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Lewis on the Neglected Capabilities of Aegis

June 12, 2007 :: armscontrolwonk.com :: Analysis

Jeffrey Lewis writes for the ArmsControlWonk.com blog, concerning the curious lack of attention to the robust capabilities of the sea-based missile defense, as compared to the Ground-Based midcourse interceptors currently in contention for Eastern Europe.

 

At a recent budget hearing of the Atlantic Council, MDA Director General Obering was asked by Representative Ellen Tauscher of the House Strategic Forces subcommittee, whether a mobile Aegis SM-3 might be part of a viable alternative to the European site of ten ground based interceptors.  Obering responded with a relative rejection of mobile sea-based missile defenses for Europe in favor of ground based systems.  General Obering cited two main sources for his skepticism of mobile defenses.

 

First, the current configurations of Aegis BMD and Terminal High Altitude Area Defense do not have the ability to counter intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) without extensive and costly modifications. Likewise, mobile system sensors for Aegis BMD and THAAD cannot provide equivalent radar coverage of Europe... Second, the protection of Europe with mobile systems such as Aegis BMD and THAAD would come at a cost that is more than five times greater to field and sustain when compared to the fixed BMD site plan.

 

The General concluded, "I believe our current proposed architecture will provide the best, most cost effective protection for our European allies, and it can be deployed beginning in 2011."

 

Lewis criticizes General Obering's assessment, noting "the 21 version-which the United States is already cooperatively developing with Japan," which according to past documentation "is supposed to have 40-60 percent better burnout velocity, between 4.5-5.0 m/s. Such an interceptor-supplemented with the appropriate terminal defenses-ought to be able to defend most of Europe with much fewer than ten ships."  Additionally, Lewis points out, Obering assumed all Aegis vessels must be on alert 24 hours a day instead of being deployed in an emergency. Thus, "Reducing the number of ships required by an order of magnitude from forty to four would make the mobile option much, much more attractive."

 

Given that the sea-based Aegis system has proven itself to be the most reliable of missile defense systems tested to date, Lewis' observations are well worth noting for those interested in a more robust missile defense system. (More »»») 

» More stories on: Analysis

» Missile system details for: Aegis Ship-Based BMD

Friedman on Russia Using Missile Defense as a Geopolitical Lever

June 12, 2007 :: Stratfor :: Analysis

George Friedman of Stratfor analyzes Russia's past hostility to ballistic missile defense and the nature of Russian hostility to the current American plan to construct such a system in the Czech Republic and Poland. Friedman characterizes both the Russian opposition to the plan and its counter-proposal as carefully constructed steps to strain Washington-Warsaw relations and regain influence in Central Europe and the Former Soviet Union.

 

Historically, Russia has opposed BMD because it would destroy the concept of mutually assured destruction. Since the USSR lacked the economic and technological ability to match the U.S. if it built such a system, Soviet policy makers aggressively combated and killed Reagan's "Star Wars" plan. However, the nature of the opposition has changed. The current U.S. plan uses ten interceptors, hardly enough to diminish Russia's tremendous nuclear deterrent.

 

Russia has long resented NATO's eastward expansion into its former sphere of influence, but could do little to resist the trend while recovering from the fall of the USSR. "The Russians believed they had an understanding with NATO and the United States, dating back to the fall of the Soviet Union, that NATO would not be extended into Central Europe—and certainly never into the FSU." As its economy has improved, Russia is increasingly verbalizing that grudge, and pushing against that trend. Russia opposes the current missile defense plan not because of historical reasons, explains Friedman, but specifically because of missile defense:

 

[A]s a symbol of a Polish-U.S. alliance that transcends NATO, it is absolutely vital. The Poles wanted the missiles in their country to symbolize the link, and the Americans wanted them there for the same reason. As long as that link exists, the Poles feel secure, and as long as the Poles feel secure, they will be a thorn in the side of the Russians. The Russian goal of exerting a sphere of influence in the FSU has a broader component. Russia does not expect to regain influence in most of Central Europe— Serbia possibly excepted. It does want the Central Europeans to be sufficiently wary of the Russians as to exercise caution.

