March 17, 2004 :: New York Times :: News
A missile defense simulation held in Washington invited a number of reporters to step into the roles of key strategic decisionmakers. In the simulation, a fictitious nation “Midland” located in the Sea of Japan—closely resembling North Korea—fires six missiles at the United States. All six are eventually intercepted, though the six American interceptors are depleted, and after one misses, the role-players were briefly faced with the need to choose between saving Anchorage and Boise, Idaho. Fortunately, the air borne laser which was part of the simulation destroyed two missiles, and disaster was averted.
The simulation should teach three clear lessons:
1). The ballistic missile threat is quite real, as an all-too believable attack from a country in the Sea of Japan should demonstrate. Missile defense is therefore clearly needed, as well as clearly possible. Arguments that it is impossible to hit a bullet with a bullet are relics of the past, and should be regarded as such.
2). The need for a layered defense. Were it not for air-borne lasers to knock out two of the missiles in their most vulnerable boost-phase, one of the missiles would have reached its target, and either Anchorage or Boise would have been destroyed.
In his description of the event, missile defense opponent Bradley Graham of the Washington Post complains that the ABL was involved in the simulation, even though the ABL will not be part of the initial deployment in 2004. And indeed, there are good reasons for this, given the ABL’s limited capability. The need for a more reliable boost-phase interceptor, ideally one which is space-based, is the more logical policy pursuit.
3). The third and most obvious lesson was the need for a greater numbers of interceptors. In the exercise, only six were available, and they were all very nearly depleted. In fact, the administration will probably deploy nine this year. Nevertheless, there is no reason to believe an attack upon the territorial US and our troops in the region would be limited to six or nine missiles.
The reporters’ relish for the tension of the simulation threatens to obscure the fact that a failure to intercept a nuclear missile would probably result in a constitutional crisis. But another problem arises which is not considered. The prospect of such a “Sophie’s choice” between one city and another is exactly the sort of nuclear blackmail which the United States, defenseless against any such attack, is susceptible to. Would a president come to terms if North Korea threatened to obliterate a major U.S. city, and had the capability to fire off more missiles than we had interceptors?
Caught up in the sensation of the exercise, both the New York Times and the Washington Post fail to note that the simulation closely follows upon a joint Russian-US missile defense exercise. The illustrated limitations no doubt pleased the Russians watching from Moscow eager for confirmation that the U.S. systems pose no threat to Russia’s still massive nuclear arsenal.
(Article)» Wash. Post description of simulation
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