Smith on the KEI
May 20, 2004 :: Analysis
David J. Smith of the National Institute for Public Policy defends the Kinetic Energy Interceptor (KEI) as it is making its way through congressional committees for funding.
Smith’s piece in the Tucson Citizen seems to be a hometown push for the Tucson-based KEI program. Smith argues persuasively for the need for boost-phase defenses as part of a layered missile defense. But while the KEI is a boost-phase program, Smith does not address any of the recent criticisms, that a boost phase program based on land is inherently problematic, in no small part because of the need to be in the right place at the right time, namely very near to the launch site of any missile which it is meant to intercept. The ability of the KEI to be based in space or sea, however, would go far to eliminating many of its problems. (Article, Link)
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» Missile system details for: Kinetic Energy Interceptor (KEI)
A Maginot Line in the Sky?
May 17, 2004 :: Analysis
An op-ed piece by a Lawrence S. Wittner repeats a tired criticism of missile defense efforts, that it is a “Maginot Line in the sky.” In other words, try our very best, it is impossible to stop a ballistic missile attack, and thus we should not even try.
The response to this analogy is quite simple. There is nothing wrong with border defenses, so long as they are better constructed and defend the whole of one’s territory. The problem with France’s Maginot Line is not that it tried to achieve too much security, but that it did not do enough. Thus Germany took advantage of France’s naive hope that the Black Forest was impenetrable, and thus circumvented the Maginot Line.
But one should not lose sight of the fact that it was not without good reason that France constructed border defenses. Germany still had to employ a great deal of difficulty and ingenuity in order to invade. Of course, France would have been better to extend the Maginot line still further around its border—not because it would be a perfect solution, but because it would render any invasion by Germany more difficult. Of course, even with broader defenses, one can never put complete faith in any one line of defenses; there is no perfect state of security.
But the fact that no technological innovation is impregnable applies to both ballistic missiles and ballistic missile defenses. One must do what one can to construct the best defense possible. To learn from the lessons of the past is not to capitulate, but that one cannot rest with a half-hearted defense. To put forward only a half-hearted missile defense and then do nothing more would be to forget the lesson of the Maginot line. But to do nothing is even worse, to preemptively offer surrender to anyone who wishes to accept it. (Article, Link)
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Union of Concerned Scientists Knocks BMD
May 13, 2004 :: UCS :: Analysis
The Union of Concerned Scientists today released a report, Technical Realities, complaining that the missile defense interceptors set to be deployed this year serve no purpose, address no real threat, and are insufficiently tested.
The charge of insufficient testing is valid, but it is important to remember that one purpose of the Fort Greely and Vandenburg AFB deployment sites is to serve as a test bed. That they would be deployed during that time to offer some minimal defense only makes sense. Reports such as these must try very hard to minimize the threat from rogue states, to say nothing of the threat from Russia and China. It is true that the limited number of interceptors set to be deployed in August—nine—are far from enough to adequately defend America. On this score, the UCS is, in a sense, correct. But the response to this charge is that they only the first installment. A more robust and layered defense is necessary to truly complete the job, and the testing conducted from Alaska and Vandenburg will aid in moving along towards that goal.
Studies such as these refuse to recognize the fairly obvious fact that, even despite the system’s limitations, some defense is better than none. (Article, Link)
» Full text of UCS report (.pdf)
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Marshall Policy Report: BMD Still Important
May 6, 2004 :: Marshall Institute :: Analysis
The Marshall Institute today released a policy document, “Missile Defense: A Continuing National Priority.” Among the points considered are that while terrorism is a scourge to our national security, the threat from ballistic missiles continues to grow. In a number of useful charts, they also show that increases in defense expenditures over past decades have continued while the budget for missile defense remains abysmally low. (Article, Link)
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Hackett on the KEI
April 29, 2004 :: Washington Times :: Analysis
Writing in the Washington Times, James T. Hackett worries about the direction the Missile Defense Agency is taking by pursuing programs such as the Kinetic Energy Interceptor (KEI), a land-based boost phase system, while ignoring the technologies available for space-based systems like Brilliant Pebbles.
