Israel-Lebanon Conflict Fueled by Iran
July 21, 2006 :: Analysis
The ongoing conflict in Israel and Lebanon demonstrates the widespread character of the war on terrorism, the expanding regional influence of Iran, and, more specifically, the Islamic Republic’s complete willingness to proliferate ballistic and cruise missile technology to terrorist entities it considers to be political and military allies.
Over the past week, Western intelligence officials and experts have concluded that the Iran-sponsored Lebanese terrorist organization, Hezbollah, has stockpiled enough firepower to sustain a protracted fight against the Jewish state that threatens all of northern Israel and possibly much further. Hezbollah (“The Party of God” in Arabic) is a Shiite organization that emerged during the Lebanese civil war in the early 1980s. It is the principal suspect for the 1983 suicide bombings of the U.S. embassy and Marine barracks in Beirut. Since the 1990s, Hezbollah has built up its forces in southern Lebanon with the help of Iran, and has been intermittently firing Katyusha rockets into northern Israel. The cheap, unguided, low-flying projectiles have a range of approximately 20 km and are capable of causing considerable damage when launched into dense civilian populations. Sources indicate that many of these rockets are manufactured in Iran. Over the past week, Hezbollah guerrillas have fired hundreds of Katyusha rockets into dozens of towns and cities across northern Israel, killing and wounding civilians in the heaviest bombardment in over a decade. Hezbollah is believed to have tens of thousands of Katyushas in its arsenal.
More worrisome than the unsophisticated Katyusha rockets are the larger, more powerful ballistic and cruise missiles that Hezbollah has obtained through Iran. Israeli intelligence believes that Hezbollah possesses hundreds of Iranian-made Fajr-3 and Fajr-5 short-range ballistic missiles, which have ranges of 40 and 75 km respectfully and allow the terrorist organization to strike deep inside Israel. On July 14, an Israeli air strike destroyed at least one Iranian-made Zelzal-2 short-range ballistic missile, according to the AP. According to officials from the Israeli Defense Force, an Israeli aircraft targeted a truck carrying an unknown number of Zelzal-2 missiles, and the force of the blast sent at least one missile flying into the air. The Zelzal-2 (“earthquake” in Farsi) is believed to have a range of anywhere from 120 to 400 km, and would be capable of striking Tel Aviv if launched successfully.
Hezbollah has also demonstrated that it possesses Iranian copies of Chinese cruise missiles. On July 14, Hezbollah guerrillas attacked Israel’s INS Hanit Eilat-class missile corvette with an Iranian-made Noor (Tondar) radar-guided anti-ship cruise missile, according to Jane’s Defense Weekly. The Noor is an Iranian copy of the Chinese C-802 (CSS-N-8), reported to have a range of approximately 200 km. Hezbollah guerrillas fired the missile from the Lebanese shore at the Hanit from a range of 16 km, which prevented the Israelis from activating the ship’s missile defense systems. A second Noor, also aimed at the Hanit, missed and instead hit a Cambodian merchant ship 60 km away, which sank although its crew members were rescued. Hezbollah is believed to possess dozens of Noor cruise missiles.
