PINR on Israel's Proposed Iron Dome Defenses
November 11, 2007 :: Analysis
The November 9 edition of Power and Interest News Report provides a detailed analysis of the Israeli Iron Dome project and its relationship with the ongoing Israeli-Palestinian peace process. The Iron Dome is a planned missile defense system specifically designed to intercept short-range Katyusha and Qassam missiles. The article argues that without an effective defense against short range missiles, peace between the two sides will remain illusive.
Katyusha and Qassam rockets are easily manufactured, costing only several dollars to build. While not particularly lethal, the rockets inflict a serious toll on the Israeli public.
Katyusha rocket makes up 90 percent of Hezbollah's rocket arsenal and has a range of approximately 20 kilometers (12 miles)... During July-August 2006, Hezbollah fired approximately 4,000 Katyusha rockets into Israel, killing 51 Israelis and seriously wounding another 250. Rockets destroyed or severely damaged 2,000 homes, while between 100,000-250,000 civilians fled, at least temporarily, from the north to other parts of Israel. Qassam rockets... are less destructive than Katyushas and have a general range of only three to ten kilometers (1.8-6.2 miles), they are cheap and easy to make, making them the weapon of choice for militants launching attacks on Israel from the Gaza Strip... Qassams have had their most significant impact on the town of Sderot... One third of Sderot's children suffer from post-traumatic stress disorder, according to a survey carried out last year, while around half of the population of Sderot has left the town since the rocket attacks intensified.
Militarily, as air strikes have been ineffective in stopping the rocket attacks, military leaders are left with the prospect of reoccupying the Gaza strip or other territories to halt the attacks. So long as the missile attacks continue, the likelihood of war increases and the prospects for peace diminish. Therefore, former Prime Minister and current Defense Minister Ehud Barak argues for the Iron Dome which could remove the threat of rocket attacks from the political equation as negotiations continue. However, the Iron Dome faces significant technical and economic challenges.
It will have to be able to identify the launch of a rocket, analyze the data and feed it to the intercepting missile for launch, all within 20 seconds, the flight time of a Qassam. While it may be possible to surmount the technological obstacles to achieving this, it may not be possible to do so at a reasonable cost... Each interceptor missile will cost between $30,000 and $50,000. The rockets that they will intercept, however, cost only a few dollars to make. Some analysts fear that reliance on Iron Dome may lead to a costly arms race, in which Palestinian militants and Hezbollah would have the advantage.
While the system would be costly to maintain, advocates state it would be less expensive than a prolonged war with the Palestinians and the cost of rebuilding damaged areas of the country. Additionally, if Israelis are confident in the effectiveness of their missile defense system, they may be more willing to make the territorial concessions necessary to create a Palestinian state.
The article concludes, "An anti-rocket system will have to form just one part of Israel's broader defenses against irregular warfare if it is to provide Israel with the security needed to allow it to make the territorial compromises that are probably necessary for peace."
(Article, Link)
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IBD: Missile Defense Before It's Too Late
November 8, 2007 :: Investor’s Business Daily :: Analysis
A November 7 editorial by Investor's Business Daily challenges the position of the Democratic Congress, which recently slashed $85 million from a planned missile defense site in Poland. Investor's Business Daily notes that Congress is undermining our best line of defense just when missile defense systems are demonstrating growing sophistication and reliability and the threats to our security are at their greatest. These improvements are displayed in the landmark November 6 test when an Aegis Cruiser intercepted two missiles. Missile defense is critical in a world of nuclear proliferation among highly unstable states. Not only Iran and North Korea could threaten the U.S., but possibly Pakistan, which "could become an enemy depending on how its internal turmoil is resolved. Both al-Qaida and the Taliban have powerful bases in the region." Additionally, "It's just as plausible that the threat could come from... Mideast nations that want to keep up with Iran's nuclear program. With Egypt making its announcement last week, there are now 13 countries in the region that have in the last year said they want nuclear power." Investor's Business Daily concludes, "Since they hold the majority in Congress and might also take the White House next year, Democrats owe the nation more forward thinking on matters of national security. Missile defense is not a mere political issue to be used to score points. It's at the core of a real life-and-death struggle." (Article, Link)
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Feulner: Defending missile defense
November 6, 2007 :: Analysis
Ed Feulner, President of the Heritage Foundation, discusses the shifting arguments against missile defense systems in the November 6 edition of the Pittsburgh-Tribune Review. In the past, politically-minded scientists have speculated that missile defense would not work, that the technology did not exist. In today's environment where missile defense testing has considerably improved, many of the same missile defense opponents are now changing position, and are now suggesting that missile defenses will be too effective.
