Karako on 25th Anniversary of SDI
March 27, 2008 :: Investor’s Business Daily :: Analysis
On the twenty-fifth anniversary of the Strategic Defense Intitiative, Tom Karako, director of programs for the Claremont Institute, writes in Investor's Business Daily comparing current missile defense policies with those begun by Ronald Reagan. Excerpts:
...The Bush administration has taken important first steps toward national missile defense. It withdrew from the ABM Treaty in 2002 and has made tremendous progress in deploying missile defenses, two things Reagan did not do. Current programs deserve much praise, but nevertheless fall short of the threat-based defense SDI in important ways pursued by Reagan.
Reagan envisioned a defense that was strategic, oriented to stopping the most an enemy could threaten. SDI emphasized interceptors in low Earth orbit. Space-based interceptors formed the primary front line of a defense, intended to be supplemented by sea- and land-based interceptors.
By the early 1990s, SDI had advanced to the level of the major defense acquisition program, a constellation of small, space-based interceptors. The Brilliant Pebbles concept promised a cost-effective way to destroy missiles in their ascent or boost phase, when they are most visible and vulnerable.
As the Missile Defense Agency's historian has documented, the program was cut for political reasons just as it was nearing the deployment phase. Its technologies were, however, successfully space-tested by the Clementine and Astrid programs in 1994.
Some hesitation about space defenses comes from the idea that space is a weapons-free preserve. But the high ground of space is merely an extension of strategic geography, and has long been "weaponized."
Armies project power on land, navies on the high seas, aircraft in the atmosphere. Satellites and missiles do so above the atmosphere. Satellites that surveil the enemy or send GPS coordinates to a warfighter are no less weapons because they do not go "boom." If a satellite in orbit helps direct a laser-guided bomb to a target in Afghanistan, in exactly what sense is space not weaponized?
All ballistic missiles travel through space, and it makes sense to intercept them from and in space. Putting interceptors closer to the paths of these missiles shortens the distance they must travel and widens the window of reaction time.
Orbited interceptors are already accelerated to 8 kilometers per second, and do not require a massive booster rocket. Any surface-based system, by contrast, retains the physical challenge of needing to be accelerated at a moment's notice. In missile interception, seconds matter. Basing in space buys time.
Orbital basing also increases the ability to destroy missiles in their boost phase. Unless they are close to the launch site, ground-based interceptors cannot reach missiles in their boost phase if launched inland. Orbits know no political boundaries, so orbiting interceptors could reach missiles in boost phase even if launched deep inside Iran, Russia or China.
...One may defend the modesty of the current approach on the ground that it is imprudent to irritate our strategic competitors in a time of war. But let us have no confusion about the degree to which some missiles retain a free ride to the American homeland.
Let us admit we intend to remain vulnerable to even accidental and unauthorized missiles coming from Russia or China. The path of deliberate minimalism is deterred from boldly pursuing the most effective missile defense systems. Such self-deterrence did not characterize Reagan or SDI.
As Secretary of State Rice remarked in February, "It is true that the United States once had a Strategic Defense Initiative, a program that was intended to deal with the question of the Russian strategic nuclear threat. This is not that program. This is not the son of that program. This is not the grandson of that program."
This is true. Twenty five years later, the S has been dropped from SDI. ...
(Article, Link)
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Cooper and Weyrich: Make Navy Missile Defense All It Can Be
February 27, 2008 :: Analysis
Ambassador Henry F. Cooper and Paul M. Weyrich write today explaining the significance for missile defense of the February 20 shoot-down of a satellite using sea-based missile defense systems. Writing for the National Ledger, they observe that "any ballistic missile defense (BMD) system that can shoot down long-range Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) also has the potential to shoot down satellites in low-earth-orbit (LEO)—such satellites travel slightly faster than ICBMs and move in similar altitudes above the earth...which leads one to ponder why sea-based defenses have not been empowered to intercept such long-range ballistic missiles."
