Ros-Lehtinen on Reckoning with Syria
September 19, 2007 :: Analysis
The New York Sun published an opinion piece by Congresswoman Ileana Ros-Lehtinen of Florida on Syria on September 19. Congresswoman Ros-Lehtinen argues that only tougher economic sanctions, particularly ones targeting Syria's energy industry, are the only way to change its destructive behavior in the region. Syria is "a stalwart supporter for terrorist organizations and activities throughout the region," allowing foreign jihadists to enter Iraq and serving as a base of operations for Hezbollah and Hamas. Additionally, "Syria has developed ballistic missiles and has reportedly even conducted research and development on biological weapons. Syria has one of the largest ballistic missile inventories in the Middle East, comprised of several hundred short-range ballistic missiles and cruise missiles." Syria's pursuit of more destructive weaponry aligned it with Iran, with whom it declared in a mutual self-defense pact in 2005.
Accordingly, Congresswoman Ros-Lehtinen has introduced the Syria Accountability and Liberation Act, which would:
[R]equire the immediate imposition of all possible American sanctions and that they remain in place until Syria ceases its support for terrorism, unconventional weapons development, and other destructive policies. It mandates a number of additional sanctions to curtail Syria's proliferation efforts and imposes new sanctions on entities that invest or conduct business in Syria's energy sector.
The Congresswoman concludes that, "Without foreign capital and development, Syria will be deprived of the energy profits it desperately needs to buy weapons and sponsor terrorist activities," and therefore make the U.S. and its allies safer. (Article, Link)
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Economist: The West and a Grumpy Russia
July 19, 2007 :: The Economist :: Events
The Economist critiques Russian President Vladimir Putin's recent suspension of Russia's obligations under the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) treaty. The CFE regulates the number of troops, tanks, artillery and aircraft which can be stationed in Europe. Russia announced that because NATO has not ratified treaty amendments to the CFE from 1999 while Russia has, it would be justified in suspending its obligations under the treaty. NATO has demanded that before they ratify amendments that allow Russia to deploy greater numbers of troops to its restive Southern Republics, Russia must first withdraw all conventional force from Moldova and Georgia. The suspension would take effect in six months to allow for negotiations between the two sides, but the six month window is likely to be only cosmetic.
The planned suspension of the CFE is only part of Russia's new post-Cold War foreign policy. Russia resents NATO's eastward push, the U.S.'s new bases in Romania and Bulgaria and a planned missile defense system in Poland and the Czech Republic. Acquiescence caused by its weakness in the 90's has evaporated with the flush of petro-dollars in recent years. Putin is attempting to eliminate older treaties signed in weakness, and reengage in the European political arena by dividing the Europeans from the U.S., and the Eastern Europeans from their Western counterparts. The next target could likely be the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) treaty which banned both superpowers from building or deploying land-based missiles with ranges from 500-5,500 km.
Unfortunately, the U.S. is contributing to the deterioration of security in Europe by "looking askance at binding agreements to limit the two sides' strategic nuclear arsenals after the current Moscow treaty governing them expires in 2012. Meanwhile the counting rules being used (which date from the earlier Start-1 treaty) will lapse in December 2009." The Economist concludes that good Cold War agreements are evaporating because hotheads on both sides refuse to find common ground. (Article, Link)
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McNamara on Dodd Amendment
July 13, 2007 :: The Heritage Foundation :: Analysis
Sally McNamara of the Heritage Foundation recently criticized an amendment by Senator Christopher Dodd to cut $225 million from building a missile defense system in Poland and the Czech Republic. The amendment ignores the pressing strategic need for the system, McNamara suggests, as well as our broader interests in European security and the U.S.'s relationship with Poland and the Czech Republic.
The emerging threat of a ballistic missile attack from a rouge state or terrorist organization is a danger to Europe and the U.S. alike. North Korea's Taepo-Dong 2 missiles and Iran's Shahab 3 ballistic missiles in particular, could threaten the security of Europe. Accordingly, "ten long-range, ground-based missile defense interceptors in Poland and a mid-course radar in the Czech Republic will strengthen transatlantic security and counter the evolving... ballistic missile threat. The Dodd amendment, however, will delay the proposed construction date of 2008 and the operational target date of 2012."
In addition to the military significance of the system, the placement of the interceptors and radar in Poland and the Czech Republic respectively would be a symbol of both transatlantic solidarity and a special relationship between those countries and the U.S.
