The Guardian Reports on British Participation in Subcritical Nevada Test
February 27, 2006 :: London Guardian :: Analysis
The Guardian reports that Britain recently took part in a subcritical test of nuclear material in Nevada. The “Krakatau test,” as it was called, took place on February 23 and involved a detonation 300 m beneath the desert. The test was designed to demonstrate that Britain’s nuclear bombs have not deteriorated while in storage and will still go off should they ever be launched. Such subcritical tests are normal, as plutonium can undergo phase changes which can alter its behavior as it ages. The Guardian, however, speculates that the U.S. and Britain might use such tests to help develop next generation nuclear warheads. The U.S. has discussed the possibility of developing “robust nuclear earth penetrators,” otherwise known as “bunker-busters,” which would be able to destroy structures deep underground. Although the Bush administration’s funding to modify two existing nuclear warheads for earth penetration was blocked by Congress in 2005 and 2006, funding was approved for the Reliable Replacement Warhead program, which The Guardian hypothesizes might be a cover for new warhead development. (Article, Link)
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Commentary on Russian Claims
February 15, 2006 :: RIA-Novosti :: Analysis
RIA Novosti political commentator Andrei Kislyakov writes that the U.S. ballistic missile defense system will become operational within years, thus providing a “credible capability,” but adds that “Russia has missiles that don’t care.” He continues with a description of the anti-BMD capabilities of the road-mobile Topol-M (SS-27) intercontinental ballistic missile:
While the U.S. is stepping up its effort to deploy early warning radars and interceptors as close to Russia’s borders as possible to detect missile launches and kill missiles at the boost stage of flight when they are the most vulnerable—and as long as the body and the warhead are still in one piece—the Topol-M, powered by three solid-propellant boosters, accelerates faster than earlier ICBMs and is accordingly less vulnerable to that kind of attack. The missile also has scores of auxiliary jets and a state-of-the-art flight control system that enables a 3D avoidance maneuver capability from the first seconds of flight.
And on top of everything else—in every sense—is the nuclear re-entry vehicle, in fact a ramjet-boosted supersonic cruise missile whose additional sustainer engine accelerates it to between Mach 4 and Mach 5 (Mach is the speed equal to the speed of sound in the air).
Such maneuverability renders a missile system a crucial surprise advantage, as the adversary cannot launch a fire-and-forget interceptor weapon because no anticipated point of contact is known or can be reliably calculated. Normally, the Topol-M carries one warhead but, unlike other strategic ICBMs, it can be easily upgraded with an advanced warhead carrying up to three independently targetable re-entry vehicles. The warhead fires off the vehicles in midcourse, changing direction twice a minute to fool warning radars as to where the charges are heading. Each vehicle is assigned an individual target at up to 100km (60 miles) from the separation point.
(Article, Link)
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» Missile details: SS-N-6
Sieff on Bush’s SOTU Silence on Missile Defense
February 2, 2006 :: UPI :: Analysis
Martin Sieff, writing for the United Press International news agency, wonders why President Bush failed to mention U.S. ballistic missile defense in his recent State of the Union address on Tuesday. The year 2005 was "the year when, more than ever before, the American BMD system finally moved after nearly a quarter of a century from the realm of ‘Star Wars' visionary fantasy to that of hard military and engineering fact." It was a breakthrough year of successful tests, increased weapons and radar deployments, and more major nations than ever around the world committing billions of dollars to buy U.S. systems and develop complementary defense systems. Yet Bush did not say a word about any of it in the speech.
Sieff speculates that Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld's prominence could be fading. Rumsfeld was "the great cheerleader of BMD" and if he is replaced, his successor will be more concerned with Iraq, or perhaps launching a full-scale war against Iran. Sieff suggests that with the departure of Deputy Secretary Paul Wolfowitz and Under Secretary for Policy Douglas Feith, missile defense lost two of its biggest Pentagon supporters. Nevertheless, Sieff believes that Bush's silence on BMD Tuesday night "should not be interpreted as any weakening of political will or presaging any major cutback in resources on deploying it."
(Article, Link)
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Dinerman on Missile Defense Needs for 2006
January 30, 2006 :: The Space Review :: Analysis
Taylor Dinerman, writing for TheSpaceReview.com, contends that ballistic missile defense is necessary now more than ever, in light of the escalating world conflict with Iran. Dinerman points out that if the pronouncements of Iran’s leaders are any indication, they will be depending on their ballistic missiles to deliver the nuclear weapons they hope to build. If or when Iran decides to use such weapons, the first thing it would likely do is launch strikes against Israel and U.S. regional targets, perhaps followed by attacks on U.S. allies in Eastern Europe and Central Asia. Although the U.S. maintains surveillance satellites are capable of locating part of Iran’s missile force, Dinerman stresses that “it takes active weapons to either destroy a missile on the ground or after it has taken off.” Yet “little has been said about the potential for missile defense to blunt [the Iranian threat], or to make it easier for the U.S. launch an attack.” If, as so many western statesmen say, Iran’s nuclear weapons program is unacceptable, “then doing something about it is going to involve more than just diplomacy.”