Hackett also responds to MDA Director Kadish’s statement this week that because the Alaska ground-based interceptor and the Aegis sea-based deployments are on schedule, the United States would be fully protected from North Korea by the end of the year. Hackett responds that North Korea is believed to already have 8 nuclear weapons and to be producing more at the rate of 4-8 per year.
Hackett argues that the KEI program diverts attention and resources from better programs and undermines better directed efforts:
Under Mr. Bush’s father, this concept [Brilliant Pebbles] was studied extensively, was found feasible, and much development work was done. Last year, that program was expected to receive $6 billion for further development over the next five years. That amount now has been cut to $843 million, with only $11 million for 2005. At the same time, more than $4.5 billion has been reallocated to the KEI program.
Hackett points out that the object of the KEI, to intercept a missile in boost phase, is much better accomplished from space than from land. But the funds being poured into KEI should signal a greater warning to the future of effective missile defenses: “Worst of all, the KEI program is under Terry Little, a former Air Force official who allegedly said at a conference last year he is proud to be a liberal Democrat, missile defense skeptic, and opponent of weapons in space.” (Article, Link)
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» Missile system details for: Kinetic Energy Interceptor (KEI)
Center for Security Policy on BMD Budget, KEI
April 28, 2004 :: Center for Security Policy :: Analysis
The Center for Security Policy weighs in on the fights in Congress over missile defense appropriations, with some harsh criticism of the current distribution of funds. The problem is the support of systems like the ground-based Kinetic Energy Interceptor, which is absorbing billions each year depriving far more effective programs from seeing the light of day.
Illustrating the limitations of the KEI, the Center notes that:
In fact, KEI program manager Terry Little, has produced a chart which notes, with considerable understatement, that a “Risk Item” is the fact that “Geo-Political Basing Constraints are a Driver of KEI Military Utility.” Just how much so is revealed by Mr. Little’s assessment that in order to secure coverage of Iranian ICBM launch sites, the U.S. would have to deploy KEI systems in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Uzbekistan. Similar coverage of North Korea would require KEI deployments in Russia. Recent experience with at least some of these countries suggests that they may prove to be unreliable, or at the very least insecure, basing countries.
At the same time that funding for the KEI is up, to 4.2 billion, programs such as Aegis, THAAD, and most importantly space-based interceptors, are being neglected. (Article, Link)
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» Missile system details for: Kinetic Energy Interceptor (KEI)
Spring on 9-11 and Missile Defense
April 12, 2004 :: Fox News :: Analysis
Baker Spring of the Heritage Foundation weighs in on the recent debate over whether missile defense was too much a priority prior to September 11. (Article, Link)
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Holton on the Logic of Rice’s Would-Be Speech on Missile Defense
April 8, 2004 :: Analysis
Christopher Holton writes at Worldtribune.com on the criticisms NSA Rice has been receiving for her would be speech on missile defense. Holton correctly observes that such criticisms stem from, or are at least only consistent with, a faith in untenable policy of mutually assured destruction, but also points to statements by various prominent opponents of missile defense which contradict the basic suppositions for such a policy. (Article, Link)
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Miniter on Rice and Missile Defense
April 6, 2004 :: OpinionJournal.com :: Analysis
Brendan Miniter of OpinionJournal.com writes on the situation facing National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice, and why the criticism of the administration’s position on missile defense is very misplaced. That terrorism is a great threat no one will contest, but the bigger picture of national security also requires significant attention to missile defense. (Article, Link)
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Center for Security Policy on Rice and Missile Defense
April 5, 2004 :: Center for Security Policy :: Analysis
The Center for Security Policy has released a fine position piece pointing out that the charges against Condoleezza Rice and the administration’s alleged emphasis on missile defense at the expense of terrorism are quite wrong headed. The logic of Rice’s speech intended for 9-11 retains its integrity and applicability even today. (Article, Link)
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