An Associated Press story last month quoted six scientists who "are skeptical that the U.S. missile-defense system can work." Yet, strangely, "they believe that in terms of raw speed, U.S. interceptors in Poland could catch a Russian ICBM launched from western Russia at any part of the continental United States."
Feulner notes also the 2000 report by the Union of Concerned Scientists that questioned whether it missile defense was technologically feasible. The UCS assumption was that between the logistical difficulty in "hitting a bullet with a bullet" and missile's defense countermeasures, "it [made] no sense to begin deployment." Last month's successful test of the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) in the Pacific proved once again that missile defense can destroy long-range missiles. In fact, "It wasn't the first time...experts were proven wrong. Over the last seven years these four programs have passed their tests— "done the impossible"—roughly 80 percent of the time."
Now, the same group of scientists that criticized the system for being too unreliable attack missile defense as being too effective. The U.S. currently is planning to deploy ten Ground Based Interceptors to Poland to defend against a missile attack from Iran. Critics now say that the missile interceptors are so sophisticated that they could conceivably intercept the more advanced Russian missiles. Feulner concludes, "The question Americans ought to ask is, "Why is that a bad thing?" These scientists are undermining their own past arguments. They now insist this technology can protect us, even against threats it's not intended to thwart. That would make missile defense one of the few federal programs to deliver more than it promised." (Article, Link)
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Pitts: Missile Defense Makes Sense
November 2, 2007 :: Analysis
On November 2, TruthNews.com posted an opinion piece from Congressman Joe Pitts (PA-16). Pitts notes that while the U.S. is fighting nuclear proliferation, the risks posed by illegal arms sales, like those of Pakistani A.Q. Khan to non-state actors and rogue states alike, will likely increase over time. While the U.S. should intensify its efforts to curtail these threats, it also must deploy a strong missile defense to defend against the worst case scenario. Unfortunately, as the need for a strong missile defense has only increased, the U.S. Congress has cut the Missile Defense Agency's budget, including "$139 million... for Europe." Pitts concludes: "This is a critical time for moving forward with the deployment of missile defense systems for the United States and our allies. Despite the best efforts of the United States, we may very well see further nuclear proliferation in the future, not less. We must prepare for the security risk that will result if countries like Iran obtain nuclear weapons." (Article, Link)
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Hackett: Re-election Strategy or New Cold War?
October 25, 2007 :: Analysis
James Hackett provides an analysis of Russia's upcoming elections for the October 25 edition of Peace and Freedom Magazine. Flushed with profits from the re-nationalized oil and gas industries, President Vladimir Putin has improved Russia's military, developing "the Topol-M mobile ballistic missile, the Bulava submarine-launched ballistic missile, a new multiple-warhead missile, a new evading warhead, the S-400 missile interceptor, fifth-generation fighter planes and four new missile-firing submarines." Putin has used Russia's newly empowered military to confront the West.
He has resumed long-range nuclear bomber flights, opposes missile defenses in Europe, claims the North Pole for Russia and suspends cooperation under the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) treaty. He also sells air defense missiles to Syria and nuclear technology to Iran, suspends gas and oil shipments to pressure other countries, and threatens both to withdraw from the Intermediate Nuclear forces (INF) treaty and to target NATO countries by basing missiles in Russia's Kaliningrad enclave.
Constitutionally, Putin cannot serve more than two consecutive terms. However, Hackett believes Putin's successor will likely be a subservient non-personality, like the new Prime Minister Viktor Zubkov, who would serve one four year term, following which Putin could legally return to the Kremlin. Hackett concludes that it is difficult to discern to what degree Putin's anti-Western rhetoric is part of the run-up to the election, or a legitimate reflection of a new dangerous turn for Russia, and it will only become more clear after the Russian Presidential election in Spring 2008. (Article, Link)
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Cooper, Pfaltzgraff, and Berman: Don't Ignore Sea- and Space-Based Missile Defense
October 22, 2007 :: Defense News :: Analysis
An opinion piece by Henry Cooper, Robert Pfaltzgraff and Ilan Berman, calling for a new approach to missile defense, was featured in the October 22 edition of Defense News. Their article responds to comments by Missile Defense Agency head Lieutenant General Obering made July 23, which dismissed critics who advocate different operational concepts for American defense and appears to equate them with those who oppose missile defense entirely. The authors criticize the Missile Defense Agency's approach thus far which focuses on ground-based midcourse defenses, which unfortunately neglects sea and space assets which can better intercept missiles and better protect the country's vulnerabilities, often for less money.