Expanding further, the authors point out that sea-based missile defense assets are inherently mobile and can therefore minimize the effects of dangerous fall-out. While the two credit President Bush for withdrawing from the ABM treaty and laying the legal framework for the navy to conduct its interception, they caution that further steps must be taken to ensure the navy can intercept more than just short range missiles. They conclude that the modest spending on new software to equip the ships with the capability to shoot down the satellite is not only justified, but should be dramatically expanded. (Article, Link)
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Hackett: Iran's Missile Leap
February 25, 2008 :: Washington Times :: Analysis
James T. Hackett discusses Russia's reaction to Iran's recent missile launch in the February 25 edition of Washington Times. On February 4, Iran launched a modified "Shahab-3B" medium-range missile, designed to launch Iran's first domestically produced satellite, Omid-1, into orbit. An Iranian reconnaissance satellite could help missiles target sites in Israel, U.S. bases in the Middle East, and most importantly Europe or North America itself. Indeed, Iran's launch is eerily reminiscent of North Korea's 1998 launch of a 3-stage Taepodong missile, "which [Pyongyang] also claimed was for launching satellites." Even the Russians, who have shied away from tightening sanctions on Iran and have criticized the U.S.'s plan for a limited missile defense system in Europe, were concerned. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said, "We do not approve of Iran's actions in constantly demonstrating its intentions to develop its rocket sector and in continuing to enrich uranium," while Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Alexander Losyukov said Tehran's actions "provoke concern" and raise "suspicions" about its claim not to be building a nuclear weapon, since a long-range rocket is a key component of any nation's nuclear weapons capability. Given Iran's continued missile testing and improvements, Hackett concludes by stressing that Congress must fund the planned missile defense site planned for Eastern Europe. (Article, Link)
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Carey: Rocket Science Reprieve
February 24, 2008 :: Washington Times :: Analysis
John E. Carey, a former senior military officer who served in President Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative Organization (SDIO) and president of International Defense Consultants, Inc, writes in the February 24 edition of the Washington Times on the U.S. Navy's recent interception of a dying spy satellite. The successful interception marks a new milestone toward achieving President Ronald Reagan's dream of a missile defense system. While Ronald Reagan formed his policy during the Cold War, "the threat posed by missile-launched weapons of mass destruction clearly still exists." Carey writes:
Russia still has a robust nuclear and missile arsenal. Add to that China. North Korea has demonstrated advancing missile and nuclear weapon technology. Pakistan and India have nuclear arsenals and long-range missiles. Iran has long-range missiles and the United Nations argues over how far Iran has advanced its nuclear weapon efforts. Terrorists have boasted they will have nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction that can soon wipe out Israel and threaten Europe and the U.S. Missile defense, the vision of Ronald Reagan and source of America's ability to destroy a potentially dangerous satellite, remains viable, important and necessary.
(Article, Link)
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Tellis: Don't Panic About Space Weapons
February 22, 2008 :: The Wall Street Journal :: Analysis
Ashley J. Tellis, a senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, analyzest the Chinese and Russian draft treaty aimed at banning weapons in space in the February 22 edition of the Wall Street Journal. Tellis argues that the treaty would in fact
neither effectively prohibit their deployment, nor conclusively annul the threat of force against space objects. It would only produce the illusion of security, while doing nothing to eliminate the counterspace capabilities currently present in many countries, especially China.
The principal problem is the treaty addresses weapons in space (of which there are none), as opposed to land- and sea-based kinetic, directed-energy and electromagnetic attack systems. However, even a retooled treaty to expand arms control regulation for these systems would miss the mark as "counterspace weapons are impossible to identify by national technical means, or even by intrusive inspections." An outright ban on these weapons would be unlikely given political considerations, and a treaty that allowed the development and deployment of these weapons but not their use would be open to abuse. Tellis argues that China and Russia support the draft treaty because of three political and strategic reasons.
First, they genuinely fear an imminent American deployment of space weapons—perhaps in connection with missile defense— and want a treaty to impede that deployment...Second, a space security treaty allows Russia and China to engage in some eye-catching histrionics. It enables them to dominate international public diplomacy and paint the U.S. as the irresponsible driver of a new arms race... Third, the Russian-Chinese draft treaty remains a splendid way for Beijing to draw international attention away from its own growing counterspace program—even as it enables Russia to assuage its own discomfort with China's space-denial capabilities.
