July 20, 2005 :: Department of Defense :: News
The Pentagon has released its annual report to Congress on Chinese military power, which describes China at “a strategic crossroads.” The 45-page report covers a host of topics, including Chinese military strategy and doctrine, the effects of military modernization, and an assessment of the security situation in the Taiwan Strait. “Questions remain about the basic choices China’s leaders will make as China’s power and influence grow, particularly its military power.” Of particular note is attention to such themes as China’s defense spending, strategic missile forces, the increasing number of short range missiles deployed near Taiwan, space policy, and the threat posed by a high-altitude electromagnetic pulse.
Defense Spending
China’s overall defense spending continues to grow; while the full size and composition of Chinese defense spending is said to be unknown, “Estimates put it at two to three times the officially published figures.” Equally important is that China has tied disciplined defense spending to its growing economy:
If China is able to sustain past growth rates—a challenge due to projected demographic changes, maturation of the industrial and technology base, and persistent financial inefficiencies—its economy could expand to almost $6.4 trillion by 2025. For comparison purposes, in 2025 Russia’s GDP is projected to be $1.5 trillion, Japan’s $6.3 trillion, and the U.S., $22.3 trillion. Based on past patterns, China’s defense sector will probably benefit from continued overall economic performance. …these additional monies could increase actual defense expenditures by two to three times the publicly available figure, suggesting the defense sector in China could receive up to $90.0 billion in 2005, making China the third largest defense spender in the world after the United States and Russia.
Short Range Missiles Near Taiwan
The Pentagon reports that some 650-730 mobile CSS-6 and CSS-7 short-range, conventionally-armed ballistic missiles (SRBMs), which constitute all of China’s SRBM supply, have been deployed in the direction of Taiwan. These numbers are an increase from those listed in the 2004 report. These SRBMs “are mobile and can deploy throughout the country to take up firing positions in support of a variety of regional contingencies.”
The 2005 report also revises and increases the intelligence community’s estimate of the rate at which China is deploying new SRBMs near Taiwan. The Defense Intelligence Agency puts the number of between “75 to 125” additional missiles per year. The 2004 report had estimated the annual increase of SRBMs offshore Taiwan at 75 per year. China’s SRBMs are listed as part of its “Precision Strike” capabilities which put at risk targets such as Western Pacific airbases, ports, surface combatants, land-based C4ISR (Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance), and integrated air defense systems and command facilities.
The report notes that China passed an “anti-secession law” in March 2005 “as a means to pressure the Taiwan leadership, build a legal foundation to justify a use of force, and form a rhetorical counter to the U.S. Taiwan Relations Act.”
Chinese Strategic Forces
The report discusses at length China’s nuclear deterrence capabilities:
China is qualitatively and quantitatively improving its strategic missile force. This could provide a credible, survivable nuclear deterrent and counterstrike capability. It is fielding more survivable missiles capable of targeting India, Russia, virtually all of the United States, and the Asia-Pacific theater as far south as Australia and New Zealand. Beijing maintains a small strategic arsenal. Its stated nuclear weapons doctrine remains one of “no first use.”
Its current nuclear force is twenty upgraded silo-based, liquid propellant CSS-4 Mod 2 ICBMs. Its current regional nuclear deterrent is maintained by twenty CSS-3 ICBMs. It also “supplements the aged CSS-2s with solid-propellant, road-mobile CSS-5 MRBMs.”
China’s future strategic force will include enhanced silo-based liquid fuel CSS-4 ICBMs (already deployed), solid-fuel road-mobile DF-31 missiles (operational 2005-06) and DF-31A ICBMs (operational, 2007-09), and the JL-2 submarine-launched ballistic missiles (operational, 2008-10). The DF-31-series ICBMs provide the Chinese the strategic advantage of mobility to avoid detection. They also provide for mobility of deployment to where it might be easier or better suited to launch an attack. China currently has “approximately twenty” CSS-4 missiles deployed, and the planned replacement of “the older, silo-based CSS-4 Mod 1 with the longer range CSS-4 Mod 2, coupled with the ongoing migration to mobile, solid-fueled systems will enhance the operational capabilities and survivability of China’s strategic missile force.”
