor missiles and early warning radars in Central and Eastern Europe would “disrupt the existing Russian-American parity in strategic delivery means.” He lists three reasons for Russia’s concern:
First, silos of the ballistic missile defense system may be easily converted for ICBMs that will reach targets in European Russia wherever they are. Effective control over the use of silos is a sheer impossibility. As a matter of fact, any such control is going to be impossible even for central governments of the countries where the silos will be built.
Second, deployment of active components of the American national ballistic missile defense system in European countries may be interpreted as an attempt on the part of the U.S. to leave Europe facing the music i.e. consequences of a conflict where ballistic missiles were used. Europe will essentially become an advanced line of defense of US territory. From the military standpoint, the logic is impeccable—bring the troops (and therefore the hostilities) as close as possible to the positions of the potential enemy and set up several more lines of defense. The world nowadays is so complicated and interdependent, however, it is so exposed to terrorism as to make these advanced outposts or whatever you might want to call them the prime targets for terrorist attacks. Russia cannot be blasé about it because it itself is a part of Europe.
Third, intercept of ballistic missiles carrying weapons of mass destruction (nuclear, germ, chemical) will cause ecological catastrophes in the European countries above whose territories the ICBMs will be killed. Fragments of the missiles and killer missiles may even fall on the territories of neutral countries (or at least the regions that are not involved in the conflict under way). Russia is particularly concerned by vulnerability of the Kaliningrad region to this threat.
Baluyevsky adds, menacingly, that such defensive deployments would “compel Moscow to revise its approach to reduction of these weapons.” He warns that Russia will be ready with “the necessary academic and technological solutions that will at least minimize negative consequences of these actions on Washington’s part.” He reminds his readers that Russia has tested new strategic arms capable of piercing the existing U.S. missile defense systems as well as those other countries may come up with in the near future, a reference to the Topol-M (SS-27) intercontinental ballistic missile.
The audience of this carefully crafted piece would seem to be less Baluyevsky’s fellow Russians, and more Americans and Europeans. Baluyevsky seemingly believes that Americans can be intimidated with cheap threats, and even more that Europeans, in particular the Poles and Czechs with whom missile defense talks continue, can be manipulated to remain themselves defenseless against not only threats from rogue states such as Iran, but also Russia itself.
The complete text from Voyenno-Promyshlenny Kurier:
It is not an exaggeration to assume that the situation in the world is mostly determined by the relations between Russia and the United States. Moreover, the relations between these two countries have determined it for almost a century now. Some profound changes took place when the Cold War became history. Rosy illusions of the early 1990’s, gave way to pragmatic understanding of national interests at the turn of the century. Vectors of bilateral cooperation are contained within some specific boundaries. First and foremost, the matter concerns the joint Russian-American declaration of new strategic relations our presidents adopted in Moscow on May 24, 2002, simultaneously with the signing of the Russian-American Treaty on Strategic Offensive Potential Reduction. The documents in question confirm that the “era when Russia and the United States regarded each other as enemies or a strategic threat is over.”
In the meantime, certain trends in the policy of the US Administration undeniable nowadays cannot help worry Moscow and raise certain questions. One of these trends takes shape in Washington to ensure its absolute supremacy in the military sphere and its undue reliance on brute force in dealing with complicated international issues.
The document titled “Review of the condition and prospects of the US nuclear forces” adopted in 2001, became what essentially is the American nuclear strategy. This is the first document that does not recognize national ballistic missile defense systems as a destabilizing factor. More than that, the document in question sets the task to make a transition to a new triad that comprises nuclear and conventional strike forces (1), system of defense and first and foremost a ballistic missile defense system of several echelons (2), and a versatile defense infrastructure (3).
Presenting the new national security strategy in March 2006, US President George W. Bush proclaimed America’s determination to use both “offensive” and “defensive” “crushing strikes” as a principal instrument of preventive action against potential enemies. It makes the ballistic missile defense system a key element of “deterrent of America’s enemies and illegal formations of its enemies as well.”
