Forbes on Missile Defense and IWG Report
August 24, 2006 :: Forbes :: Analysis
Steve Forbes argues that the U.S. must ramp up its missile defense efforts to defend against rogue nations and terrorist organizations. He writes in the September 4 issue of Forbes that North Korea’s July 4 missile tests and Hezbollah’s Iranian-supplied rocket attacks against Israel underscore the vulnerability of the U.S. to ballistic missile attack, even as the U.S. deploys ground-based interceptors in California and Alaska, and sea-based Aegis interceptors in the Pacific.
Forbes praises the recent report by the Independent Working Group (IWG), Missile Defense, the Space Relationship, and the Twenty-First Century, which puts forth a variety of recommendations to defend the U.S. against missile attack, including reviving the space-based Brilliant Pebbles system. “The American people would overwhelmingly support such an accelerated effort,” Forbes writes. “The nightly news reminds us that the day of our vulnerability to terrorist missiles is nigh.” (Article, Link)
» Read the 2007 report: The Independent Working Group on Missile Defense, the Space Relationship, and the Twenty-First Century (8 MB)
» More stories on: Analysis
Codevilla on THEL and Mideast Conflict
August 10, 2006 :: National Review Online :: Analysis
Angelo M. Codevilla, professor of international relations at Boston University and a senior fellow of the Claremont Institute, today discusses the Tactical High Energy Laser (THEL) and the role it might have played in defending Israel against Hezbollah’s Katyusha rockets, had it not been canceled. Codevilla notes that the technical problem in shooting down Katyushas has always been their short flight time, from their appearance over the horizon to their impact, which precludes the use of any normal Patriot-type surface-to-air interceptor missile. Katyushas are cheap and numerous (they are not ballistic missiles) and could easily overwhelm such defenses. The only way to effectively destroy Katyushas in flight, Codevilla notes, is through rapid fire, multi shot, directed energy weapons. During the 1990s, the U.S. and Israel developed such a system known as THEL, and by 1998 the system had been successfully tested against Katyusha rockets at the White Sands Missile Range in New Mexico.
Yet THEL was never deployed in Israel. Codevilla draws two conclusions, first that the decision not to deploy a workable defense is a result of “the flawed McNamara logic of almost a half century ago, that defense was not ‘cost effective.’…But consider the cost of not defending against them: the enemy was able to make a big chunk of the country uninhabitable..” Codevilla’s second point is that the ground-based laser technology is similar to the space based laser project which has also since been abandoned.
Codevilla makes good points about the unique capabilities of the THEL program, which is uniquely suited to the short range artillery such as that facing Israel from Hezbollah terrorists. But much has happened with the THEL program since 2000, including successful testing, upgrades, and the transformation of THEL into “MTHEL,” with a mobile capability.
Codevilla’s analysis omits reports that the U.S.-Israel cooperation on THEL was suspended in 2005 after Israel had transferred technologies to China, or of some other details in the THEL story.
As recent events in Lebanon have again shown, the United States and Israel have many and profound common interests—indeed are somewhat natural allies. To benefit from that natural alliance, Israel should perhaps not be transferring systems to China, which of course sells weapons to Israel’s enemies, including Iran and Pakistan. Israel’s lack of THEL system today may be the result of not just bad strategic thinking about assured destruction from the McNamara era (thinking Israel arguably never adopted), but perhaps also from a lack of clarity in the past about allies. (Article, Link)
» July 12, 2006: Northrop Grumman unveils Skyguard program, apparent reincarnation of THEL
» May 18, 2005: Glick: Cooperation on THEL suspended because of Israeli tech transfer to China
» More stories on: Analysis, Israel
» Missile system details for: Tactical High Energy Laser (THEL), Tactical High Energy Laser (THEL)
Richardson on Cruise Missile Proliferation
August 4, 2006 :: Canberra Times :: Analysis
“How did the [Chinese] C-802 [CSS-N-8] anti-ship cruise missile—rated by experts as among the most lethal in the world—get into Hezbollah’s hands?” asks Michael Richardson, a research fellow at the Institute of South East Asian Studies in Singapore in today’s edition of The Canberra Times. He goes on to discuss the “extensive but little-known trade in increasingly sophisticated missiles that have the capacity to upset stability and the balance of power in conflict-prone areas of the world.” The supply trail runs from China to Iran and then into Lebanon either by sea or over land via Syria. Iran and Syria are Hezbollah’s allies against Israel and the U.S. China has used Israel as a military supplier in the past, but has political and energy interests in Iran and Syria that are now in conflict with those of Israel. The tale of the C-802, Richardson writes, “is a classic story about the dog-eat-dog nature of the global arms trade and the destabilising impact of weapons that are not effectively controlled by national regulation or international treaties and agreements.” At present, there is no ban on the proliferation of anti-ship cruise missiles such as the C-802. Richardson lays out a plausible and frightening scenario based on the disclosure early last year by officials of Ukraine’s recently installed democratic government of the illegal export of 20 Russian-made Kh-55SM cruise missiles, each with a range of 3,000 km:
The Kh-55 family of missiles is Russia’s main nuclear-armed cruise missile launched from the air by strategic bombers. The missiles, exported in 2000 and 2001, were diverted from Soviet stocks left behind after Ukraine declared independence in 1991 after the collapse of the Soviet Union. The illicit sale took place despite the fact that Ukraine was an regime member. Twelve of the Kh-55SMs reportedly went to Iran, six to China and two to Pakistan. Iran is alleged to have paid nearly $US50million ($A65.5million) for its missiles.
