September 20, 2006 :: The Heritage Foundation :: Analysis
The current lack of an effective missile defense is the product of a political process that makes it exceedingly difficult to reverse deeply entrenched policies, argues Baker Spring of the Heritage Foundation. For roughly 30 years, the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty restricted missile defense research and development to inadequate options such as ground-based defenses deployed at fixed locations. The result was that the missile defense bureaucracy eventually became professionally defined within these narrow boundaries, and individuals currently working on these programs are reluctant to permit open competition between their programs and effective alternatives such as sea- and space-based assets now permitted by U.S. withdrawal from the ABM Treaty.
In addition, missile defense has fallen victim to what Spring terms “public choice theory.” Time and again, the American public has expressed strong support for missile defense. Yet when the question turns to which kind of missile defense system should be deployed, a vocal minority of hardened opponents prevails in its opposition to new technologies that would more effective, such as sea- and space-based interceptors. Political leaders move to embrace compromises that seek to satisfy both sides, favoring an outcome that “embraces strong statements of principle in favor of missile defense in deference to the majority and simultaneously marginalizes the most effective option for missile defense in deference to the vocal minority.”
Opponents are thus able to denounce the entire missile defense enterprise in the context of the limited system currently being deployed. Spring argues that missile defense proponents in Congress must extend their support to new and more effective technologies. “True support for missile defense must be tied to commitments to back the best possible missile defense system at an affordable price,” he writes. (Article)
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