Tellis concludes that the Bush administration is correct to reject this treaty, and encourages any new presidential administration to do the same. (Link)
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Investor's Business Daily: From Russia with Love
February 13, 2008 :: Investor’s Business Daily :: Analysis
An editorial in the February 13 edition of Investor's Business Daily discusses Russia's military resurgence and hostility to the West. The editorial notes that after a decade of seeming irrelevance, Russian President Vladimir Putin has begun to rebuild the country's tarnished status as a global power. Flush with revenue from high oil and gas prices, Russia has "spen[t] heavily on the new Tu-160 supersonic strategic bomber, which can launch cruise missiles; the Su-34 Fullback all-weather fighter-bomber designed to attack heavily defended targets; and a fifth-generation fighter, the Sukhoi T-50, scheduled to become Russia's front-line fighter in 2008. " On February 9, Russian fighters intercepted a U.S. nuclear-powered aircraft carrier. Russia also has resumed its long range bomber patrols. The editorial concludes by suggesting the current Democratic presidential hopefuls could not face this strategic challenge. "Will an Obama or a Clinton have the courage Reagan showed when he deployed Pershing missiles in West Germany in response to the Soviet SS-20 threat? Not likely. More probably we will see what Barack Obama calls "aggressive personal diplomacy," by which we bargain away our missile defense for a handful of beads while making nice with the thugs who plan to launch missiles against us." (Article, Link)
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Dale on Forward Progress
February 6, 2008 :: Washington Times :: Analysis
In today's edition of the Washington Times, Helle Dale writes supporting the U.S. plan to emplace ten Ground Based Interceptors in Poland and an X-band radar facility in the Czech Republic. If constructed, the new Eastern European facilities would buttress current missile defense-related systems in the United Kingdom, Greenland and the United States. Dale discusses that while the plan would shield the U.S. and Europe from limited missile attacks from Iran or any of the other 27 states armed with ballistic missiles, many Europeans have rallied against the plan. The critics argue that the bases would provoke Russia, which fears the interceptors would diminish its strategic nuclear deterrent, and worsen trans-Atlantic relations for a non-existent strategic gain. Dale stresses that the ten interceptors could not shield Europe or the U.S. from a Russian missile attack. Additionally, a missile defenses by definition should not be a threat to anyone. Fortunately, despite the criticisms, Polish and U.S. negotiators have agreed "in principle" to place the interceptors in the Eastern European country. Dale concludes the development is positive, and hopefully points to a speedy conclusion and deployment of the system. (Article, Link)
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Crouch and Joseph on the Next Tough Steps for Missile Defense Policy
January 22, 2008 :: The Wall Street Journal :: Analysis
In today's Wall Street Journal former Deputy National Security Adviser J.D. Crouch, II and former Undersecretary of State Robert Joseph call for a bold and firm approach to ballistic missile defense and to space-based interceptors in particular. In "Tough Calls, Good Calls," Crouch and Joseph liken the Bush administration's decision to withdraw from the ABM Treaty and to begin to deploy ballistic missile defense system to other tough choices guided by strategic foresight which have since been proven sound. Crouch and Joseph point out that critics objecting to the ABM Treaty withdrawal predicted consequences of gloom and doom which never materialized, such as a new arms race. "None of these things have happened as a result of the ABM Treaty withdrawal. But the decision will enable us to counter a still-growing 21st century threat."
Crouch and Joseph go on to argue that important, and "tough calls" remain for ballistic missile defense policyand the next presidential administration. These steps include the European third-site for Ground-Based Interceptors, measures to combat countermeasures by North Korea and Iran, the development of multiple-kill vehicles, enhanced sea-based defenses, and finally space-based interceptors:
What are the next steps that the country should take to capitalize fully on this strategic choice?
First, the president's call for a third strategic missile defense site in Europe must be carried out. This site provides additional capability to protect the U.S., and to protect as well our European allies from a growing Iranian missile threat. The site would further cement the development of a global sensor-and-interceptor network necessary for effective missile defense. Failure to follow through would have implications for our alliances both inside and out of Europe.
Second, we can expect that rogue states such as North Korea and Iran are already looking at ways to counter our existing defenses. One way they might do this is to deploy decoys or other countermeasures on their existing offensive missiles that must be attacked, and could thus exhaust our limited supply of interceptors. Fortunately, we can now explore cost-effective solutions to this threat.
One solution is to develop interceptors with multiple kill vehicles -- something that was explicitly banned by the ABM Treaty. Another solution is to develop advanced discrimination techniques to tell the decoys from the real threats. These techniques include using radars, space-based sensors, or a new concept that uses dozens of miniature interceptors that can literally sweep away an entire threat cloud of decoys, allowing the missile interceptor to hone in on the real warhead.
None of these techniques is fully proven, but neither was the hit-to-kill technology begun by President Reagan and later successfully deployed by President Bush. We must focus investment in the discrimination problem and improve our existing systems with these new capabilities.