None of the Kh-55SMs from Ukraine had their 200 kiloton nuclear warheads. But the deal included the system for testing, programming and launching the missiles which had been in service for a number of years. China and Pakistan, both declared nuclear powers, evidently wanted to strip the missiles to copy and incorporate its design, propulsion and guidance components into their own efforts to develop long-range cruise missiles—a process known as reverse engineering.
Iran, too, may have similar interests in using some of the Kh-55SMs as a shortcut for developing a derivative long-range cruise missile—one capable of striking Israel from some 1500 km away. But having a dozen of the missiles could also enable Iran to fit the weapon to its Soviet built Su-24 strike aircraft or fire it from ships or land-based truck launchers.
Robertson concludes: “The ultimate nightmare for Israel and the U.S. would be a Kh-55SM-type missile, armed with an Iranian nuclear warhead.” (Article, Link)
» More stories on: Analysis, China, Cruise Missiles, Iran, Proliferation
Fisher: China May Have Second-Strike Capability
August 3, 2006 :: Analysis
China may have a “second-strike” nuclear capability, says Richard Fisher, a researcher at the International Assessment and Strategy Center in Alexandria, Virginia. Fisher recently spoke at the American Enterprise Institute in Washington, D.C., where he stated his belief that Beijing has equipped and launched the first JIN-class (Type 094) ballistic missile submarine. The Pentagon had previously asserted that the new Chinese submarine would not be operational until around 2010. Fisher also speculated that China might have already armed the Type 094 submarine with JL-2 (CSS-NX-5) submarine launched ballistic missiles, which would give China a second-strike nuclear capability in any confrontation with the U.S. “The JL-2 SLBM has undergone a series of tests,” he said. “The potential for [the Type 094 submarine] to be armed with multiple warheads is there.” (Article, Link)
» More stories on: Analysis, China, Sea-Based Systems
» Missile details: CSS-NX-5 (JL-2)
Hong Kong Op-Ed: China Will Not Help Disarm North Korea
August 2, 2006 :: The Standard (Hong Kong) :: Analysis
China will not prove helpful in disarming North Korea, writes Liu Kin-ming in Hong Kong’s The Standard. Liu analyzes a recent statement by General Guo Boxiong, vice-chairman of China’s powerful Central Military Commission, following North Korea’s July 5 test launch of seven ballistic missiles. Speaking at the National Defense University in Washington, D.C., on July 19, Guo told the audience: “We only learned of North Korea’s missile tests on July 5 through U.S. intelligence broadcast by the media. At that time, I myself and the relevant people in our government were all very surprised. North Korea is a sovereign state. We can’t force it to do or not to do things.” He continued: “Let me be honest with you. What will North Korea do next? China doesn’t know. I also don’t know.” Liu notes that China’s influence over its neighbor could be limited, as evidenced by Pyongyang’s improper treatment of a top-level Chinese delegation just before its July 5 test launch. Liu emphasizes, however, that regardless of whether or not Guo’s statement about relying upon U.S. intelligence and monitoring is true, it shows that China does not plan to be of any help in disarming Pyongyang. “If Guo’s statement is true, Beijing has no influence over Pyongyang,” he writes. “If the statement isn’t true, Beijing thinks the Americans are the worst suckers on earth.” (Article, Link)
» More stories on: Analysis, China, North Korea
Hong Kong Op-Ed: China Will Not Help Disarm North Korea
August 2, 2006 :: The Standard (Hong Kong) :: Analysis
China will not prove helpful in disarming North Korea, writes Liu Kin-ming in Hong Kong’s The Standard. Liu analyzes a recent statement by General Guo Boxiong, vice-chairman of China’s powerful Central Military Commission, following North Korea’s July 5 test launch of seven ballistic missiles. Speaking at the National Defense University in Washington, D.C., on July 19, Guo told the audience: “We only learned of North Korea’s missile tests on July 5 through U.S. intelligence broadcast by the media. At that time, I myself and the relevant people in our government were all very surprised. North Korea is a sovereign state. We can’t force it to do or not to do things.” He continued: “Let me be honest with you. What will North Korea do next? China doesn’t know. I also don’t know.” Liu notes that China’s influence over its neighbor could be limited, as evidenced by Pyongyang’s improper treatment of a top-level Chinese delegation just before its July 5 test launch. Liu emphasizes, however, that regardless of whether or not Guo’s statement about relying upon U.S. intelligence and monitoring is true, it shows that China does not plan to be of any help in disarming Pyongyang. “If Guo’s statement is true, Beijing has no influence over Pyongyang,” he writes. “If the statement isn’t true, Beijing thinks the Americans are the worst suckers on earth.” (Article, Link)