Dinerman recommends that the U.S. should redeploy its Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3) interceptors that performed well against Iraq’s short-range Scud missiles during the 2003 war, positioning them to defend high value regional targets. The PAC-3 units should be joined by Aegis-equipped cruisers and destroyers armed with Standard Missile-2 and SM-3 interceptors. Both the PAC-3 and Aegis should be integrated with Israel’s Arrow system, which is operational and has proven itself in recent tests. (Article, Link)
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» Missile system details for: Aegis Ship-Based BMD, Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3)
Significance of Conservative Win in Canada
January 27, 2006 :: UPI :: Analysis
Stephen Harper’s recent Conservative Party victory in Canada will have significant consequences for hemispheric ballistic missile defense and long-term U.S.-Canadian relations, writes Martin Sieff for the UPI news agency. Sieff argues that it was Harper’s decision to break the longstanding political consensus in Canada to steer clear of BMD that gave him a significant boost in what turned out to be a tight race, and predicts Harper will find it much easier to push ahead with BMD cooperation with Washington, in contrast to domestic issues. To begin with, the debate during the election campaign indicated that BMD is relatively popular with the Canadian public. More importantly, initial cooperation with the U.S. on BMD will not cost the Canadian taxpayer one cent under the terms that President Bush offered Prime Minister Martin last February. Sieff believes that, by joining hands with the U.S. on BMD, Stephen Harper will resurrect “the tremendous tradition of strategic cooperation between the United States and Canada that guaranteed hemispheric defense through World War II and the long decades of the Cold War.” He adds Canada to a growing list of nations, including Japan and Poland, in which BMD has become a “vote winner,” support for which has characterized victorious and resurgent conservative parties. (Article, Link)
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» Missile details: Shahab 6
Victor Davis Hanson on Missile Defense
January 9, 2006 :: Analysis
Victor Davis Hanson, military historian and fellow of the Claremont Institute, takes note of the subject of missile defense in a recent piece for The Washington Times. Hanson discusses the geopolitical stakes in the games being played by Russia and Iran, and notes that missile defenses will prove an important element in these maneuvers.
Hanson notes that Russia and China would play the role of “spoiler,” despite their (apparent) interest in keeping rogue nations from obtaining nuclear weapons. Yet the Russians currently make enormous profits from trade with the oil-rich Iran, and “derive a certain satisfaction from tweaking the United States.” Likewise, the Chinese see advantages in allowing North Korea to preoccupy their rivals, especially Japan, Taiwan, and the United States.
“Strategic missile defense will prove invaluable in the decades ahead against regimes that have only a few dozen warheads,” writes Hanson. Of course, truly “strategic” missile defense capabilities would be arrayed against all threats, and not only those by Iran and North Korea. In the parlance, “strategic defenses” are those which, like Ronald Reagan’s Strategic Defense Initiative, are meant to replace the reliance upon purely offensive deterrence (or mutually assured destruction) with a defense against large-scale or “strategic” threats, such as those posed by Russia and China. (Article, Link)
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Timmerman on Iran
January 9, 2006 :: Analysis
Conflict between Israel and Iran may well be brewing, suggests Kenneth R. Timmerman in FrontPage Magazine. Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon’s stroke has thrown Israeli politics into turmoil, and might be the starting point of a coming showdown between the Jewish state and the Islamic republic. Timmerman notes that Sharon had made a strategic decision—against the advice of his own generals and intelligence staff—to support U.S. backed nuclear negotiations with Iran led by the EU. With Sharon incapacitated, Israel might pursue other options in the face of escalating Iranian rhetoric and actions.
On January 3, Iran’s Revolutionary Guards Corps began a two-day seminar in Tehran on nuclear-biological-chemical warfare and new defense technologies, including lectures by Iranian experts on electromagnetic pulse weapons, graphite bombs, and laser-guided bombs. On January 4, three battalions of the IRGC began three days of military exercises in the Semnan province, not far from Iran’s main ballistic missile test range. That same day, Iran’s top nuclear negotiator, Ali Larijani, told Iranian TV that Israel will “suffer a great loss” if it attacks Iran, noting that Israel has “no strategic depth” and is “within our range.” In addition, the Russians have agreed to sell S-300 anti-ballistic missile systems to Iran.