Dual Purpose Air- and Missile- Defenses
Surface-to-surface missiles are part of a variety of tools from aircraft to naval forces that “provide comprehensive defense of Chinese airspace,” a reflection of the report’s claim that China’s air defense doctrine has shifted “from point defense of key military, industrial, and political targets to a new Joint Anti-Air Raid Campaign doctrine based on a modern, integrated air defense system capable of effective offensive counter-air (OCA) and defensive counter-air (DCA).” As for the systems used for such defense, the report notes that China’s inventory of surface-to-air missiles “is increasing with the acquisition of Russian-made strategic SA-10 and SA-29 systems.” Moreover,
“In August 2004, China received the final shipment from Russia of four S-300PMU-1/SA-20 surface-to-air missile (SAM) battalions. China has also agreed to purchase follow-on S-300PMU-2, the first battalion of which is expected to arrive in 2006. With an advertised intercept range of 200 km, the S-300PMU-2 provides increased lethality against tactical ballistic missiles and more effective electronic counter-counter measures.
Sea Control
China’s sea denial/anti-access strategy to defend its 9,000 mile-long coastline will utilize naval mines, submarines, cruise missiles, and special operation forces.
“China is also researching the possibility of using ballistic missiles and special operations forces to strike ships or their ashore support infrastructure. Finally, China is developing or improving counter-reconnaissance and counter-space capabilities using a range of solutions from low-tech denial and deception based on camouflage, cover and concealment, to high-tech lasers and space-tracking devices.”
China’s anti-access strategy is limited to regional waters around Taiwan, but “[i]f China were to shift to a broader “sea control” strategy, the primary indicators would include: development of an aircraft carrier, development of robust anti-submarine warfare capabilities, development of a true area anti-air warfare capability, acquisition of large numbers of nuclear attack submarines, development of effective maritime C4ISR, and increased open water training.”
As for anti-ship cruise missiles,
The PLA Navy and Naval Air Force have or are acquiring nearly a dozen varieties of ASCMs, from the 1950s-era CSS-N-2/STYX to the modern Russian-made SS-N-22/SUNBURN and SS-N-27/SIZZLER. The pace of indigenous ASCM research, development, and production—and of foreign procurement—has accelerated over the past decade. Objectives for current and future ASCMs include improving closure speed (e.g., ramjet propulsion, such as with the SS-N-22), standoff distance (e.g., longer-range assets, such as the C-802), and stealthier launch platforms (e.g., submarines). SS-N-22 missiles may be fitted on smaller platforms in the future (e.g., the Russian Molniya patrol boat, which originated as a joint effort with China, or on the new stealth fast attack patrol boat).
Space Strategy
China’s space policy “has focused on building the infrastructure to develop advanced space-based C4ISR and targeting capabilities.” While there have been no new significant developments in China’s on-going space programs, aside from reports that say they plan to send up a two-person crew on a five day mission this September, the Pentagon report emphasizes the trends in China’s space modernization efforts:
China seeks to become a world leader in space development and maintain a leading role in space launch activity. Beijing’s goal is to place a satellite into orbit “within hours upon request.” The Long March series of rockets can support that requirement as long as adequate satellites remain in reserve. With ever-better satellites, China is becoming a peer in quality to the world’s leading producers. In manned space, after the two-person mission scheduled for this fall, China hopes to conduct space walks and docking missions with a space lab by 2010, followed by a full space station by 2020.
China is also pursuing an active counterspace policy. The reports also points out that the Chinese “can currently destroy or disable satellites only by launching a ballistic missile or space-launch vehicle armed with a nuclear weapon,” but that it is pursuing a number of other anti-satellite methods. Research is being conducted to develop ground-based laser ASAT weapons, and, according to Defense Intelligence, these weapons may pose a legitimate threat to American satellites, either to destroy them, or to use lower-energy lasers to blind sensors on low-Earth orbiting satellites. “Whether Beijing has tested such a capability is unclear.”
EMP Plans
Finally, the report touches on the threat of the Nuclear Weapons/High-Altitude Electromagnetic Pulse (HEMP) Option. Chinese Army theorists are said to be “aware of the electromagnetic effects of using” the EMP option and “might consider using HEMP as an unconventional attack, believing the United States and other nations would not interpret it as a use of force and as crossing the nuclear threshold.” The Pentagon believes the Chinese could utilize HEMP to “intimidate” and probably “decapitate” the Taiwanese leadership. The report summarizes the physics behind an electromagnetic pulse:
HEMP causes a substantial change in the ionization of the upper atmosphere, including the ionosphere and magnetosphere. These effects likely would result in the degradation of important war fighting capabilities, such as key communication links, radar transmissions, and the full spectrum of electro-optic sensors. Additional effects could include severe disruptions to civil electric/power and transportation. These effects cannot easily be localized to Taiwan and would likely affect the mainland, Japan, the Philippines, and commercial shipping and air routes in the region.
(Article)» NY Times: China’s Military Geared to Deterring Taiwan, Report Says
» Text of 2004 DOD Report on Chinese Military Power
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