For Warsaw and Prague, this would mark a milestone in their integration into the transatlantic security community. They would be providing a significant contribution to NATO and making a powerful statement in support of the alliance's principle of mutual defense. Hosting missile defense facilities would also offer Poland and the Czech Republic a special defense relationship with the United States. The project entails genuine cooperation between Washington and new, solid allies who have expressed an interest in building more enduring alliances with the United States.
The success of the Dodd amendment however would not only weaken Polish and Czech confidence in the U.S.'s commitment to their security, but would embolden Russia to meddle in European affairs. McNamara concludes, "Congress must display resolve and leadership by providing adequate funding to take this step toward solidifying the transatlantic security alliance." (Article, Link)
» More stories on: European Missile Defenses, NATO, Analysis
Berman: Russia Shows the U.S. the Central Asia Door
July 11, 2007 :: Jane's Information Group :: Analysis
Ilan Berman, Vice President for Policy at the American Foreign Policy Council, analyzed Russian and U.S. rivalry in Central Asia in the July 11 edition of Jane's Defence Weekly. In the aftermath of September 11, Russian President Vladimir Putin had acquiesced to U.S. air bases in Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan to fight the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. However,
[F]our years later, America's regional presence is dwindling rapidly. Already, disputes with local governments have led to the ouster of US forces from one strategic facility, the Karshi-Khanabad base in Uzbekistan, and called into question the future of its deployment in Manas [Kyrgyzstan]. Diplomatically, meanwhile, Washington faces growing regional hostility, punctuated by public calls from the six-member Russian- and Chinese-led Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) for an exit of US and allied forces from the region.
While the U.S. was quick to promote governmental reform and human rights, Russia offered "value-free" cooperation.
Fearful of the possibility of a permanent US military outpost in its immediate neighbourhood and of the potential for US-assisted democratic change there, the Kremlin has adopted a multifaceted strategy of economic and political outreach designed to diminish US influence there...Moscow...has pursued a "value free" approach to regional ties, emphasising co-operation on military, strategic and energy matters over structural and political reforms.
The autocratic regimes of Central Asia thus rediscovered a regional power that would aid them while condoning a slide back into autocracy. Compounding the problem, the U.S. has shifted its focus back to Iraq and the Middle East and away from Central Asia. Berman concludes that the U.S. ignores the region and its autocratic drift at its peril, considering its geopolitical and economic importance. (Link)
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Podvig on the Russian RS-24 as Modified Topol-M
July 6, 2007 :: Analysis
The RS-24 missile that Russia tested on May 29, 2007 is a multiple-warhead version of the Topol-M and not a new missile, concludes Russian analyst Pavel Podvig writing for the Russian Forces blog. Russia has long wanted to have a MIRV version of the Topol-M, assuming it could compensate the slow pace of missile deployment by making the forces look bigger. However, under the guidelines of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START), Russia and the U.S. are forbidden from "increasing the number of warheads attributed to an ICBM or SLBM of an existing or new type [of missile] (Article V.12d)". Since under the guidelines of the treaty, the Topol-M would be considered a variant of the Topol missile, Russia cannot declare that it will be equipped with multiple warheads. Therefore, Russia declared the Topol-M a "new" missile.
It is (almost) official now - the RS-24 missile that Russia tested on May 29, 2007 is a multiple-warhead version of Topol-M. That was my guess at the time of the test, but now I have had it confirmed. The missile, of course, have a new warhead section, but it is a Topol-M. It was said to use a guidance system that shares technology with that of the Bulava SLBM and, just as I suspected, it will be using the same warheads. It appears, though, that MIRVed Topol-M will carry no more than six warheads (the range was reported to be from three to six, but no final number yet).
MIRVing of Topol-M has long been somewhat of an obsession in Russia - there is a broad consensus among experts across the spectrum that this could compensate for the slow pace of the missile deployment, if only by artificially making the Russian forces look bigger. I think this belief is deeply misguided, but this is where the Russian debate stands. ...
At the moment, Russia can declare it as a prototype, which means it does not have to attribute a number of warheads or throw-weight to the missile until it is flight-tested at least 20 times or deployed. Since START is set to expire in December 2009, this means that Russia may avoid a conflict with the treaty by simply withholding the final throw-weight declaration until then.
(Article, Link)
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» Missile details: RS-24
Schmitt on China's Military Power
June 14, 2007 :: Washington Post :: Analysis
Gary J. Schmitt writes for The Washington Post on China's increased military spending. The U.S. has a tendency to "complain that we don't know exactly how much China is spending on its military and what exactly it is acquiring. Most important, we complain that we don't know the strategic 'why' behind this buildup." While most scholars attribute China's ballooning military spending to political circumstance or the size of the U.S.'s budget, Schmitt argues that in fact:
[T]he Chinese military buildup really began after the demise of the Soviet Union—that is, precisely when China had the least reason to worry about its defense needs. And the buildup continued during a period when the United States was cutting its own defense budget by significant amounts. Moreover, no other Asian regional power was putting forward double-digit defense increases. To the contrary, Taiwan—presumably China's main military concern—was slashing its defense budget. And Japan, the only possible regional ‘great power' competitor to China, was suffering from a decade of economic stagnation, with a static defense budget to match.