 

Such an alliance would embolden Warsaw and Washington to furthur engage in pro-Western agitation, especially in Ukraine. "Of all of the former European satellites, Poland has been the most openly anti-Russian and the most active in supporting forces in the FSU that also are resisting Russian resurgence."

 

 

After feigning outrage over the U.S. plan for months, Russia abruptly changed face and issued a counter-proposal at the G-8 meeting that would place the U.S.'s missiles in Iraq or Turkey and use a pre-existing Russian radar facility in Azerbaijan instead. The proposal masterfully portrays Russia as cooperative and flexible, while leaving the U.S. in a difficult position. Despite the fact that the radar facility is far too close to Iran and the Middle East to prove as efficient as the current plan, "by rejecting the proposal, Washington would look hostile and uncompromising. Accepting it would mean basing the missiles near the Iranian border, possibly too close to intercept long-range missiles fired from there. Using Russian radar—which currently is insufficient for U.S. needs—would make the entire system dependent on Russian cooperation. And pulling the system from Poland would be a signal to Central Europe that military agreements with the United States are subject to negotiation with the Russians. That, of course, is exactly the signal Putin wants sent." Friedman concludes, "The Russians now have very little to lose and quite a bit to gain from confrontation." (Article, Link) 

» More stories on: Russia, Analysis, European Missile Defenses

Coyle on the European Missile Shield

June 8, 2007 :: Analysis

The Tehran Times carries Philip Coyle's response to a surprise proposal concerning European missile defense by Russian President Vladimir Putin at the G-8 summit in Germany.  Philip Coyle is a Senior Advisor to the Center for Defense Information and a former assistant secretary of defense.

 

Russia's compromise to the U.S. plan to base an X-band radar facility in the Czech Republic was to use a pre-existing radar facility in Azerbaijan.  Coyle argues the Azeri site would be advantageous:

 

At that location, the proposed missile defenses can 'defend' all of Europe, including South Eastern Europe. The Poland/Czech Republic arrangement cannot 'cover' all of Europe. Also a radar at the Azerbaijan site cannot 'see' Russian missile launches going over the pole towards America, which means that it cannot be used to defend America from Russia.

 

Coyle concludes that "if Russia is not an enemy, as President Bush says, he should be willing to seriously consider this proposal. Ever since President Reagan, the U.S. has been saying it wants to cooperate with Russia on missile defense and then it doesn't happen. Maybe this time it will." (Article, Link) 

» More stories on: Analysis, Russia, European Missile Defenses

Spring on Measuring the Presidential Candidates

May 31, 2007 :: The Heritage Foundation :: Analysis

 (Article, Link) 

» More stories on: Analysis, Policy

Franks on Need to Continue Robust Missile Defense Efforts

May 31, 2007 :: The Hill's Congress Blog :: Analysis

Writing in The Hill, Representative Trent Franks examines Russia's position on missile defense, and suggests it is hypocritical.  On the one hand, Russia recently tested a new and highly advanced missile that is capable of penetrating any missile defense system. The missile's payload was said to be necessary "in terms of defense and security Russia can look calmly to its future."  Russia nevertheless vehemently opposes a limited defensive plan by the U.S. to assure its security. Representative Franks suggests it is unfortunate that Russia can seek new offensive weaponry to assure its security, but the U.S. may not develop defensive systems to provide for its security.  "Russia is not the only country that should be able to 'look calmly to the future.'" (Article, Link) 

» More stories on: Russia, Analysis

Alaska to Revise Emergency Response Plan to Include Preparation for EMP Attack

May 29, 2007 :: News

On May 24, the Alaska State Emergency Response Commission was briefed by the Institute of the North, based in Anchorage, on the dangers from an electromagnetic pulse (EMP) attack delivered by ballistic missiles.  As a result of this briefing, Alaska will include preparation for an electromagnetic pulse (EMP) attack when it revises its emergency response plan.