What follows is essentially an expert evaluation of some factors that accompany deployment of the American national ballistic missile defense system.
Possibility of appearance in Iran and North Korea of a missile capable of delivering warheads to the territory of the United States is viewed in the latter as the principal missile threat. Analysis of missile programs in these countries, however, makes it plain that their actual capacities are thoroughly limited. Iran and North Korea are using outdated technologies, mostly restricted to modernization of Scud missiles and improvement of their parameters. Extension of their range is no longer an option. To master sophisticated missile technologies on the other hand, a number of factors has to be present including the most important of them - availability of expertise from abroad, sufficient financial resources, and test launches. Where technologies are concerned, control regimes are being stiffened to the extent where they put modern missile technologies out of reach of Iran and North Korea. (The part Russia has played in it should not be underestimated, either.) As for the financial capacities of the countries the United States views as its prime enemies, they are fairly restricted too.
The following conclusion is inevitable then: the United States is working on its ballistic missile defense system on the basis of some other information concerning missile strikes and deductions from these data. It is Russia and China that are apparently the only countries that possess this ability. No wonder The Foreign Affairs, a prominent American journal, ran a piece not long ago whose authors stated that US policy in the sphere of strategic arms led to a situation where “in the near future already the United States may find itself capable of destroying Russia’s and China’s strategic nuclear potentials with the very first strike.” In other words, the world is essentially back to square one - that latter being the situation of America’s nuclear monopoly of the 1940’s.
When the United States withdrew from the Ballistic Missiles Defense System Treaty, the Russian leadership pronounced the Russian deterrent potential immune to whatever Washington was doing by way of deployment of a national ballistic missile defense system. These days, however, the situation is changing. Deployment of components of the US ballistic missile defense system cannot help worry Moscow.
Appearance of killer missiles with the necessary infrastructure in Alaska and involvement of radars of the missile attack early warning system in the ballistic missile defense system mount tension in the region. Particularly alarming are the reports that the components of the ballistic missile defense system built in Japan may be included in the regional command contour too. All these factors compel countries of the region to revise their views on missiles and the uses they ought to be put to.
There is one other aspect of realization of the American plans concerning a global ballistic missile defense system that worries Russia. The US is considering deployment of early warning radars and killer missiles of the ballistic missile defense system in Central and East Europe in 2010-2011. According to General G. Obering of the US Agency for National Ballistic Missile Defense System, the 2007 draft budget of the Agency (the 2007 financial year begins on October 1, 2006) includes $119 million to be used to procure whatever materials and gear are necessary to build such a base. Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Turkey, and Bulgaria are viewed as potential sites. As the pretext, Washington uses the alleged necessity to protect its NATO partners from the hypothetical missile threat posed by Iran.
Moscow’s opinion (and not exactly ungrounded) is that fulfillment of the American plans may result in deployment near the Russian borders of the weapons that will disrupt the existing Russian-American parity in strategic delivery means. Washington claims that all these systems are not targeted at Russia or China but its words do not check with its deeds. Not to mention the fact that the ballistic missile defense system in Europe will become an additional stimuli to the missile arms race in the Middle East and North Africa.
What worries Russia?
First, silos of the ballistic missile defense system may be easily converted for ICBMs that will reach targets in European Russia wherever they are. Effective control over the use of silos is a sheer impossibility. As a matter of fact, any such control is going to be impossible even for central governments of the countries where the silos will be built.
Second, deployment of active components of the American national ballistic missile defense system in European countries may be interpreted as an attempt on the part of the US to leave Europe facing the music i.e. consequences of a conflict where ballistic missiles were used. Europe will essentially become an advanced line of defense of US territory. From the military standpoint, the logic is impeccable - bring the troops (and therefore the hostilities) as close as possible to the positions of the potential enemy and set up several more lines of defense. The world nowadays is so complicated and interdependent, however, it is so exposed to terrorism as to make these advanced outposts or whatever you might want to call them the prime targets for terrorist attacks. Russia cannot be blase about it because it itself is a part of Europe.