Schmitt suggests that the Chinese believe a first-class army is critical for its global stature in its quest to become a world power. "The Chinese are a proud people and they want to be seen as a powerful, potentially dominant, state. And power, they understand, includes not only a strong economy but a powerful military. When the Chinese look at the world today, who gets in their way most of the time? It's certainly not the Europeans, who have economic strength but little hard power. It's the United States." (Article, Link)
» More stories on: China, Analysis
Stakelbeck on a New Ballistic Missile Triad
June 14, 2007 :: Washington Times :: Analysis
Fredrick Stakelbeck writes for The Washington Times discussing the the emerging ballistic missile threat to the United States from Russia, China and Iran.
Russian President Vladimir Putin has assisted Iran with the development of its missile technology and nuclear program, has recently claimed he may freeze Russia's compliance with the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty and the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty. Russia recently tested a new RS-24 missile which is especially designed to penetrate missile defenses.
The recent Department of Defense report on China's military spending "catalogs in great detail the country's continued efforts to establish not only a defensive ballistic missile capability, but an offensive ‘first strike' capability as well. The expected deployment of additional mobile, land and sea-based ballistic nuclear missiles that can reach the U.S. mainland have raised serious questions in Washington about the county's regional and global intentions." While China has maintained a "no first strike" policy, "other sources suggest that they are possibly developing capabilities for a more flexible use of nuclear weapons that would call into question this declared policy."
Led by President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, Iran has developed with significant Chinese and Russian assistance, its Shahab-3 and Shahab-4 missiles, which can target Israel and Europe respectively. Iran also has continued its quest to acquire nuclear weapons despite diplomatic efforts to halt its program.
Stakelbeck concludes, "In the meantime, the United States and its allies should consider increasing funding dedicated to the research, development and testing of a more agile anti-missile defense umbrella. By taking this important step, the combined offensive intercontinental ballistic missile capabilities of China, Russia and Iran, as well as rogue nations such as North Korea, will be made increasingly irrelevant." (Article, Link)
» More stories on: Analysis, China, Russia, Iran
National Review on Russian Intentions
June 13, 2007 :: National Review Online :: Analysis
An editorial by The National Review today examines the surprise Russian counter-proposal unveiled at the G-8 summit meeting in Germany. Russia had denounced the U.S. plan to house ten Ground Based Interceptors in Poland and construct a X-band radar facility in the Czech Republic, suggesting that the U.S. instead base interceptors in Turkey, Iraq or on Aegis vessels and use a pre-existing Russian radar base in Azerbaijan.
National Review suggests the U.S. approach such a proposal cautiously and verify Russia's intentions. "If it is indeed a serious offer to enhance global security against the menace of ayatollahs who brandish nuclear weapons, then it could represent a geopolitical breakthrough. Yet if it is just another Russian attempt to undermine existing missile-defense plans, it deserves to be shot down quickly." The editorial suggests that the Russian proposal may be problematic geographically. Additionally, if Russia were actually committed to preventing a ballistic missile attack from Iran, then it should halt its assistance to the regime and work with the West to keep the Iranians from gaining a nuclear weapon at all. However, if the offer to work with the U.S. is genuine, then it should be taken seriously. "Russia’s determination to block the missile-defense sites in the Czech Republic and Poland always has seemed to have more to do with exerting influence over Eastern Europe than with anybody’s security interests. ...Verify Russia's intentions, and only then begin to trust." (Article, Link)
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Lewis on the Neglected Capabilities of Aegis
June 12, 2007 :: armscontrolwonk.com :: Analysis
Jeffrey Lewis writes for the ArmsControlWonk.com blog, concerning the curious lack of attention to the robust capabilities of the sea-based missile defense, as compared to the Ground-Based midcourse interceptors currently in contention for Eastern Europe.
At a recent budget hearing of the Atlantic Council, MDA Director General Obering was asked by Representative Ellen Tauscher of the House Strategic Forces subcommittee, whether a mobile Aegis SM-3 might be part of a viable alternative to the European site of ten ground based interceptors. Obering responded with a relative rejection of mobile sea-based missile defenses for Europe in favor of ground based systems. General Obering cited two main sources for his skepticism of mobile defenses.