 

An electromagnetic pulse occurs when a nuclear warhead is detonated between 40 and 400 kilometers above the Earth's surface.  The explosion creates a pulse that disrupts and damages electric power grids and electronic devices; a nuclear weapon with a yield of 30 kilotons detonated at an altitude of 100 kilometers could have devastating effects of up to 70% of electrical systems up to a thousand miles in every direction.

 

Testifying before the Alaska State Emergency Response Commission, Institute of the North Senior Fellow Mead Treadwell noted that, "What makes contingency planning on this issue so critical is that in the case of an EMP attack, Alaska could be losing all these capacities at once, without being able to call upon outside assistance."

 

Alaska Homeland Security Director John Madden, co-chair of the Alaska State Emergency Response Commission, stated that planning for the threat of EMP will include integration, implementation and survivability measures, and that he plans to present the issue before the Department of Homeland Security later this summer in order to raise EMP preparedness as a national issue, not just an Alaska issue.

 

Treadwell also urged the Commission to consider the cost-benefit implications for EMP emergency planning since even a one-time attack would be financially devastating. "Indeed, such a calculation could factor into national decisions regarding expanding a missile defense program," he added. 

 

Treadwell quoted author Thomas Schelling to emphasize that, though unprecedented, there is, "…a tendency in our planning to confuse the unfamiliar with the improbable. The contingency we have not considered looks strange; what looks strange is therefore improbable; what seems improbable need not be considered seriously."

 

A report by the 2004 Commission to Assess the Threat to the Untied States from Electromagnetic Pulse Attack noted that, "…one or a few high-altitude nuclear detonations can produce EMP effects that can potentially disrupt or damage electronic and electrical systems over much of the United States, virtually simultaneously, at a time determined by an adversary." The executive summary of the EMP Commission report is viewable online at www.missilethreat.com/empreport.

 

The briefing follows the release of a nationwide survey of Adjutants General on issues such as missile defense and EMP attack that was conducted jointly by the Anchorage-based Institute of the North and the Claremont Institute of Claremont, California. Survey results revealed that our nation’s National Guard leaders are unprepared to respond to an EMP attack and would like further information on the subject.

 

Both the Institute of the North and the Claremont Institute, publisher of the website www.missilethreat.com, have been working closely together for more than 10 years on policy issues related to the strategic defense of the United States. One goal of the collaboration is to help state and local officials and citizens understand policy options at all levels related to ballistic missile defense.  (Link) 

» Press Release on Insitute of the North Briefing for Alaska State Emergency Response Commission

» More stories on: Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) Weapons, Analysis, Space-Based Systems

Survey of Adjutants General Reveals States Unprepared for EMP, Missile Attack

March 7, 2007 :: Analysis

America's state-based emergency responders are not actively preparing against an attack on the United States by electromagnetic pulse (EMP), according to the Adjutants General who oversee National Guard units throughout the country. Such an attack could disable most of the nation's electric power grid, telecommunications, automobiles, and computers with a single, high altitude, nuclear blast. An EMP attack is an increasingly likely possibility as ballistic missile and nuclear technology continue to proliferate.

A survey of state-based Adjutants General throughout the United States, entitled Missile Defense and the Role of the States, was conducted jointly over the last year by the Anchorage-based Institute of the North and the Claremont Institute of Claremont, California.

The survey, entitled Missile Defense and the Role of the States, was conducted jointly over the last year by the Anchorage-based Institute of the North and the Claremont Institute of Claremont, California. The survey's questions were sent to Adjutants General of all 50 states, with more than half of the states' Adjutants General responding to the questionnaire.

Although 96% of state Adjutants General indicated significant concern over an EMP attack, the majority had done little or no analysis of the impact of an overhead EMP attack to potential targets in their particular state. Likewise, most admitted little or no preparation in the areas of training, equipment/EMP hardening, and exercises/procedure.