For less than 10 percent of the MDA's $10 billion-per-year budget, the Navy has amassed an impressive test record: nine successful intercepts in 11 attempts with its SM-3 interceptor (10 for 12 if the Navy's successful test of its SM-2 Block 4 is also counted). Impressive indeed, compared with the five-for-10 record of the Alaska ground-based interceptor system...At a price tag of just $25 million for software fixes, investing in this expanded capability is something of a no-brainer...Then there is the matter of ship deployment. Of the 18 being given the SM-3 intercept capability, 16 are headed to the Pacific (the six already there are mostly protecting Japan). For just $62 million more, the Navy could begin outfitting another nine of the 80 Aegis ships around the world and deploy a contingent of 11 to defend against terrorists launching Scuds off our East Coast, as well as against Iranian ballistic missiles.
Space defenses are equally critical because they are best positioned to intercept missiles during their weak boost phase of launch, and because the U.S. is increasingly dependent on satellites of all kinds which are themselves susceptible to missile attacks.
As the anti-satellite test carried out by China in January amply demonstrated, a growing number of U.S. adversaries and strategic competitors are seeking to exploit, even dominate, space for military and commercial purposes. If the United States does not protect its interests in space--including through the deployment of missile defenses--we may soon find our security, which is critically dependent on our space systems, at the mercy of nations that have.
(Article, Link)
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» Missile system details for: Aegis Ship-Based BMD, Ground-Based Interceptor (GBI)
Oberg on the Weaponization of Space
October 9, 2007 :: The Space Review :: Analysis
James Oberg writes on the weaponization of space in the October 9 edition of The Space Review. Oberg reacts to the clear media bias against U.S. space programs, and charges that the media further encourages inflammatory Russian remarks about having to match the U.S. military presence in space. Oberg argues:
Like children drawing glee in poking a stick into an anthill to see the turmoil they can cause, or teenagers throwing rocks at a chained junkyard dog just to hear him snarl, some elements of the Western news media seem to evince diabolical delight in seeing just how they can inflame good old fashioned Russian paranoia about "enemy threats", especially from the United States. Regardless of the rationale, such exercises leave measurable scars on the international diplomatic scene. ...
To fabricate and encourage Russian fears of the imminent American "weaponization of space", then, isn't merely a matter of politically useful alarmism and ideologically satisfying posturing. To the degree that it reinforces Russian fears and encourages Russian militaristic responses, it is downright dangerous and irresponsible. Shame on the space-war fear mongers: they are part of the problem, not part of the solution, which is accuracy.
Most recently, articles in the New York Times recognizing the 50th anniversary of the launch of Sputnik cited that the Soviet satellite motivated Eisenhower to enter a "scary new world of space arms" by "publicly encouraged peaceful uses of space even while spending billions to explore futuristic weaponry like death rays fired from rocket ships." Oberg argues that the article ignores the most important details of Eisenhower's space policy, such as "deliberately assign[ing] America's satellite project to a research rocket rather than a weapons rocket... and establish[ing] a civilian-controlled space exploration administration (something the Soviets never did)." Also, the New York Times's article omits critical information about the Soviet's history in space.
Not discussed here are the orbital thermonuclear weapons designed, tested, and deployed by the USSR in the 1960s, whose operation was expressly forbidden by the Outer Space Treaty of 1967-a scrap of paper that provided no protection to their use in a sneak attack on the United States. Not mentioned... are the handguns that the Russians are allowed to pack at the International Space Station (NASA's website doesn't mention them either), or the much more serious space-to-space attack vehicles (on standby in earth-based launch tubes) whose very existence Moscow denied for decades.