Finally, Iran’s well-trained Revolutionary Guard is believed to be providing on-the-ground military advisers to Hezbollah with some level of coordination with Syria, according to Anthony Cordesman, the respected Middle East expert at the Washington-based Center for Strategic and International Studies, as well as several U.S. officials. If this report is accurate, it means that the Islamic Republic has expanded well beyond its traditional role of financier, proliferator, and spiritual ally, and could in fact be the driving political and military force behind Hezbollah’s recent and future actions. (Link)
» More stories on: Analysis, Iran, Israel, Proliferation, Terrorism
» Missile details: Zelzal-1/2/3
WSJ on the Taep’o-dong Democrats’ Opposition to Missile Defense
July 21, 2006 :: The Wall Street Journal :: Analysis
Today’s lead editorial in the Wall Street Journal lambastes “Taep’o-dong Democrats” for their continued opposition to missile defense, even after North Korea’s test launch of its long-range Taep’o-dong 2 ballistic missile. The editorial provides a succinct history of Democratic opposition to missile defense, dating back to 1983 when Senator Ted Kennedy (D-MA) dismissed President Reagan’s Strategic Defense Initiative as a fanciful “Star Wars” program. Ten years later, with President Clinton in the Oval Office, Democrats starved SDI of funding and eliminated promising research and development initiatives such as Brilliant Pebbles. Congressional Republicans managed to keep the program alive as part of their Contract with America, although they were forced to spend the greater part of the 1990s battling the Clinton administration on the issue. When President Bush withdrew the U.S. from the defunct 1972 ABM Treaty, thus allowing the U.S. to develop missile defense assets to meet the challenges of the post-Cold War era, Democrats stood in firm opposition. Former Vice President Al Gore had actually campaigned in 2000 to keep the treaty; Senator Joe Biden (D-DW) predicted that dropping out of the treaty to build missile defenses would turn the U.S. into “a kind of bully nation”; and Senator John Kerry (D-MA) warned that “we must not set aside the logic of deterrence that has kept us safe for 40 years.” Democrats remained staunchly opposed to missile defense even after the September 11 terrorist attacks. Just this year, Representative John Tierney (D-MA) attempted to cut the Pentagon’s missile defense budget by over 50 percent, a proposal that won the support of more over half of his Democratic colleagues, including would-be Speaker Nancy Pelosi (D-CA). This June, Senator Carl Levin (D-MI) attempted to cut off all funding for the ground-based interceptor program, which was recently activated to defend the U.S. against a potential North Korean missile attack.
The Wall Street Journal rightfully takes Democrats to task for maintaining their rigid anti-BMD positions, even after North Korea’s test launching of its long-range Taep’o-dong 2 ballistic missile, which is capable of hitting the continental U.S., the growing nuclear threat from Iran, and the further proliferation of missile technology from rouge nations such as Iran and Syria to terrorist organizations such as Hezbollah. The editorial correctly states that, although no defense system is perfect, the U.S. BMD shield has made significant progress in recent SM-3, PAC-3, and THAAD tests, provides a limited defense against North Korean missiles, adds to the credibility of the U.S. deterrent, reassures our allies abroad, and enhances U.S. influence on the global stage. (Article, Link)
» More stories on: Analysis, North Korea, Policy
» Missile details: Tien Ma 1
Lettow on Reagan Legacy on Nuclear and Missile Defense Policies
July 21, 2006 :: The Heritage Foundation :: Analysis
Paul Lettow, author of Ronald Reagan and His Quest to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (New York: Random House, 2005), delivered a speech yesterday at the Heritage Foundation on the legacy of Ronald Reagan on the subject of U.S. nuclear weapons policy. Lettow discussed the former President’s central role as leader, visionary, strategist, diplomat, and negotiator. In particular, he touched on Reagan’s unrivalled championing of the 1983 Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), which proposed to use ground-based and space-based systems to protect the U.S. from ballistic missile attack. An excerpt:
Reagan saw SDI as a means of accomplishing his objective of a nuclear-free world. An effective missile defense, he believed, could render ballistic missiles “impotent and obsolete.” In his eyes, such a defense would make not just ballistic missiles but all nuclear weapons negotiable, and would spur talks, first with the Soviet Union and then with the other nuclear powers, that would result in the elimination of all nuclear arms. He thought that the United States could then share a defense system, and that an “internationalized” defense would serve to guarantee security in a nuclear-free world. None of Reagan’s advisers adhered to his vision of SDI as the catalyst for and guarantor of a world without nuclear weapons. But from the inception of the initiative through the rest of his presidency, Reagan held unwaveringly to that vision of SDI.
(Article, Link)
» More stories on: Analysis, Nuclear Weapons, Policy
Shapiro: Missile Defense Wanted
July 6, 2006 :: Analysis
Ben Shapiro, a 2006 Publius Fellow at the Claremont Institute, discusses the urgent need for missile defenses on FamilySecurityMatters.org. Without an effective missile defense system, notes Shapiro, the U.S. risks defeat in the War on Terror and in future confrontations with rogue nations. Since terrorist groups must have the aid of state sponsors in order to succeed in their operations, the U.S. and its allies must have the capability to destroy these state sponsors in order to successfully prosecute the War on Terror. However, the absence of an effective U.S. missile defense system provides rogue nations with a way to deter such attacks. Shapiro lays out a plausible and troubling scenario:
Imagine, for example, that Iran worked with al-Qaeda to station a ballistic missile off the coast of California. Imagine also that Iran, which is currently racing to update its missile technology to take advantage of American shortcomings, develops missiles capable of reaching the United States directly. Al-Qaeda launches its ballistic missile over Los Angeles, and the city is destroyed. America, recognizing Iranian sponsorship, seeks to retaliate. Iran, however, explains calmly that if any attempt at regime change is made, it will launch its missiles on Israel and America. Would a president knowingly sacrifice millions of additional lives to avenge the millions lost in Los Angeles?