This finding differs with a 2004 recommendation by the congressionally mandated Commission to Assess the Threat to the United States from EMP Attack, which urged states to coordinate with the federal government to prepare an emergency response plan against EMP: "Working with state authorities and private-sector organizations, the Department of Homeland Security should develop draft protocols for implementation by emergency and other government responders following EMP attack, Red Team these extensively, and then institutionalize validated protocols through issuance of standards, training, and exercises."

An electromagnetic pulse is created by detonating a nuclear warhead between 40 and 400 kilometers above the earth's surface. The electromagnetic field created by the nuclear detonation at that altitude creates a "pulse" which can disrupt and disable electronic computers, electric power, telephone and information systems over a significant geographic area. Furthermore, a space-based nuclear blast could also disable satellites that would enable the U.S. to identify the source of and respond to such an attack.

The 2004 EMP report noted that, "...one or a few high-altitude nuclear detonations can produce EMP effects that can potentially disrupt or damage electronic and electrical systems over much of the United States, virtually simultaneously, at a time determined by an adversary." The executive summary of the EMP Commission report is viewable online at www.missilethreat.com/empreport.

The Institute of the North/Claremont Institute survey indicates that National Guard leaders would like increased briefings on the missile threat in general and the EMP threat in particular. While 74% of Adjutants General had been briefed on the threat from Russian ballistic missiles, only 44% had received briefings on the threat posed by ship-borne or "stateless" missiles, and 41% indicated that they received no regular briefings regarding ballistic missile threats.

Survey results also highlight overwhelming agreement (93%) that the United States needs an effective missile defense system. A majority of survey respondents supported a "layered" missile defense, composed of ground-, sea-, air-, and space-based interceptors. Furthermore, 59% of participants stated that they envisioned their state's National Guard having a role in the development, testing, manning, and deployment of missile defense systems which could prevent an EMP attack overhead.

None of the Adjutants General surveyed indicated that they were actively involved in a formal planning process on EMP attack. The survey authors suggest policy options urging states to direct contingency planning in which they create their own realistic scenarios that demonstrate the potential effects of cruise and ballistic missiles, weapons of mass destruction, and EMP attack, thus increasing state preparedness. States are also encouraged to coordinate defense efforts with the Department of Homeland Security.

"A question state policy makers may want to ask themselves is, ‘Does our state have an EMP contingency plan?,'" said Mead Treadwell of the Institute of the North: "If not, we should get on with it, as the EMP Commission recommends."

"The United States Congress has continued the EMP Commission's work since it issued its report in 2004," said Tom Karako of the Claremont Institute. "Their report was published the same day as the 9/11 Commission, but it has been too long ignored."

Survey results and a summary report were mailed to state governors and Adjutants General for their review. Based on the survey's findings, the Institute of the North and the Claremont Institute plan to follow-up by publishing a regular newsletter highlighting ways in which state military leaders and policy makers can raise awareness and increase involvement in their state. Both institutes have been working closely together for over ten years on policy issues related to the strategic defense of the United States. Their goal is to help state and local officials and citizens understand the issues related to ballistic missile defense.

The project was initiated by Mead Treadwell, senior fellow at the Institute of the North, and Tom Karako, editor of www.missilethreat.com, an online project of the Claremont Institute. Both are members of an independent working group which recently published the report, Missile Defense, the Space Relationship, and the Twenty-First Century.

  (Link) 

» Press Release for Missile Defense and the States project report

» Project Report: Missile Defense and the States, a project of the Institute of the North and the Claremont Institute

» More stories on: Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) Weapons, Analysis, Policy