The revisionist perspective of history has a profound effect today, as the U.S. deploys the first components of a missile defense system, and considers future space-based components. The Russian government, supported by the U.S. media, has hitherto condemned these efforts as sparking a new weaponization of space. Russian Colonel General Vladimir Popovkin recently claimed Russia would "not allow any other country to play the master in outer space. The consequences of positioning strike forces in orbit will be too serious." Once again, the facts of the planned space system are ignored, Oberg suggests: "Proposed space-based anti-missile systems will be designed with guidance sensors that depend on hot rocket exhausts and large missile skins, the sort of thing you'd see during an actual launch. Satellites orbiting passively high above Earth are not nearly as big as missiles, and are nowhere near as hot. They usually aren't firing rocket engines at all. Anti-missile systems of the type under consideration probably could not even detect such targets, much less hit them." (Article, Link)
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Obering on European Missile Defense
October 8, 2007 :: Arms Control Today :: Analysis
Lieutenant General Henry Obering, head of the Missile Defense Agency, discussed the importance of deploying a comprehensive missile defense system in the October edition of Arms Control Today. Obering argues that the U.S. must field a comprehensive missile defense system to prepare against potential long-range missile attacks from rogue states such as North Korea and Iran, but also to change their calculations for acquiring offensive missiles, making those expenditures less attractive.
With ballistic missiles and missile technologies widely available on the global market, we expect an acceleration of ballistic missile and nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons proliferation... A major factor in this proliferation is the value countries place on these weapons, precisely because historically there has been no defense against them. Without a defense against these weapons, they will continue to be valuable as a means to coerce or intimidate the United States and our allies and friends around the world.
With a fully operational missile defense system in place, countries could not depend on using weapons of mass destruction or missile technology to threaten or blackmail the U.S. Additionally, the fact that countries are utilizing increasingly better protections of their missile stockpiles and launch sites, such as air defenses and underground installations, offensive or preemptive strikes against become less likely to succeed.
Obering stresses that an important component of a future defenses involve a current plan by the U.S. to house ten ground based interceptors in Poland and an X-band radar facility in the Czech Republic. A missile defense system in Europe, however limited, would protect the U.S. and all European countries from long-range missile attacks. Other supplements could be added to this structure to defend more susceptible parts of Europe from short-range missile attacks from Iran. The missile defense plan for Europe not only would protect the U.S. and its European allies, but would not diminish Russia's strategic nuclear deterrent, as "10 ground-based interceptors, would be no match for Russia's strategic offensive missile force, which consists of hundreds of missiles and thousands of warheads." (Article, Link)
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Kimball: Of Missiles and Missile Defenses
October 8, 2007 :: Arms Control Today :: Analysis
Daryl G. Kimball, writing for the October edition of Arms Control Today, criticized current missile defense plans and instead argues for a new strategy to reduce the threat posed by offensive missiles. Missile defense poses serious problems, Kimball argues, because "even if [they] can be developed and pass operationally realistic testing, foes can always counter by building sufficient numbers of offensive ballistic missiles to overwhelm a system." Instead, the U.S. should instead focus on closer collaboration with Russia to reduce offensive weapon stockpiles and prevent them from increasing their nuclear stockpiles should the U.S. deploy a missile defense system. Additionally, the U.S. should focus on preventing short and medium range missiles, both because the technology is better developed and because those defenses are less provocative to other global powers like Russia. Lastly, Kimball recommends the U.S. work to enforce and expand the support for the International Code of Conduct Against Ballistic Missile Proliferation, which "obliges states to exchange information on missile holdings and testing and exercise restraint with respect to their ballistic missile programs, could become the blueprint for a binding set of limitations on the most destabilizing types of missiles." (Article, Link)
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Hackett: Missile Defense Works
October 5, 2007 :: Washington Times :: Analysis
James T. Hackett writes in the October 5 edition of The Washington Times discusses the successful September 28 intercept test conducted by the Ground Based Midcourse defense system. Although the test was a clear success and demonstrated both complexity and effectiveness, Hackett warns that opponents of the system will not be satisfied. A frequent complaint used by opponents of missile defense is to cite inadequate flight tests and a lack of operational testing of ground-based defenses, ignoring the details of the most recent intercept.
A ballistic missile launched from Kodiak, Alaska, flew thousands of miles southeast before being struck and destroyed some 100 miles over the ocean by an interceptor from Vandenberg Air Force Base on the California coast. It was an operational interceptor, same as the nearly two dozen now in silos in Alaska and California, launched from an operational site, using operational command and control, manned by operational crews and tracked by the operational radar at Beale AFB, Calif. If that is not an operational test, what is?
Hackett also attacks critics who argue the current system is not flexible enough to accurately identify and destroy real missiles. The current U.S. missile defense plan incorporates sea and land based radars, including the powerful X-band radar that can now discriminate between decoy and authentic missiles more successfully than ever. Hackett concludes the intercept should "quiet even the most severe critics." (Article, Link)
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