Third, intercept of ballistic missiles carrying weapons of mass destruction (nuclear, germ, chemical) will cause ecological catastrophes in the European countries above whose territories the ICBMs will be killed. Fragments of the missiles and killer missiles may even fall on the territories of neutral countries (or at least the regions that are not involved in the conflict under way). Russia is particularly concerned by vulnerability of the Kaliningrad region to this threat.
It is necessary to understand that evaluation of actual combat efficiency of any ballistic missile defense system will always be an approximation at best. It is guesswork, in other words.
Let’s say the national ballistic missile defense system the United States is out to build will live to its designers’ expectations and kill about 95% of the inbound missiles. I.e. its reliability will be 95%, which is extremely good for a system of this complexity from the purely technical side. When 1,000 missiles are launched, at least 50 of them will then reach their targets. When 100 are launched, 5 have a fighting chance of reaching them. It follows that the system is only good for single launches.
It means that whenever a mass launch is to be dealt with, the system becomes pretty useless because no sane leader of the state will appraise even several “Hiroshimas” on the territory of his country as an acceptable result. And yet, development of a system like that requires decades of effort and hundreds of billions of dollars - as we see from America’s example.
Not even a full-scale ballistic missile defense system guarantees absolute protection from strikes, including strikes with weapons of mass destruction. Why? Because the whole system is geared for dealing with ICBMs only. This state of affairs may reactivate the efforts to come up with “asymmetric counter-measures” and that may even include attempt to smuggle weapons of mass destruction to the target country. As a result, technologically less complicated, financially less expensive, but considerably more reliable ways and means of delivery (guided missiles, aircraft, and ships) may come to pose a worse threat. Consider what was done to America on September 9, 2001, and how it was done.
When national ballistic missile defense systems are designed, it is of utmost importance to define the nature of threats the future system is supposed to counter or negate. When local threats or single (even perhaps terrorist) missile strikes are concerned, it is necessary to think about how these threats may be thwarted by adequate means. Adequate is the key word here because it will be like crushing a fly with a steamroller otherwise.
The Russian leadership and general public wouldn’t have been so worried had the United States been content to build its ballistic missile defense system alone without all other elaborate military preparations. Washington, however, wouldn’t resort to the ballistic missile defense system alone. We see its resolve to build the system even though it is already sadly behind schedule. These plans will be implemented to some extent or other, and that will disrupt the Russian-American strategic offence arms parity and compel Moscow to revise its approach to reduction of these weapons.
Russia should be prepared for the worst possible turn of events when all its worst fears and suspicions become a hard fact of life. It is therefore necessary for Russia to be ready with the necessary academic and technological solutions that will at least minimize negative consequences of these actions on Washington’s part.
In the meantime, the Russian defense industry has vast potential that is being developed. Russia has already tested some sophisticated strategic arms capable of piercing the existing defense systems and the ones foreign countries may come up with in the foreseeable future. We are convinced therefore of Russia’s ability to thwart all and any attempts to compromise its security.
What particularly upsets Moscow is that deployment of the American national ballistic missile defense system may spark a new round of the arms race and reroute colossal resources from where they should be used in dealing with the problems faced by Russia and the United States and, incidentally, by the rest of the international community. That is why the Russian Defense Ministry calls for advancement of a dialogue with all interested countries over national ballistic missile defense systems. This is a dialogue where its participants should abandon declarative transparency for the sake of bona fide mutually beneficial cooperation and search for solutions to potential conflicts. Interests of partners in the dialogue must be respected. Cooperation in the sphere of ballistic missile defense system is not supposed to be a separate problem. On the contrary, it should help the international community remove the existing discord and maintain strategic stability and security in the world.
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