Sieff on Israel's New Dilemma

December 10, 2006 :: UPI :: Analysis

Israel desperately needs a short-range anti-rocket defense system, as demonstrated by Hezbollah's bombardment of northern Israel in July-August 2006, writes Martin Sieff in the UPI. Yet Israel has recognized significant development problems with its two possible solutions: Northrop Grumman's Skyguard, a high-energy chemical laser system; and Lockheed Martin's Sky Shield, a conventional rapid-fire cannon. Skyguard, developed in conjunction with the U.S. Army and the Israeli Defense Forces, was expected to be the IDF's first choice. The system is based on technology developed for the highly successful Tactical High Energy Laser (THEL). Yet according to All Headline News, Israel has suspended its participation in the project. "The point of contention appears to an inability to increased Skyguard's range to 6 miles [9.6 km]," AHN reported. "With its current range of only 1.8 miles [2.9 km], deploying Skyguard along Israel's entire northern border would be prohibitively expensive." The second option, Sky Shield, successfully destroyed a replica of Palestinian-made Qassam rocket in a recent lab test, according to the Israeli newspaper Ha'aretz. But since the rocket was not in flight, the system has not yet proven itself capable of intercepting incoming Qassams. Much more development may be needed. "It is far too early to write off either system, especially given the relatively meager resources that have so far been allocated to developing either of them," Sieff notes. "But time is not on the Israelis' side, and they may have to choose fast." (Article, Link) 

» More stories on: High Energy Defenses, Israel, Analysis

Freedman on the Future of British Deterrence

December 1, 2006 :: Financial Times :: Analysis

Nuclear deterrence should continue to play a role in Britain’s international affairs, argues Sir Lawrence Freedman, professor of war studies and vice principal (research) at King’s College, London. “What is it about our current strategic environment that suggests that this is the time to abandon the deterrent?” Freedman asks in the Financial Times. “The obvious answer is ‘very little.’” He notes that Russia is in a “bad temper,” North Korea has demonstrated its nuclear capability, and Iran appears on the verge of acquiring its own. Despite the problem of how a full-blown British nuclear capability will deter suicidal sub-state organizations like Al-Qaeda, nuclear weapons continue to “make clear the horrific consequences of full-scale war or even a big miscalculation and so encourage states to resolve disputes without resort to armed force.” Freedman cites the case of India and Pakistan, in which the introduction of nuclear weapons into the conflict introduced a welcome element of caution. He notes, however, that some conflicts “may become so unstable that mutual deterrence will collapse and catastrophe will ensue, which is why proliferation is not to be encouraged.” Freedman, nevertheless, appears to agree with the British government’s position that “however difficult it is to imagine a plausible scenario where it would be necessary to threaten, let alone use, nuclear weapons, the future is horribly uncertain.” Nuclear weapons therefore remain “an essential insurance policy.” (Link) 

» More stories on: Allies, Analysis, Nuclear Weapons, Proliferation, Terrorism

Rubin: Iran “Major Missile Power” in Region

November 30, 2006 :: UPI :: Analysis

Uzi Rubin, former head of Israel’s missile defense program, argues in a new study published by the Institute for National Security Studies that Iran is now “the major missile power” in the Middle East. “No other country in the world … comes close to Iran in the number and variety of ballistic missiles in development or already deployed,” Rubin writes. He lists Iran’s assets: Shahab-3 medium-range missiles, an “an indispensable complement to [Iran’s] nuclear ambitions”; Scud B and Scud C short-range missiles, manufactured “in considerable quantities”; Zelzal short-range missiles, which can target troop concentrations; the Raad, an advanced version of the Chinese Silkworm anti-ship cruise missile; and an assortment of smaller anti-tank missiles. “Every major city and military installation between the western shores of Turkey and the eastern border of Pakistan and between the Black Sea in the north and the southern narrows of the Red Sea are within range,” he writes. Moreover, Iran can now hit any point in the Middle East from well-protected, fixed silos “survivable against preemption.” He warns: “There should be no doubt that in case of conflict, Iran will launch Shahab-3 missiles regardless of their flight test record, and that some of them will reach their destinations.” Rubin adds that Iran is also developing satellites, and that any suitably modified space launch vehicle can serve as an intercontinental ballistic missile. At the rate they are going, “Iranian missiles will dominate the entire continent of Europe by the end of this decade,” he concludes. (Article, Link) 

» More stories on: Israel, Iran, Analysis

» Missile details: Shahab 6, Scud B/C/D variants, Zelzal-1/2/3

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