Third, we can do more to increase the capabilities of existing assets. We can, for example, improve our sea-based capabilities -- both our performance against long-range missiles and the number of assets deployed. Under the ABM Treaty, we had to "dumb down" our so-called theater systems to ensure that they could not be used to defend the U.S. from attack. Free from this restraint, as well as from the Treaty's prohibition on mobile-launch platforms, we can now do much more to integrate our defense with that of our allies and make the most of the assets we have deployed.
Finally, we must look again at space as a place to deploy interceptors.
There is no question that space provides the highest leverage against the missile threat: Targets are more visible, more accessible and more vulnerable when attacked from space. While there are concerns about "weaponizing space," these pale in comparison to the increasing vulnerability of U.S. space-based satellites by weapons from the ground traversing space. The recent Chinese anti-satellite test was a wake-up call.
Space-based interceptors, like those proposed by former President George H. W. Bush in 1991, have the potential to strengthen missile defense, and to provide protection for key intelligence and communications assets in space that are now vulnerable from ground-based attack.
The progress of the past six years stems from one tough decision. That very same decision will allow us to stay ahead of the 21st century ballistic-missile threat.
(Article, Link)
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Hackett on the X-Band Radar
November 15, 2007 :: Washington Times :: Analysis
Writing for the November 15 edition of The Washington Times, James Hackett discusses the progress made on the Sea-Based X-band radar (SBX). The SBX is designed "to detect and track ballistic missiles more effectively and provide targeting information to both ground- and sea-based interceptors. The power and precision of its beam improves the ability of the interceptor to distinguish warheads from decoys and other penetration aids." Indeed, the radar is so powerful it can "track an object the size of a baseball over the East Coast." The SBX's usual position is Adak in Alaska's Aleutian Islands, however the radar is mobile, and has moved by its own power around the Pacific for various missile tests.
Hackett also notes that, in 1998, a prototype of the X-band radar "was installed on Kwajalein Atoll in the Pacific ... as the primary fire control radar for the Pacific missile test range." It is a similar X-band radar that the U.S. is planning to locate in the Czech Republic as part of a new missile defense in Europe.
Hackett concludes by noting: "As missile and nuclear technology spread to more countries, possibly even to terrorist groups, it is in Russia's own security interest to join Europe and America in creating a common defense. And it is Congress' responsibility to approve the funds needed to base the X-band radar and interceptors in Europe." (Article, Link)
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» Missile system details for: Sea-Based X-Band Radar (SBX)
Franks: Missile Defense Should Be Top Priority
November 12, 2007 :: Defense News :: Analysis
Writing for The Hill, Congressman Trent Franks responds to the recent change of heart on the need to build a missile defense system in Eastern Europe by Congresswoman Ellen Tauscher, chair of the House Armed Services Strategic Forces subcommittee. Previously, in Washington and on a congressional trip to the Czech Republic, Tauscher had supported the missile defense system in Europe to defend against a limited missile attack from Iran. "The U.S. intelligence community's current estimate is that Iran is five to 10 years away from developing such a capability...plainly, this is a very serious threat about which we must be vigilant... A GMD system deployed in Europe could help deter a potential Iranian long-range ballistic missile threat if one emerges."
While the Strategic Forces subcommittee did cut some of the funds directed to the site, Tauscher was careful to note, "We did not say no. What we said is we have fiscal priorities...We encourage the talks to continue...we are dealing on a margin of weeks and months. Not years." She stated that once Poland and the Czech Republic ratified the agreement, the two countries could expect a receptive and cooperative Congress.
Franks was "disturbed," however, by Tauscher's subsequent and abrupt change on the issue. Writing in the November 8 edition of Defense News, Tauscher called on the U.S. Missile Defense Agency to "work harder at protecting deployed U.S. troops against current missile threats with proven technology and ‘pull-back' from science projects such as the European missile defense site."
From this Franks concludes:
I look forward to seeing the final marks for the defense authorization bill, and in particular, the language associated with the European Site. There is so much at stake here. As I have said before, missile defense is not only our last line of defense for an incoming ballistic missile, it is also our first line of defense to counter missile proliferation because it devalues these weapons as offensive military assets, which may ultimately keep nuclear technology in general out of the hands of terrorist-friendly nations. It is my hope Ms. Tauscher both substantiates her claims to support this critical defense initiative, and helps to lead our colleagues during conference to support our allies in Poland and the Czech Republic.
(Article, Link)
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