This is international blackmail, and it is promoted by American vulnerability. There is a reason that Kim Jong Il spent so much time and effort developing both nuclear weapons and ballistic missile technology capable of carrying those weapons to America’s shores. Kim Jong Il, like most of America’s enemies, sees that he can prevent aggressive American action by gaining a deterrent. The more vulnerable we are to ballistic missile threat, the more our enemies will exploit the vulnerability—and less likely we are to do anything about it.
(Article, Link)
» More stories on: Analysis, Iran, North Korea, Terrorism
Spring on North Korea Options
July 6, 2006 :: The Heritage Foundation :: Analysis
Baker Spring of the Heritage Foundation yesterday laid out a comprehensive set of military capabilities for countering North Korea’s growing missile threat. He noted that these capabilities should be seen as part of a larger “damage limitation strategy” that would lessen both the likelihood and potential impact of a military aggression by North Korea on the U.S. and its allies. The first capability would be a conventional defense of South Korea. Such a defense would encompass the achievement of air dominance to support precision air-based attacks, as well as the ability to destroy North Korean artillery, rocket systems, and armored columns. The second military capability would be a global, layered missile defense system, including the deployment of space-based interceptors and sensors. Spring noted that the U.S. should facilitate direct Japanese and South Korea participation in such an effort. The third capability would be a new nuclear deterrent adapted to the requirements of the post-Cold War world, in particular with respect to rogue regimes. Such a deterrent should be capable of holding targets at risk that are valued by the North Korean leadership as means for personal and regime survival, such as strategic weapons, personal security systems, intelligence services, and other instruments of domestic repression. The fourth military capability would be preemption, to be used if U.S. intelligence believes that a Taep’o-dong 2 long-range ballistic missile has been armed with a nuclear warhead. The U.S. should be prepared to preempt with attack aircraft, cruise missiles, and ballistic missiles armed. The missiles should be armed with conventional warheads when there is high confidence of destroying the targets in question, or nuclear warheads if necessary. (Article, Link)
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» Missile details: Tien Ma 1
Lowry on Missile Defense as “Stabilizing”
June 24, 2006 :: National Review Online :: Analysis
Rich Lowry, editor of National Review, argues that missile defense can be a “stabilizing force” rather than a “destabilizing” one, as critics often claim. In the context a possible North Korean long-range missile test, missile defense is itself a kind of deterrence, for it provides the North Korean leadership with good reason not to launch. “If a Kim Jong-il knows that a launch against the U.S. might not even succeed but risks calling down a devastating response, he would be that much less likely to try in the first place,” writes Lowry. “Just as importantly, by rendering his nuclear arsenal less reliable, missile defense limits Kim’s ability to deter and/or coerce the U.S. (from attacking him in the first instance and into giving him aid in the second).” It is ironic, he adds, that those who oppose missile defense, including two top Clinton-administration defense officials, are now advocating a preemptive U.S. strike against the North Korean launch site. Such a strike would be an act of war against a sovereign state. “It is passing strange that liberals should want our only option in the event of a nuclear missile attack from North Korea or another rogue state to be absorbing the blow, then annihilating the offending country,” he writes. (Article, Link)
» More stories on: Analysis, North Korea
NRO Symposium on Missile Defense and North Korea
June 24, 2006 :: Analysis
A recent symposium on National Review Online presented a range of options for what to do about North Korea.
Angelo M. Codevilla, professor of international relations at Boston University and a fellow at the Claremont Institute, argues that the U.S. should “get serious about missile defense.” He calls the current U.S. missile defense program “Clinton lite and twice the price,” a reference to the Bush administration’s adoption of Clinton’s favoring of ground-based interceptors and other near-term solutions over more effective space-based assets.
Newt Gingrich, former Speaker of the House, argues that ballistic missile defense will simply not work, and that “no serious person believes this.” The tests of the ground-based interceptors currently deployed in Alaska and California have not been robust enough or realistic enough to assure that the U.S. can intercept a North Korean missile, if launched. The U.S. should instead destroy the missile on its site. “Our ability to preempt the launch is nearly certain,” he wrote.