» More stories on: Analysis, China, North Korea
Baluyevsky Criticizes U.S. Defensive Posture
August 1, 2006 :: RIA-Novosti :: News
General Yuri Baluyevsky, Russia’s Chief of Staff and First Deputy Defense Minister, published a lengthy and important article in the Voyenno-Promyshlenny Kurier on July 26 criticizing steps by the U.S. to move toward a more defensive posture. Balueyvsky criticizes in particular recent discussions about deploying missile defense assets in Eastern Europe. The Chief of Staff accuses Washington of attempting to achieve “absolute supremacy in the military sphere” and condemns its “brute force in dealing with complicated international issues.” Baluyevsky notes that while the U.S. might appear to be deploying missile defenses to protect against strikes from Iran and North Korea, its real enemies are Russia and China, against whom the systems are allegedly designed to defend.
Baluyevsky writes that “the world is essentially back to square one—that latter being the situation of America’s nuclear monopoly of the 1940’s.” The U.S. plan to deploy interceptor missiles and early warning radars in Central and Eastern Europe would “disrupt the existing Russian-American parity in strategic delivery means.” He lists three reasons for Russia’s concern:
First, silos of the ballistic missile defense system may be easily converted for ICBMs that will reach targets in European Russia wherever they are. Effective control over the use of silos is a sheer impossibility. As a matter of fact, any such control is going to be impossible even for central governments of the countries where the silos will be built.
Second, deployment of active components of the American national ballistic missile defense system in European countries may be interpreted as an attempt on the part of the U.S. to leave Europe facing the music i.e. consequences of a conflict where ballistic missiles were used. Europe will essentially become an advanced line of defense of US territory. From the military standpoint, the logic is impeccable—bring the troops (and therefore the hostilities) as close as possible to the positions of the potential enemy and set up several more lines of defense. The world nowadays is so complicated and interdependent, however, it is so exposed to terrorism as to make these advanced outposts or whatever you might want to call them the prime targets for terrorist attacks. Russia cannot be blasé about it because it itself is a part of Europe.
Third, intercept of ballistic missiles carrying weapons of mass destruction (nuclear, germ, chemical) will cause ecological catastrophes in the European countries above whose territories the ICBMs will be killed. Fragments of the missiles and killer missiles may even fall on the territories of neutral countries (or at least the regions that are not involved in the conflict under way). Russia is particularly concerned by vulnerability of the Kaliningrad region to this threat.
Baluyevsky adds, menacingly, that such defensive deployments would “compel Moscow to revise its approach to reduction of these weapons.” He warns that Russia will be ready with “the necessary academic and technological solutions that will at least minimize negative consequences of these actions on Washington’s part.” He reminds his readers that Russia has tested new strategic arms capable of piercing the existing U.S. missile defense systems as well as those other countries may come up with in the near future, a reference to the Topol-M (SS-27) intercontinental ballistic missile.
The audience of this carefully crafted piece would seem to be less Baluyevsky’s fellow Russians, and more Americans and Europeans. Baluyevsky seemingly believes that Americans can be intimidated with cheap threats, and even more that Europeans, in particular the Poles and Czechs with whom missile defense talks continue, can be manipulated to remain themselves defenseless against not only threats from rogue states such as Iran, but also Russia itself.