First, the current configurations of Aegis BMD and Terminal High Altitude Area Defense do not have the ability to counter intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) without extensive and costly modifications. Likewise, mobile system sensors for Aegis BMD and THAAD cannot provide equivalent radar coverage of Europe... Second, the protection of Europe with mobile systems such as Aegis BMD and THAAD would come at a cost that is more than five times greater to field and sustain when compared to the fixed BMD site plan.
The General concluded, "I believe our current proposed architecture will provide the best, most cost effective protection for our European allies, and it can be deployed beginning in 2011."
Lewis criticizes General Obering's assessment, noting "the 21 version-which the United States is already cooperatively developing with Japan," which according to past documentation "is supposed to have 40-60 percent better burnout velocity, between 4.5-5.0 m/s. Such an interceptor-supplemented with the appropriate terminal defenses-ought to be able to defend most of Europe with much fewer than ten ships." Additionally, Lewis points out, Obering assumed all Aegis vessels must be on alert 24 hours a day instead of being deployed in an emergency. Thus, "Reducing the number of ships required by an order of magnitude from forty to four would make the mobile option much, much more attractive."
Given that the sea-based Aegis system has proven itself to be the most reliable of missile defense systems tested to date, Lewis' observations are well worth noting for those interested in a more robust missile defense system. (More »»»)
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» Missile system details for: Aegis Ship-Based BMD
Friedman on Russia Using Missile Defense as a Geopolitical Lever
June 12, 2007 :: Stratfor :: Analysis
George Friedman of Stratfor analyzes Russia's past hostility to ballistic missile defense and the nature of Russian hostility to the current American plan to construct such a system in the Czech Republic and Poland. Friedman characterizes both the Russian opposition to the plan and its counter-proposal as carefully constructed steps to strain Washington-Warsaw relations and regain influence in Central Europe and the Former Soviet Union.
Historically, Russia has opposed BMD because it would destroy the concept of mutually assured destruction. Since the USSR lacked the economic and technological ability to match the U.S. if it built such a system, Soviet policy makers aggressively combated and killed Reagan's "Star Wars" plan. However, the nature of the opposition has changed. The current U.S. plan uses ten interceptors, hardly enough to diminish Russia's tremendous nuclear deterrent.
Russia has long resented NATO's eastward expansion into its former sphere of influence, but could do little to resist the trend while recovering from the fall of the USSR. "The Russians believed they had an understanding with NATO and the United States, dating back to the fall of the Soviet Union, that NATO would not be extended into Central Europe—and certainly never into the FSU." As its economy has improved, Russia is increasingly verbalizing that grudge, and pushing against that trend. Russia opposes the current missile defense plan not because of historical reasons, explains Friedman, but specifically because of missile defense:
[A]s a symbol of a Polish-U.S. alliance that transcends NATO, it is absolutely vital. The Poles wanted the missiles in their country to symbolize the link, and the Americans wanted them there for the same reason. As long as that link exists, the Poles feel secure, and as long as the Poles feel secure, they will be a thorn in the side of the Russians. The Russian goal of exerting a sphere of influence in the FSU has a broader component. Russia does not expect to regain influence in most of Central Europe— Serbia possibly excepted. It does want the Central Europeans to be sufficiently wary of the Russians as to exercise caution.
Such an alliance would embolden Warsaw and Washington to furthur engage in pro-Western agitation, especially in Ukraine. "Of all of the former European satellites, Poland has been the most openly anti-Russian and the most active in supporting forces in the FSU that also are resisting Russian resurgence."
After feigning outrage over the U.S. plan for months, Russia abruptly changed face and issued a counter-proposal at the G-8 meeting that would place the U.S.'s missiles in Iraq or Turkey and use a pre-existing Russian radar facility in Azerbaijan instead. The proposal masterfully portrays Russia as cooperative and flexible, while leaving the U.S. in a difficult position. Despite the fact that the radar facility is far too close to Iran and the Middle East to prove as efficient as the current plan, "by rejecting the proposal, Washington would look hostile and uncompromising. Accepting it would mean basing the missiles near the Iranian border, possibly too close to intercept long-range missiles fired from there. Using Russian radar—which currently is insufficient for U.S. needs—would make the entire system dependent on Russian cooperation. And pulling the system from Poland would be a signal to Central Europe that military agreements with the United States are subject to negotiation with the Russians. That, of course, is exactly the signal Putin wants sent." Friedman concludes, "The Russians now have very little to lose and quite a bit to gain from confrontation." (Article, Link)
» More stories on: Russia, Analysis, European Missile Defenses