In early December, Lieutenant General Dan Halutz, Israel’s military chief of staff, told foreign journalists in Tel Aviv that he believed diplomacy had reached a dead end. When asked by one reporter how far Israel was ready to go to stop Iran’s nuclear projects, Halutz replied, “2,000 kilometers,” the distance by air between Israel and Iran’s main nuclear and missile sites. (Article, Link)
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Hackett on Need for East Coast Defenses
January 1, 2006 :: Washington Times :: Analysis
James T. Hackett argues persuasively in The Washington Times that the U.S. must defend its highly-populated East Coast against ballistic missile attack. He acknowledges that MDA is correctly concentrating on deploying the most urgent missile defenses in Alaska and California, to defend against threats from North Korea and China. Yet Hackett reminds us that major East Coast population centers remain vulnerable to attack from the Middle East.
Iran, for instance, is determined to produce both long-range missiles and nuclear warheads, and is anywhere from a few months to a few years away from having a nuclear bomb. Iran is also at work on a longer-range variation of its Shahab-3 missile that would be able to strike Western Europe. It is possible that the Iranians could extend this new missile to reach the eastern U.S. In addition, Al-Qaeda still considers Washington and New York among its prime targets and would like to strike them yet again. It is possible that Al-Qaeda could get its hands on a ballistic missile armed with a nuclear warhead, perhaps one of the hundreds of aging ballistic missiles and thousands of nuclear warheads in Russia.
Hackett’s solution is to begin work on a ground-based missile site in Europe, and his site recommendation is Poland. A long and reliable friend, Poland recently elected a pro-American, anti-terror, conservative government. As Hackett argues, “A site there would strengthen our military alliance with Poland and move toward the goal of a global missile defense.” The U.S. would, with such a site, also achieve a missile defense for the East Coast, at least against certain types of missile threats. (Article, Link)
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Hackett on Topol-M Tests, Space Defenses
November 14, 2005 :: Analysis
James Hackett writes in the Washington Times of the numerous reports of Russia’s Topol-M test of a maneuvering warhead on November 1, which he labels both “breathless” and perhaps even to some degree “hype.” Hackett adds a few details about the Russian test which have not previously reported, including that the test included three independently targetable warheads, that the missile is equipped with faster burning engines designed to shorten the boost phase, that 46 single-warhead missiles have been fielded to date, and that 350 more armed with multiple warheads are eventually to replace the SS-25 missiles being phased out.
Hackett notes the irony behind Russia’s “Cold War”-like attempt to overcome U.S. missile defenses which are not even designed or capable of defending against Russian missiles in type or number: “you would think the Cold War never ended. …[the Russians are] ignoring the inconvenient fact that the U.S. does not intend to attack Russia.”
Hackett emphasizes too the significance such Russian developments have for U.S. missile defense efforts, namely, that they reinforce the arguments for going to space. The proliferation of the technologies to evade interceptors in midcourse and terminal phase make all the more necessary space-based interceptors. An excerpt:
A Nov. 2 report in Moscow Gazeta boasted that Russia’s new weapons will be able to overcome America’s missile defenses, noting these new weapons could only be stopped by a layer of space-based interceptors that could strike them before their final phase of flight. That is why, the article says, Moscow keeps pushing a U.N. resolution to ban weapons in space.
The Russians are right in recognizing the importance of weapons in space. The best way to stop a missile launched from an unknown location deep inland—and off-road mobile launchers can go anywhere—is from overhead. When technologies such as rapid ascent rockets and multiple maneuvering warheads spread to China, North Korea and Iran, defenses in space will be urgently needed.
It is not wise to wait until the offense gains too much advantage over the defense. The Pentagon should put more resources at an earlier date into the initial step of designing an architecture for space-based missile defenses, and get on with the developing a weapon that can perform that mission.
The full text is well worth reading: (More »»»)
» More stories on: Analysis, Maneuverable Warheads, Space-Based Systems
» Missile details: SS-N-6
Hackett on the Senate’s Review of Missile Defense
October 11, 2005 :: Washington Times :: Analysis
Roughly one year after the first interceptors of the ground-based missile defense system were placed into their silos, the Senate Appropriations Committee has completed an important review of missile defense expenditures and goals, and the appropriations bill has now moved onto the House. James Hackett writes in the Washington Times summarizing the progress made in missile defense over the past several years, and what remains to be done.
Hackett notes in particular, and with just praise, the Senate Committee’s support and additional funding for completing the GMD midcourse interceptor program begun in Alaska and California, their additional funding of the Airborne Laser, and also of the relative cutbacks for the Kinetic Energy Interceptor (KEI), a ground-based boost defense system whose worthy aim to destroy a missile in its boost phase requires that the interceptor be placed quite near the enemy missile’s launch site. The pursuit of faster interceptors is a laudable technological pursuit, as is boost-phase intercept—but land-basing raises too high the standard of being in the right place at the right time for the interceptor to be practical or widely useful. Writes Hackett, “Many think this an infeasible chimera that would waste resources needed to complete and improve more practical defenses.”
Hackett concludes that “the House should accept the Senate’s missile defense changes.” (Article, Link)
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