Malcolm Wallop, former senator and founder and chairman of Frontiers of Freedom, argues that the U.S. should deploy Aegis missile defense warships within range of any North Korea launch sites, making it clear that any missiles launched will be destroyed over North Korean territory. The U.S. should also “demonstrably arm” the ground-based interceptor missiles in Alaska. Only as a last resort should the U.S. attack North Korea’s nuclear and missile capabilities directly (Article, Link)
» More stories on: Analysis, North Korea
» Missile details: Tien Ma 1
» Missile system details for: Aegis Ship-Based BMD, Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD)
Blank on Moscow’s Complacency Toward North Korea
June 24, 2006 :: Analysis
Stephen Blank, professor at the Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College, notes that Russia has displayed “amazing insouciance” toward the possible North Korean long-range missile test. Russian Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov recently referred to warnings of a possible test as “purely speculative,” while Russian President Vladimir Putin’s aide, Igor Shuvalov, referred to North Korea’s actions as a “psychological test.” Blank documents the Kremlin’s only complaint to date, the fact that nobody has formally notified it of any potential North Korean missile launch. Among Russian experts, the consensus seems to be that Pyongyang’s launch preparations are nothing more than the usual manifestations of political blackmail to secure economic advantages, or perhaps jealousy over the concessions that Iran has been gaining due to its own nuclear program. Blank notes that such conclusions indicate a “widening sphere of discord with Washington” over the issues of North Korea and proliferation and the North Korean. “Under these circumstances,” he writes, “it is reasonable to ask whose psyche needs testing: those who proliferate or those who remain in denial about proliferation’s ultimate consequences for them and everyone else.” (Article, Link)
» More stories on: Analysis, North Korea, Proliferation, Russia
» Missile details: Tien Ma 1
Hwang: Direct Talks with North Korea Would Reward “Manipulation and Brinksmanship”
June 20, 2006 :: The Heritage Foundation :: News
Balbina Y. Hwang, a senior policy analyst at the Heritage Foundation, argues that the U.S. must not reward North Korea’s “manipulation and brinksmanship.” By threatening to test-launch its Taep’o-dong 2 long-range missile, Pyongyang is attempting to force Washington to engage in direct bilateral talks. “The United States has been clear that all diplomatic negotiations must go through the Six-Party framework involving North Korea, the United States, South Korea, Russia, Japan, and China,” she writes. “The Bush Administration should make clear that aggressive behavior by the North Koreans will not cause the United States to alter its position.” Rather than succumbing to Pyongyang’s belligerent behavior, Washington should keep the military option on the table, and make it clear to the North Korean leadership that it will shoot down the missile with ground-based interceptors. Hwang adds that if Pyongyang goes ahead with the launch, Washington should bring North Korea’s aggression before the U.N. Security Council. (Article, Link)
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» Missile details: Tien Ma 1
Gaffney Warns of North Korean EMP Attack, Calls for Increased Missile Defense
June 20, 2006 :: National Review Online :: Analysis
Frank Gaffney, president of the Center for Security Policy, warns in National Review Online that the U.S. remains vulnerable to an electro-magnetic pulse (EMP) attack from North Korea. If North Korea were to detonate a nuclear warhead high in the atmosphere above the U.S., the resulting burst of immensely powerful energy would devastate nearly every form of electrical system in the nation. In 2004, a blue-ribbon commission tasked by Congress with assessing the EMP threat found that it could have a “catastrophic” effect, possibly reducing the U.S. to a pre-industrial society. The commission noted that an EMP could be delivered with a “relatively unsophisticated missile,” and named North Korea as one of the states that could be seeking such a capability. In his article, Gaffney calls upon the U.S. to “make a redoubled effort to deploy effective, comprehensive defenses against ballistic missiles that might be used for EMP and other attacks.” He urges the Pentagon to augment the modest ground-based systems in Alaska and California, in particular with increased sea-based defenses that could shoot down North Korean missiles at various points in their flight path. (Article, Link)
» July 22, 2004: EMP Commission Report Points to Need for Missile Defense
» More stories on: Analysis, Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) Weapons, North Korea
» Missile details: Tien Ma 1