The complete text from Voyenno-Promyshlenny Kurier: (More »»»)
» More stories on: Allies, Analysis, Nuclear Weapons, Russia
» Missile details: SS-N-6
Barnes on Missile Defense and Electoral Politics
August 1, 2006 :: The Weekly Standard :: Analysis
An election year is the perfect time to generate national support for a robust, multi-layered missile defense shield, writes Fred Barnes in The Weekly Standard. Polls have shown that the American public overwhelmingly supports missile defense, even more so given North Korea’s recent tests launches and Iran’s relentless drive to acquire nuclear weapons. Democrats, who kept missile defense spending at anemic levels during the Clinton years and have attempted to block deployments under President Bush, are vulnerable on the issue. Yet most Americans are not aware that if Democrats capture either the House or Senate, funding for missile defense may be dangerously curtailed and deployments postponed. To avert this, missile defense must become a major campaign issue for Republicans and the Bush administration. “The issue can be laid out very simply,” writes Barnes. “We need robust missile defense for the safety of America; Democrats are standing in the way; vote Republican.” (Article, Link)
» More stories on: Analysis, Policy
Gaffney: Missiles Abroad Should Concentrate the American Mind
July 25, 2006 :: Washington Times :: Analysis
The development, deployment, and proliferation of ballistic missile technology abroad requires a “concentration” of American minds and a concerted effort to develop robust missile defenses, writes Frank J. Gaffney Jr., president of the Center for Security Policy, in The Washington Times. Gaffney catalogues the missile threats that have grown in recent years: North Korea’s readiness to sell missile technology to willing buyers; Pakistan’s intention to build as many as 40 to 50 nuclear warheads per year; Iran’s continued development of nuclear weapons and ballistic missile technology; China’s ever increasing missile arsenal; and Russia’s development of newer intercontinental ballistic missiles possibly with maneuverable re-entry vehicles.
Gaffney makes particular note of the fact that Iran has test launched a short-range Scud missile off of a ship, which would allow it to attack the U.S. without developing an intercontinental ballistic missile. He also points out that Iran has tested its medium-range Shahab-3 ballistic missile in a manner that appears designed to detonate a nuclear weapon in space. Such a detonation above the U.S. would result in an electromagnetic pulse (EMP) capable of wiping out electrical systems and crippling the U.S. infrastructure and economy.
Gaffney suggests that the Bush administration carefully examine the newly released report by the Independent Working Group, entitled Missile Defense, the Space Relationship and the Twenty-First Century, which lays out a roadmap for the development and deployment of a robust, layered, and effective U.S. missile defense shield. The report calls for the deployment of space-based defenses and the expansion of sea-based defenses, and describes ways in which the necessary technical, public, and political support can be obtained and sustained. (Article, Link)
» Read the 2007 report: The Independent Working Group on Missile Defense, the Space Relationship, and the Twenty-First Century (8 MB)
» More stories on: Analysis, Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) Weapons, Iran, Ship-Launched Threat
» Missile details: Scud B/C/D variants, Shahab-6
Kennedy on the Common Sense of Missile Defense
July 22, 2006 :: Investor’s Business Daily :: Writings
Brian T. Kennedy, president of the Claremont Institute, explains in Investor’s Business Daily why missile defense is a common sense necessity in the age of rogue nations such as North Korea. Kennedy notes that while most U.S. policymakers seem to believe that Kim Jong Il would never launch a missile at the U.S., such a scenario exists. He sketches out a plausible scenario that Kim Jong Il might arrive at the conclusion that a nuclear attack against the U.S. might not even bring about a retaliatory strike from Washington:
Imagine Kim Jong Il calculated that he could launch a nuclear missile against Seattle—well within range of his Taepodong-2 missile. He would first recall that the U.S. did not use nuclear weapons during the Korean War, Vietnam War, Iran hostage crisis, bombing of Marines in Beirut, terrorist attacks by al-Qaida throughout the 1990s or the 9-11 assault.
In each case, measured military action was taken, great effort was made not to endanger civilians and a central concern was not provoking hostilities with China or Russia. Second, Kim Jong Il might be convinced that China will defend the North Koreans as it has in the past. So what would happen?
Assume China does move to protect the North Koreans in their folly. Chinese President Hu Jintao calls President Bush and declares that the North Korean attack on Seattle was an awful crime, but that any nuclear retaliation will be seen by the Chinese as an attack on China itself. He pledges to help the U.S. rebuild Seattle and promises to deal harshly with the North Koreans.
Likewise, President Vladimir Putin calls to second his Chinese counterpart: Russia, too, will assist in rebuilding and offers to help negotiate a cease-fire—claiming that the last thing the world needs is a nuclear attack by the U.S. on North Korea….
It is possible, perhaps likely, that the U.S. would launch a counterattack using nuclear weapons. This would fulfill the premise of mutually assured destruction, and require a large-scale nuclear attack to destroy the North Korean regime and its military capabilities—especially since the prospect of a North Korean invasion of the South would become a real possibility under such uncertain circumstances.
But would the U.S. attack if it meant a possible nuclear war with China and Russia? Bush is a courageous and patriotic man. But to avoid a full-scale nuclear war and the annihilation of millions of Americans, is it possible that a U.S. president might not retaliate using nuclear weapons and instead accept such an attack as an unfortunate catastrophe that might lead to the unthinkable nuclear war between the superpowers?
(Article, Link)
» More stories on: Analysis, North Korea, Policy
